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Abstract 
Since the end of the 1990s, Berlin’s housing has been described by a transformation 
from state- to market-led provision, creating more socially and spatially segregated 
neighbourhoods. The underlying processes exacerbating and reproducing these in-
equalities have however rarely been addressed. This thesis investigates the question 
how the transformation of Berlin’s mode of housing provision generated particular 
forms of social and spatial inequalities. It begins from a state-focused approach to 
regulation theory and the related debate on the contemporary form of urban govern-
ance of the entrepreneurial city. 
 
The thesis identifies three transformation processes of Berlin’s mode of housing pro-
vision, which are informed by critical realist housing research. First, the privatisation 
of state-owned housing and the entrance of institutional investors; second, the refor-
mation of the remaining state-owned housing companies and their adaptation to the 
government’s social and economic demands; and third, the abandonment of supply-
side subsidies for the construction and renovation of housing. The analysis of these 
three processes exposes how regulation, production, and consumption mechanisms 
play out under particular spatial and temporal circumstances, creating social and spa-
tial inequalities. A particular emphasis lies on the production mechanisms defined 
through the diverging strategies of different institutional investors and state-owned 
housing companies. 
 
The thesis concludes with a reflection upon the benefits of a critical realist methodol-
ogy for analysing state restructuring. It is argued that only through the application of a 
critical realist methodology, the strengths of the regulation theory’s conceptualisation 
of state transformation can fully be deployed. The thesis therefore goes beyond an 
affirmation of a more entrepreneurial mode of housing provision in Berlin, deploying 
a critical realist approach to reveal the underlying mechanisms of the particular mode 
of housing provision and its uneven consequences.  
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1 Introduction 
 
1.1 “Poor, but Sexy” – Berlin’s Urban Development 
 
In 2003, a German magazine asked the Mayor of Berlin if money is sexy. He denied 
that money was sexy and gave Berlin as the perfect example to underline his point of 
view: “We are poor, but nevertheless sexy” (Frey 2003). This became a well-known 
Berlin slogan, advertising the city as extremely cheap but nevertheless or exactly be-
cause of it attractive. It also characterises, however, fairly well how Berlin developed 
after reunification: pretty unevenly. While economically under-performing and finan-
cially broke, Berlin became a global brand characterised as the “wild cultural me-
tropolis” (Scharenberg and Bader 2009: 330). 
 
Following reunification, the decision to re-establish Berlin as Germany’s capital cre-
ated expectations that the city could become another nodal point for the European or 
global economy and attract international headquarters to compete with Paris or Lon-
don. Anticipating the transformation of Berlin (re-)gaining world city status, develop-
ers, expecting a growing demand for office and commercial space, considered the city 
as an excellent investment opportunity (Cochrane and Jonas 1999). This created, in 
the early 1990s, what Strom (2001: 7) called a “gold rush mentality”. At the same 
time, Berlin’s government invested heavily into the construction and modernisation of 
the city’s housing stock, especially in East Berlin. The government promoted the con-
struction of both new social and private housing with subsidies and tax deductions. 
Additionally, urban renewal strategies for the modernisation of Berlin’s housing stock 
were extended to the neighbourhoods of East Berlin. The growth expectations for 
Berlin, however, were exaggerated, and the city soon struggled with increasing finan-
cial difficulties due to political, economic, and demographic changes.  
 
While Berlin, both East and West, was highly subsidised during the Cold War, it lost 
its special status on the world stage that it had due to the two competing ideologies 
and therefore also lost the financial support from the national state and the occupying 
forces respectively. Furthermore, the population as well as the economy declined 
(Krätke and Borst 2000; Häußermann and Kapphan 2002).
1
 The population decline 
was partly due to an out-migration to other regions, especially to West Germany 
where more job opportunities could be found. It was, however, primarily due to an 
impressive suburbanisation process, which was only made possible through the fall of 
                                                 
 
1
 There was a short period at the beginning of the 1990s when the population increased. However be-
tween 1994 and 2004, the population declined by 2.42 percent from 3.47 million to 3.39 million resi-
dents (Amt für Statistik Berlin-Brandenburg 2010). 
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the Wall. The general demographic development and the in-migration, mostly from 
abroad, were not able to balance this out. And even though the population has been 
slightly growing in the last few years and is expected to continue to do so 
(Investitionsbank Berlin 2009: 16 et seq.), it has not returned to 1994 levels. Further-
more, it is not expected that the population will rise significantly in the near future. 
 
This development was reinforced by an economic downturn. The selling of industrial 
enterprises of the former GDR to West German and western European companies 
induced a fast de-industrialisation process in East Berlin. At the same time, West Ber-
lin’s excessively subsidised industries and outdated economic structure collapsed after 
the discontinuation of state subsidies (Heeg 1998). The de-industrialisation and trans-
formation process led to the loss of half a million industrial jobs that have been only 
partly replaced by service and creative industries (Droste and Knorr-Siedow 2007).
2
 
Even though there has been a growth of jobs in these sectors, they were not emerging 
at the anticipated pace (Krätke 2001). The demographic decline and economic down-
turn also affected Berlin’s housing market. Towards the end of the 1990s, the housing 
market was characterised as having a surplus. Berlin’s housing market suddenly faced 
high vacancy rates.
3
 This led to a drastic decline in housing construction.
4
 The demo-
graphic and economic downward spiral also increasingly affected the city’s fiscal 
revenue and budget. Berlin currently has a debt of around 60 billion Euros 
(Senatsverwaltung für Finanzen 2010c).
5
 
 
From 2005 onwards, the downturn was at least temporarily halted. Statistics point to 
an economic recovery (3 percent growth of the GDP between 2005 and 2007) and a 
small population growth of 0.6 percent between 2005 and 2007 (Amt für Statistik 
                                                 
 
2
 See Seiler (1998) for a more detailed account of the economic crisis after reunification and how the 
government tried to address it. 
3
 Vacancy rates are measured based on the use of electric metres. A dwelling is considered vacant if not 
in use for longer than six months. Between 2006 and 2008, the vacancy rate was stagnating at 5.7 per-
cent. In 2009, it decreased to 5.5 percent (Investitionsbank Berlin 2010). There is however a debate on 
the accuracy of means for measuring vacancy rates and several respondents argued that the official 
vacancy rate is overestimated because part of the vacant housing stock is no longer inhabitable. See 
also Bangert et al. (2006) and Berliner Mieterverein (2009) for a discussion on measuring vacancy 
rates in Berlin. All respondents however agreed that there are parts of Berlin’s housing market that are 
suffering relatively high vacancy rates. 
4
 While from the early until the mid-1990s, approximately 12,000 housing units were built a year, only 
approximately 3,600 housing units a year were built between 2005 and 2008. This is approximately 0.2 
percent of Berlin’s housing stock with 1.89 million dwellings (Investitionsbank Berlin 2010). Because 
the new construction is so marginal, the present research almost completely neglects the construction 
side of the housing provision and focuses on the finance, investment, management, and exchange of the 
existing housing stock.  
5
 In 2009, Berlin produced a GDP of 90.1 billion Euros (Amt für Statistik Berlin-Brandenburg 2009c). 
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Berlin-Brandenburg 2009b).
6
 Berlin has also gained new popularity, attracting 
younger residents and artists because of the comparably low living costs. Reporting 
on a recent ranking of German cities by economists, a ZEIT online article was even 
titled “Berlin owns the future” (Endres 2010, author's translation). According to the 
study
7
 quoted in the article, Berlin has all the essential features for a successful boom: 
a well educated population, an international orientation and good transport links. A 
closer look at the development within Berlin’s twelve districts shows however that not 
all districts are equally gaining from this development. Some areas, especially the 
inner districts of former East Berlin have gained in popularity and value. In contrast, 
the outer districts of the city continue to suffer from the economic transformation. 
Different studies (Häußermann and Kapphan 2002; Krätke 2004) point to the fact that 
social polarisation is no longer necessarily observable between Berlin’s eastern and 
western districts. It seems that the ‘losers’ of economic restructuring are increasingly 
the inner urban districts of West Berlin – the “traditional industrial workers’ districts” 
(Krätke 2004: 61). 
 
The short outline of Berlin’s development since reunification shows that within the 
specific historical context, Berlin’s transformation from manufacturing to service in-
dustries has been delayed. Whereas other industrialised cities have been adapting to 
global economic changes since the mid-1970s, Berlin continued to receive high subsi-
dies (Heeg 1998) and did not need to adapt until the fall of the Wall. As Latham 
(2006a: 89) puts it, “[i]t is only since the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 that normal 
history has returned to Berlin”. This raises the question to what extent does Berlin 
follow the path that other cities have been following since the end of the 1970s? How 
does Berlin reposition itself within a global context of increasing interurban competi-
tion?
8
 Are there similar patterns of increased social and spatial inequalities observable 
in other contemporary cities? How is the state regulating this uneven development?
9
 
 
                                                 
 
6
 Berlin’s economic situation in 1999 was stagnating with a GDP growth rate of 0.5 percent. In 2003, 
the GDP contracted by -0.7 percent. The economy started only to take off again in 2005 with a growth 
rate of 2.1 percent (Statistisches Landesamt Baden-Württemberg 2009). However the unemployment 
rate only started to improve in 2007 from a very high level of 17.9 percent (Amt für Statistik Berlin 
Brandenburg 2007; Statistisches Landesamt Baden-Württemberg 2009) and the purchasing power of 
16,908 Euros per person in 2008 is still below Germany’s average of 18,734 Euros (IHK Berlin 2009). 
7
 The Hamburgischen WeltWirtschaftsInstitut HWWI conducted the study (Endres 2010). 
8
 In a review essay, Brenner (2002: 641) points to this gap in the literature on Berlin. He criticises 
Krätke and Borst (2000) and Häußermann and Kapphan (2002) for not providing theoretical interpreta-
tions “of the entrepreneurial, globalisation-oriented policy reorientation that has unfolded in Berlin’s 
local state apparatus”. 
9
 While a majority of the studies on Berlin’s urban development are concerned with the immediate 
post-reunification changes (see Prokla 1998; Scharenberg 2000; DISP 2004), this thesis focuses not on 
the immediate consequences of the reunification, but on the period between 1998 and 2008 and the 
question how Berlin developed beyond the immediate impact of the reunification process. 
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1.2 Regulating Uneven Development 
 
Uneven development as the unequal geographical pattern of economic and societal 
development has long been discussed within the discipline of Geography but also 
within other social sciences.
10
 The definition of uneven development that different 
places and scales develop at different speeds would, as Smith (1982: 142) points out, 
“barely deserve mention”. However, studying the reasons for the production of a spe-
cific spatial pattern is what scholars have become interested in. Especially within 
critical geography, various approaches to account for uneven spatial patterns have 
been developed. Harvey (1982; see also Smith 1982; 1984), for example, argues that 
uneven development is a necessary condition of the capitalist system whereas capital 
moves through space seeking higher profitability, leaving behind older industrial re-
gions in favour of more dynamic and innovative ones.
11
 In contrast to Harvey’s struc-
turalist view, Massey (1984; see also Massey 2004) argues that uneven development 
is a reflection of the unequal social relations within the economic system. The in-
equality between social groups and their respective function in the production process 
is reflected in the division of labour, which is spatially manifested. This means that 
different forms of production necessarily create a differentiated spatial pattern, be-
cause conditions for profit maximisation differ depending on the mode of production. 
 
The present thesis uses as an initial approach a regulation theory that explores the role 
of the local state triggering processes of uneven development. Regulation theory 
(Aglietta 1976; Jessop 1990a) is an analytical framework that was originally applied 
to analyse the reproduction of the capitalist system during crisis periods. More recent 
generations of regulation theorists depart from the predominating economic concern, 
analysing such issues as the transformation of the state and the impact on the urban 
context. While regulation theory is a broad field that is continuously developed, this 
thesis is specifically concerned with a particular group of regulation theorists’ inter-
pretation of the local state and the uneven development of state regulation at the sub-
national level (Painter and Goodwin 1995; Peck and Tickell 1995). Integrating no-
tions from Harvey and Massey, Peck and Tickell (1995: 27, original emphasis) argue 
                                                 
 
10
 Besides the discipline of Geography, economists have studied uneven development most famously. 
The new economic geography’s understanding of uneven development is based on the Keynesian de-
velopment economists (Myrdal 1960; Hirschman 1958/1988) who explained uneven development 
through the cumulative effects of advantages (democratisation, industrialisation, dominance in trade) of 
the western world over the less developed countries. This position was in contradiction to the neo-
classical view that spatial disparities are only a result of external events like environmental disasters, 
war, or state interventions that contort market mechanisms, which would otherwise even out inequali-
ties. However, newer neo-classical studies take into account positive external factors such as knowl-
edge (see Wissen and Naumann 2008 for an overview). 
11
 See also Harvey (2006) for other explanatory approaches to uneven spatial development and Wissen 
and Naumann (2008) for an extensive discussion of the conceptualisation of uneven development 
within a Marxist tradition. 
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that “distinctive local modes of social regulation” represent different regulatory prac-
tices that lead to specific social relations. The basic argument of this strand of regula-
tion theory thus claims that due to the different regulatory practices, on different 
scales and within different places, there is an uneven spatial development. Little has 
either then or later, however, been said on processes of uneven development within a 
specific place and time. 
 
These abstract analytical categories of regulation theory mean however that more 
concrete research is needed in order to account for a specific spatial and temporal con-
text (Duncan 1981).
12
 Regulation theorists and other urban scholars have investigated 
the current regulatory processes at the urban level under the concepts of neoliberalism 
(Tickell and Peck 1995) and urban entrepreneurialism
13
 (Harvey 1989; Jessop 1997b; 
Hall and Hubbard 1998). This strand of literature argues that the urban level has 
gained importance through a restructuring of state scales since the 1970s (Brenner 
2004a). Accordingly, it is argued that the national state as a regulatory institution is 
increasingly ‘hollowed out’ (Jessop 1994a) in favour of supra- and sub-national bod-
ies of regulation. Through the advancement of technology and communication infra-
structure, and through a continuous deregulation and liberalisation by governments 
and international institutions (Castells 2000), the national state increasingly lost its 
capacity to regulate the economy within its own borders. At the same time, cities have 
come to play a strategic role in the global network of economic activities as the lo-
cation for the key industries of finance and services (Friedmann 1986; Sassen 1991; 
Knox and Taylor 1995). Thus, cities are in a competition with one another for new 
investment and industries. In order to be able to maintain or establish a competitive 
position in this contest, cities have been developing “more active entrepreneurial 
strategies” (Leitner and Sheppard 1998: 286) to generate economic growth. These 
processes are combined with an increasing dominance of a political discourse promot-
ing the free market. 
 
Urban entrepreneurialism is defined here according to Painter (1998: 261) as “a shift 
in urban politics and governance away from the management of public services and 
the provision of local welfare services towards the promotion of economic 
competitiveness, place marketing to attract inward investment and support for the 
                                                 
 
12
 See section 2.1.4 for an elaboration of this argument. 
13
 The terms entrepreneurial city or urban entrepreneurialism, which are used interchangeably, leave 
room for a lot of ambiguity. An entrepreneurial city can have different meanings, as for example, a 
place for entrepreneurial activity or a place with increasing entrepreneurialism among its residents (see 
Painter 1998 for a more complete list). It would be more useful to speak of urban governance domi-
nated by economic and market dynamics. This thesis sticks, however, to the terms of entrepreneurial 
city and urban entrepreneurialism because these have become established concepts within the urban 
studies literature (Harvey 1989; Hubbard and Hall 1996; Leitner 1990). 
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development of indigenous private sector firms”. The entrepreneurial city is thus the 
neoliberal form of urban governance. Two shifts within the regulatory processes of 
the local state characterise the entrepreneurial city. On the one hand, there is a re-
focus from policies for the provision of public services to policies oriented towards 
the development of a business-friendly city. On the other hand, there is a 
reorganisation of the institutional structure of regulation, increasingly integrating non-
governmental agencies in the formulation and implementation of urban policies 
(MacLeod et al. 2003). On a more concrete level, urban entrepreneurialism includes 
activities such as place-marketing through cultural events, property-led (re-)de-
velopment projects, and the promotion of knowledge-based industries through the 
creation of technology parks (Leitner and Sheppard 1998). In order to realise these 
state projects, governments increasingly rely on external agencies dissolving the 
boundaries between government and governance (Jessop 1997b). The local state’s 
responsibilities are reduced to the role of a partner – often the one that takes on the 
risk – and facilitator in growth coalitions (Harvey 1989). Mostly, these partnerships 
are established without public legitimisation. Therefore, citizens’ interests are often 
neglected or even overruled by the imperative to stay competitive. A consequence of 
these entrepreneurial strategies is an increasing spatial exclusion of the socially 
disadvantaged; either through processes of urban renewal, displacing local habitants 
(Marcuse 1986); or through exclusionary spaces from which the poor are ruled out 
(Katz 2001). 
 
While there is an extensive literature on the entrepreneurial city,
14
 several authors 
(Hubbard and Hall 1996; Wood 1998; Ward 2003) have pointed out that there is still 
little understanding of the implications of these processes on the social and spatial 
inequalities
15
 within cities. This is foremost due to a lack of understanding of the un-
even processes between the new forms of urban governance and the temporary out-
comes of social and spatial inequalities. Thus, questions like what is it about the en-
trepreneurial city that creates these inequalities need to be addressed. Moreover, there 
is a need to understand the processes of uneven spatial development within the do-
main of the state’s withdrawing from welfare provision. 
                                                 
 
14
 For a good overview on the different aspects of urban entrepreneurialism see Hall and Hubbard 
(1998). 
15
 Social and spatial inequality is defined here as the historically relative social and spatial outcomes of 
uneven regulation, production, and consumption processes (compare Massey 1979). 
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1.3 Research Aim and Object 
 
It is exactly this shortcoming within regulation theory and the debate on urban entre-
preneurialism that this thesis tackles. It addresses the question: How does a more en-
trepreneurial form of local governance create social and spatial inequalities. In order 
to answer this question, it is argued, one must investigate the particularities of a spe-
cific sector. This thesis, therefore, takes the re-regulation of Berlin’s housing provi-
sion as its object of study. Its aim is to analyse the processes of uneven development 
caused through the reorganisation of Berlin’s mode of housing provision. Thus, the 
thesis goes beyond the regulation theorists’ claim that different regulatory systems at 
the sub-national level lead to an uneven development between places, but identifies 
the processes of uneven development of housing provision within a specific place. 
 
The reorganisation of Berlin’s housing provision serves here as an object of study for 
three reasons. First, housing is a good indicator to study processes of uneven devel-
opment and its social and spatial inequalities. Housing is part of the built environment, 
therefore reflecting the value of different areas within a city. At the same time, the 
social status of the tenants reflects social-economic disparities within a neighbour-
hood. Second, having been strongly state-led for the last five decades, Berlin’s mode 
of housing provision has recently undergone a major transformation process, which 
analytically can be identified as a more entrepreneurial form of housing provision.
16
 
This makes it an excellent object to study Berlin’s urban development and its uneven 
consequences. Third, the current mode of housing provision has led to protests and 
violence. Burning cars throughout the city have made the news across the country in 
recent years (see, for example, Kohlenberg 2010) and a website continues to count the 
Mercedes, BMWs etc. that get burned every couple of days (Anonymous Author 
2010).
17
 The fact that inner city districts have come increasingly under pressure from 
investors has led to a battle between investors of luxurious apartments and anarchist 
groups who claim to resist gentrification processes. These anarchist groups have re-
sorted to violent means by burning cars in order to discourage investors. The gov-
ernment of Berlin seems, at the same time, rather helpless. Analysing the particular 
mode of housing provision in Berlin therefore also contributes to current political de-
bates. 
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1.3.1 Research Questions 
 
Guided by the literature on the entrepreneurial city, the first research question is thus 
How has Berlin’s mode of housing provision been reorganised? As mentioned, the 
literature on urban entrepreneurialism claims that the local state increasingly with-
draws from the provision of social services in favour of economic development poli-
cies, trying to attract investment. These state activities are implemented by govern-
ance structures whereas the state is merely facilitating and co-ordinating private actors 
who are implementing market-oriented policies. Thus, one would expect a withdrawal 
of Berlin’s government from the provision of housing. However, it is argued that 
there is more to the reorganisation of housing provision than a mere withdrawal from 
the state in favour of private capital; the state also integrates market mechanisms into 
state-led housing provision. The ‘entrepreneurialisation’ of Berlin’s housing provision 
is thus a complex process, which has intended and unintended consequences. The 
thesis explores these different dimensions of Berlin’s transformation to an entrepre-
neurial form of housing provision. 
 
The second question, introducing the concept of uneven development within a spe-
cific place, is How does Berlin’s provision of housing create processes of uneven de-
velopment? The thesis thus analyses how the processes of reorganisation play out spa-
tially. In the literature on urban entrepreneurialism, it is generally expected that the 
shift towards an entrepreneurial city cause the increasing inequalities that are assessed 
in urban areas throughout the world (Brenner and Theodore 2002). This thesis ex-
plores the connecting uneven processes between the shift towards an entrepreneurial 
city and increasing social and spatial inequalities. Importantly, the thesis goes beyond 
a confirmation of an uneven spatial outcome under the entrepreneurial city. Rather, 
through the focus on the specifics of the system of housing provision, it investigates 
the uneven development processes between the reorganisation and temporary forms of 
social and spatial inequalities. 
 
1.3.2 Research Approach 
 
In order to analyse the processes between the reorganisation of the mode of housing 
provision and the social and spatial inequalities, the thesis takes a critical realist ap-
proach. Based on this analytical specification, the thesis establishes causal relations 
between concepts of the mode of housing provision such as regulation, production, 
and consumption.
18
 Following a method of iterative abstraction, causal mechanisms 
are established through a dialogue between the abstract model and concrete observa-
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 See section 3.1 for a discussion on critical realism and the specific approach that has been applied 
within this thesis. 
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tion. This approach helps to understand the specific mechanisms of the mode of hous-
ing provision that create processes of uneven development, linking back to the ques-
tion; what is it about the entrepreneurial form of housing provision that creates un-
even spatial development? 
 
Thus, the theoretical analysis is structured around the debates discussed above (see 
chapter 2). However, in order to establish the specific model of causal relations of the 
mode of housing provision (see section 3.2), the thesis borrows from an extensive 
literature on housing.
19
 Specifically, the meta-theoretical concept of the ‘structure of 
housing provision’ (Ball and Harloe 1992; Ball 1986, 1983) and Lawson’s (2006) 
critical realist application of the structure of housing provision play an important role 
in organising the empirical research. The ‘structure of housing provision’ concept 
aims at an analysis that goes beyond “political explanation of the changes in housing 
policy” (Ball et al. 1988: 2), including not only the demand side of housing, but also 
the production side. Lawson (2006) refers more generally to the different institutional-
actor relations influencing a particular mode of housing provision. These approaches, 
therefore, provide a useful starting point to address questions of processes beyond the 
policies of the local state. They identify the specific mechanisms of housing markets 
and financial regulations that equally influence the mode of housing provision. How-
ever, the ‘structure of housing provision’ is an analytical framework that needs “to be 
founded on implicit or explicit theories” (Kemeny and Lowe 1998: 163; see also Ball 
and Harloe 1992: 13). Thus, in order not to be trapped in an empirical analysis of 
housing, the structure of housing provision in the context of this research is used to 
bridge the gap between the theoretical debates on regulation and the empirical analy-
sis of the particular mode of housing provision in Berlin. 
 
1.3.3 Literature Review of Recent Research on Berlin 
 
An analysis of the current state of the literature on Berlin shows that in the last decade, 
an increasing body of literature has tried to tackle questions regarding the city’s urban 
development. The literature can be categorised along the debate of whether Berlin has 
become an entrepreneurial city and to what extent alternative paths have been sought 
and taken. However, only few studies have focused on housing, and they have fore-
most been in the context of gentrification. 
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Towards an entrepreneurial city? 
 
Studies (Cochrane and Jonas 1999; see also Cochrane and Passmore 2001; 
Scharenberg 2000; Prokla 1998) that focus on place-making and re-imagining through 
redevelopment projects pointed to a business-friendly orientation of urban develop-
ment policies, confirming a more entrepreneurial approach to urban governance. Ana-
lysing redevelopment processes such as those of the Friedrichstrasse, Potsdamerplatz 
or the Alexanderplatz in the mid-1990s, these authors showed how Berlin tries to re-
create itself as a global city, taking on entrepreneurial policy strategies and reinforc-
ing social division (Häußermann and Kapphan 2002; Krätke and Borst 2000). Mar-
cuse (1998), referring specifically to the new buildings of the national government 
and the Potsdamerplatz, even argues that these redevelopment projects are an explicit 
demonstration of economic and political power and represent a return to authoritarian-
ism.
20
 The vision of a competitive city able to transform itself into a city for global 
finance and services remains the predominant discourse, despite the fact that all of 
these efforts have not resulted in great success (Heeg 1998). Consequences of this 
vision are increasingly repressive and exclusionary policies embedded, in a discourse 
oriented towards international competitiveness (Eick 1998; Heeg 1998).
21
 
 
Studies on the gentrification process of inner city districts in former East Berlin have 
come to a similar conclusion regarding Berlin’s transformation process. Bernt and 
Holm (2005; see also Levine 2004) studied the transformation and urban renewal pro-
cess of Prenzlauer Berg using gentrification and displacement theories. They note that 
because of rent control and the remaining of substandard housing throughout the dis-
trict, gentrification has been delayed. In their more recent account, however, Bernt 
and Holm (2009: 323) criticise how a more neoliberal policy orientation goes hand in 
hand with the acceptance of gentrification “as a ‘normal’ form or urban development” 
and is generally neglected by the political elite in Berlin (and increasingly also by 
urban scholars according to their account). Holm (2006) concludes that the aban-
donment of support programmes and a de-politisation of the urban renewal process 
has widely economised the transformation process. Thus, a transfer from public-
financed renovations towards private-financed renovation since the mid-1990s has 
diminished the influence of Berlin’s government and accelerated processes of gentri-
fication causing displacement. 
 
The transformation towards an entrepreneurial city has also been, at least partially, 
confirmed through studies analysing the institutional transformation processes within 
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the context of these redevelopment projects (Lenhart 2001; Strom 2001). Applying 
urban regime theory (Stone 1989, 2004; Stoker 1995), Strom (2001) could not find a 
typical growth oriented coalition for the development of these sites. Due to the gov-
ernment’s preoccupation with its own transformation immediately after reunification, 
Berlin’s policy-makers were not capable of forming growth coalitions. Lenhart (2001; 
see also Lenhart 1998) finds nevertheless a substantial democratic deficit in the deci-
sion-making processes for the development projects at Friedrichstrasse and Alexan-
derplatz. Due to the political re-orientation towards a globally successful city, endo-
genous interests and citizen participation processes were completely overruled. Thus, 
while the involvement of private actors might not have been as coordinated as regime 
theory would expect, and private actors might not have played as big a role as pre-
dicted in the entrepreneurial city debate, the problem of legitimisation of local politics 
has been ascertained by these authors. 
 
More recent studies (De Frantz 2006; Colomb 2007; Scharenberg and Bader 2009) on 
Berlin focus on cultural policy as a way to re-imagine Berlin. Especially the demol-
ishment of the Palast der Republik, a symbolic building of the former GDR gov-
ernment and the reconstruction of the Stadtschloss, the residence of the Prussian 
Kings on the same site, led to enormous public and political debates. Stressing the 
historical and local political context, De Frantz (2006) argues that such symbolic cul-
tural projects can serve as a mean to reposition the city within a global competition. 
At the same time, these symbolic projects also foster public debates that involve the 
formation of an alternative urban development model. 
 
Towards an alternative urban development model? 
 
Other studies (Colomb 2007; Scharenberg and Bader 2009; Bader and Scharenberg 
2010), especially on the (sub-)cultural sector in Berlin, show that there is increasing 
resistance against urban entrepreneurial strategies. Latham (2006a, 2006b) emphasises 
that Berlin is still characterised as a refuge for alternative living and therefore could 
potentially take a different path towards urban development as opposed to an entre-
preneurial one. Analysing one of the most recent development projects in Berlin, the 
‘Media Spree’, Scharenberg and Bader (2009: 331) show that a successful urban 
movement can challenge the state’s neoliberal strategies through political pressure. A 
coalition of cultural entrepreneurs and local residents managed to “turn a debate about 
urban space into political mobilization” and force a renegotiation of the development 
project. Colomb (2007: 308 et seq.) researched the public discourses surrounding the 
demolition of the ‘Palast der Republik’ and showed that there are points of resistance 
towards the “vision of a recreated Castle”, which serves the economic growth strat-
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egies of the city and “would privatize a strategic inner city site”. Local initiatives 
from artists were able to challenge, at least temporarily, the predominant discourse. 
 
This thesis thus contributes to the debate on Berlin’s urban development looking at 
the less extensively studied theme of the withdrawal from welfare provision, analys-
ing the reorganisation process of Berlin’s mode of housing provision within the last 
decade and identifying its uneven consequences. 
 
1.4 Chapter Outline 
 
As argued above, the thesis follows a method of iterative abstraction whereas causal 
mechanisms are understood through a process between a theorisation of the abstract 
model and concrete observation.
22
 However, for purposes of readability, the thesis 
follows a more traditional chapter structure cross-referencing the interaction between 
theory, method and empirical findings. 
 
Chapter 2 outlines the theoretical debate of the specific regulation theory approach 
and the debate on the entrepreneurial city within which this thesis positions itself. It 
presents the regulation theory approach concerned with the concepts of a local mode 
of social regulation and uneven development. On a more concrete level of abstraction, 
the chapter then discusses the literature on urban entrepreneurialism, identifying its 
shortcomings for the analysis of the processes between the local state’s transformation 
towards urban entrepreneurialism and the uneven spatial consequences. The chapter 
argues for a critical realist approach, focusing on the investigation of particular causal 
relations of a specific sector such as the system of housing provision. 
 
Following the theoretical discussion, chapter 3 presents the philosophical and episte-
mological basis of the thesis. It establishes the conceptual model for the empirical 
analysis of Berlin’s mode of housing provision. The model outlines, as a starting point 
for the empirical investigation, the internal causal relations of regulation, production, 
and consumption, as well as the external causal relations of time and space. The prac-
tical process of fieldwork, data collection, and data analysis are discussed in the sec-
ond part of chapter 3. 
 
The empirical part is then structured in four chapters (see Figure 1.1). Chapter 4 ana-
lyses the spatial, institutional, physical, and social evolution of Berlin’s mode of hous-
ing provision along the three most important types of housing; late 19
th
-century block 
developments; Nineteen Twenties, Thirties, and Fifties row developments; and post-
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war high-rise developments. This chapter, therefore, provides the context within 
which current regulatory changes to the mode of housing provision has to be under-
stood. By structuring the chapter along the spatial, institutional, physical and social 
differences between the three types of housing, the chapter thus raises the question 
how these characteristics play out under the particular mode of housing provision. 
 
 
 
Chapters 5 to 7 analyse three specific processes of the reorganisation of Berlin’s mode 
of housing provision and their respective causal mechanisms creating processes of 
uneven development. Chapter 5 analyses the privatisation of state-owned housing and 
the influence of institutional investment on Berlin’s housing market. Within the global 
context of financial deregulation, the selling of state-owned housing has provided 
institutional investors an opportunity to enter Berlin’s housing market. Chapter 5 in-
vestigates the strategies of two different types of investors and the consequences they 
have for the particular mode of housing provision. This chapter thus argues that it is 
not the privatisation of the state-owned housing per se, which created uneven devel-
opment, but the particular way the government managed the privatisation. Moreover, 
Figure 1.1: Structure of Empirical Chapters 
The provision of housing in Berlin: 
Spatial, institutional, physical, and social characteristics 
(Chapter 4) 
Local mode of social regulation: 
Urban entrepreneurialism 
Causal mechanisms of processes of uneven development 
 
Abandonment of 
supply-side  
housing subsidies 
(Chapter 7) 
Reformation of 
state-led housing 
(Chapter 6) 
Privatization of 
state-owned  
housing 
(Chapter 5) 
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it is the different production mechanisms of institutional investors under the state’s 
regulatory conditions, which fosters the processes of uneven development. 
 
Chapter 6 explores the reformation of the remaining state-owned housing companies. 
Facilitated through the national deregulation of non-profit housing companies, Ber-
lin’s government increasingly used state-owned housing companies for its financial 
benefit. This led to a reorientation of the state-led housing companies’ strategies with 
uneven consequences. Chapter 6 therefore analyses the processes of Berlin’s reforma-
tion of state-led housing and the strategies pursued by state-owned housing companies 
to fulfil the state’s economic and social expectations. It argues that a more entrepre-
neurial form of housing provision is not a mere withdrawal of the state, but also in-
cludes complex processes of market mechanisms within state-led housing provision. 
Chapter 6 thus challenges the dualistic distinction between private- and state-led 
housing provision. 
 
Chapter 7 investigates the specific regulatory conditions of social housing and urban 
renewal housing and the impact this has on the provision of housing structure. The 
government of Berlin decided to abandon the supply-side housing subsidies for social 
and urban renewal housing. The chapter analyses how the previously established 
agents of housing provision act under these specific regulatory conditions and argues 
that the state’s particular way of abandoning the supply-side housing subsidies re-
inforce processes of uneven development. 
 
In a concluding chapter 8, the thesis refers back to the literature on regulation theory, 
the entrepreneurial city, and uneven development and argues how a critical realist 
approach to regulation theory helps to re-conceptualise these terms. Chapter 8 thus re-
emphasises the argument that only an investigation of the particular causal relations of 
the system of housing provision allows for an understanding of the uneven processes 
resulting from a move towards urban entrepreneurialism. The chapter addresses the 
consequences of the re-conceptualisation of the entrepreneurial city contributing to 
the debate on Berlin’s urban development and ends with suggestions for future re-
search. 
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2 Uneven Development, Local Modes of Social Regulation, and the 
Entrepreneurial City 
 
The empirical research of this thesis lies at the intersection of two theoretical ap-
proaches that contribute to the understanding of uneven development and of the reor-
ganisation of the local state. Theory here is not used as a hypothetical model that is 
confirmed (or rejected) through empirical regularities. Rather, theory is understood 
here as the conceptualisation of empirical observations (see chapter 3). The process of 
conceptualisation is however not independent from previous concepts. Observation is 
therefore “theory-laden” (Sayer 1992: 83) whereas a system of concepts guides the 
empirical observation. By putting the conceptual system into a new situation, observa-
tion then either leads to the discovery of objects that have already been satisfactorily 
conceptualised or it leads to the discovery that changes the meaning of pre-existing 
concepts (Sayer 1992: 79); and some of the previous established concepts “may be 
part of the problem we are trying to escape” (Sayer 1992: 81). The aim of this chapter 
is thus to establish the concepts used around the reorganisation of the local state and 
uneven development and, via a sympathetic critique, to identify the shortcomings 
within the existing uses of the concepts (Sayer 1992: 81). 
 
The first theoretical approach the thesis interacts with, is a reading of regulation 
theory that is concerned with the role of the state and the conceptualisation of uneven 
development at different regulatory state scales (Painter and Goodwin 1995; Peck and 
Tickell 1995). This theoretical debate provides a starting point for understanding the 
relation between economy and state regulation in a capitalist system (2.1). However, 
the position adopted in this thesis is that this literature remains at a level of abstraction 
that needs further concretisation for an analysis of regulatory processes within a spe-
cific time and place. The theoretical debate on the entrepreneurial city does help here 
(Harvey 1989; Jessop 1997b). Also based on foundations of regulation theory, the 
entrepreneurial city is viewed as the current regulatory practices at the urban level 
(2.2). Integrated into the neoliberal state, the entrepreneurial city is characterised by a 
policy shift and an institutional transformation increasingly creating forms of social 
and spatial inequalities.  
 
There is however a shortcoming of the understanding between the reorganisation of 
the local state towards urban entrepreneurialism and the uneven development pro-
cesses, which trigger social and spatial inequalities (2.3). Addressing this theoretical 
shortcoming, I propose a search for the causal relations between the processes of re-
organisation within an entrepreneurial city (object) and processes of uneven spatial 
development (event) (Sayer 2000). Thus, the chapter adds a third level of abstraction: 
the particular mode of Berlin’s housing provision. I argue that through an analysis of 
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the causal mechanisms of the reorganisation of Berlin’s system of housing provision 
processes of uneven development at the local state-level can be better understood and 
in turn, feed back into the more abstract levels of the entrepreneurial city and regula-
tion theory. Table 2.1 illustrates the different levels of abstraction to clarify the ana-
lytical framework adopted in this thesis. 
 
Table 2.1: Theoretical Framework from Abstract to Concrete 
 Regulation Theory Entrepreneurial City Berlin’s Housing Provision 
Object 
Local mode of social 
regulation 
Current regulatory processes 
at the local state level 
 
Current mode of Berlin’s 
housing provision 
 
Event 
Different local modes of 
regulation create uneven 
development 
Entrepreneurial form of 
urban governance creates 
social and spatial inequali-
ties 
 
Berlin’s particular mode of 
housing provision creates 
uneven processes with the 
consequence of social and 
spatial inequalities 
 
 
 
2.1 Uneven Development and the Role of the State 
 
Compared to other approaches for explaining uneven development within critical ge-
ography (see Harvey 1982, 2006; Massey 1984, 2004), the strand of regulation theory 
used in this work focuses on the role of the state. It is therefore considered the most 
useful perspective to understand the reorganisation of Berlin’s state-led housing pro-
vision and its consequences. The following section first discusses the origins of regu-
lation theory and then presents the specific interpretation used within this thesis. 
 
2.1.1 Regulation Theory 
 
Regulation theory was developed by French scholars (Aglietta 1976; Lipietz 1977; 
Boyer 1986) in opposition to neo-classical economics and structural Marxism. Con-
trary to the neo-classical economists’ point of view that the economy is regulated 
through the market, regulation theorists integrate the economic with the extra-
economic. Thus, regulation theory analyses economic activities as socially embedded 
and regulated. The integrated relation of economic and extra-economic mechanisms 
are historically contingent. Economic development is therefore path-dependent 
(Aglietta 1978; Jessop 1997c). In opposition to structural Marxism, which is based on 
the automatic reproduction of capitalism towards its decline, regulation theorists ar-
gue that capitalism has to be regarded in stages whereas crisis play a “rejuvenating 
role” (Tickell and Peck 1995: 360; see also Jessop 1995b; 1997c). Regulation theory 
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presumes that crisis is an intrinsic character of capitalism that can be stabilised 
through distinctive regulatory institutions (Painter and Goodwin 1995). In summary, 
regulation theory brings institutions back into political economy. 
 
Two concepts of regulation theory are essential in understanding the stabilisation of 
capitalist accumulation through extra-economic institutions: The ‘regime of accumu-
lation’ and the ‘mode of regulation’. The ‘regime of accumulation’ refers to a period 
of time in which the conditions of production and consumption are balanced. The 
relatively stable convergence between the forms of production and consumption can 
however only occur through a distinctive set of social processes. These social pro-
cesses are defined as the ‘mode of regulation’ (MacLeod 1997). The ‘mode of regula-
tion’ is an ensemble of social, political, and economic institutions that help stabilise a 
regime of accumulation and therefore enable economic growth. The coupling between 
accumulation and regulation is the result of “chance discoveries” that are formed 
through social and political struggles (Lipietz 1987: 15). This ‘institutional fix’ of the 
coupling between accumulation and regulation is however only temporary and phases 
of relative stability are interrupted by periods of crises and regulatory restructuring 
(Peck and Tickell 1994). There are two opposing views regarding a particular institu-
tional fix. On the one hand, Tickell and Peck (1995) claim that a particular (e.g. post-
Fordist) mode of regulation is only found when uneven development is regulated and 
there is sustainable growth.
23
 Mayer (1994) then also sees in regulation theory’s pro-
ject the aim to test new modes of regulation against their effectiveness to balance un-
even development and create sustainable growth. On the other hand, Painter and 
Goodwin (1995; see also Goodwin and Painter 1996) criticise this search for a new 
institutional fix as both teleological and functionalist. Instead of being concerned with 
the search for a new institutional fix, regulation theory is used as a tool to analyse 
ongoing processes of regulation. There is a constantly ongoing adjustment process 
between accumulation and its stabilising regulation, and it is relatively rare to stumble 
upon a stabilising mode of regulation. This is not a reason to abandon regulation 
theory, but to refocus research from a search for a new institutional fix to revealing 
regulatory processes and mechanisms. In accordance with Painter and Goodwin 
(1995), the thesis considers regulation theory as a tool to investigate the processes and 
mechanisms of regulatory change. 
 
French regulation theorists (Aglietta 1976; Lipietz 1977; Boyer 1986) were pre-
occupied with the economic dimension of regulation. They were concerned with the 
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 Tickell and Peck (1995) oppose Jessop’s (1994b) proposition of a Schumpeterian workfare state as a 
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crises.  
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crisis of the Fordist regime of production and its corresponding mode of regulation, 
the Keynesian welfare state. The focus was on the regulation of the national economy 
(Aglietta 1976; Boyer 1986). In the past few decades, however, regulation theory has 
become more widely debated, especially within the disciplines of political economy, 
and urban and regional studies. Substantive critiques against the French school have 
evolved (MacLeod 1997) such as the neglect of the interaction of regulation at differ-
ent scales (Brenner and Glick 1991) and the underdeveloped understanding of the 
processes behind regulatory changes (Painter and Goodwin 1995). Regulation theo-
rists outside the French school have tried to address these critiques and have devel-
oped a research agenda directed towards the social dimensions of regulations. In-
corporating different theoretical approaches such as Gramscian state theory (Jessop 
1997a) or discourse analysis (Jessop 1997a), these regulation theorists are highlight-
ing issues such as the state, space, and discourse.
24
 
 
Regulation theory has been used in numerous fields of research and is continuously 
developing in exchange with other approaches, its main objective being a more insti-
tutionally grounded political economy (Peck and Tickell 1995). This thesis lies within 
later regulation theory approaches that depart from the predominating economic con-
cern, but analyse such issues as the transformation of the local state and the impact of 
a local mode of social regulation on the spatial development. Regulation theory is 
therefore used to analyse regulatory processes at the local state level, such as political 
practices, strategies, and conflicts in order to reveal the processes of uneven develop-
ment. The next two sections discuss in more detail the role of the state as the primary 
site for regulation (2.1.2) and uneven development between sub-national state levels 
caused by different local modes of social regulation (2.1.3). 
 
2.1.2 Role of the State Within Regulation 
 
The role of the state within regulation has been furthest developed through Jessop’s 
strategic-relational approach (Jessop 1990b, 2007). Based on neo-Gramscian state 
theory, the strategic-relational approach
25
 focuses on the role of the state, taking into 
account the spatial and temporal specificities of institutions. The strategic-relational 
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 Jessop, in what he calls a second phase of the strategic-relational approach, generalised the approach 
to “more general issues of structure and agency” (Jessop 2007: 38; Jessop 2005). Here however, I am 
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operandi of the state system can be understood in terms of their production in and through past political 
strategies and struggles” (Jessop 1990b: 260-2; see also Jessop 2007: 36-7). 
 28 
approach defines the state as integral, meaning as a complex relationship of political 
and social institutions. This conceptualisation of the state helps to understand uneven 
spatial development avoiding the structuralist trap (Jessop 2001; MacLeod and 
Goodwin 1999), because it emphasises the conflicts within regulatory processes and 
shows how these conflicts are resolved through the state. 
 
The strategic-relational approach therefore claims that the state has to be analysed as a 
complex construction of social relations, which are guided by strategically selective 
institutions. The state is not able to manage the economy itself and hence must in-
clude different interest groups in the governing process. The state is a “site of struggle 
and contestation among diverse forces acting in and through the state” (Park 2008: 
42). Thus, there is a conflict between different social interest groups that act through 
pre-existing institutions. The conflict is eventually resolved through a hegemonic pro-
ject supported by an accumulation strategy. The hegemonic project involves the sup-
port of strategies that “explicitly or implicitly advance the long-term interests of the 
hegemonic class (fraction) and which also privileges particular ‘economic-corporate’ 
interests” (Jessop 1990b: 208; see also Jessop 1997a). The accumulation strategy is 
thus a specific model that enables economic growth. Jessop (1990b) admits that par-
ticular interests outside of the hegemonic project are integrated, especially in the in-
terest of social cohesion. He argues however that these particular interests are cared 
for only in the short term in order to achieve longer-term goals of the hegemonic pro-
ject. Thus, an accumulation strategy is important “in generating confidence in a 
hegemonic project as well as in the provision of the aspects of its social cohesion by 
letting material benefits, such as tax reductions and state subsidies flow to the social 
base, and by providing a high-quality infrastructure for economic growth including 
funding for scientific and technical education, worker retraining and research and de-
velopment funds and centres” (Bertramsen et al. 1991: 114). 
 
In order to implement a growth model, a state strategy is thus privileging the interests 
and access of key actors in formulating economic policy interventions. Institutions are 
therefore defined by a strategic selectivity
26
 because some institutions are more effec-
tive in achieving the state strategy (Bertramsen et al. 1991). The institutions are there-
fore necessarily specific in their geography and time. As Jessop (2001: 1227) puts it: 
“the structurally inscribed strategic selectivities of institutions are always and inevi-
tably spatiotemporal and this in turn creates the space for both a geography of institu-
tions and for a recognition of institutions as being, inter alia, geographical accom-
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over others. 
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plishments”.
27
 Furthermore, this means that the institutions of the state must be ana-
lysed as the outcome of past conflicts over state strategies (Jessop 1990b; Jessop et al. 
2008), because “the present state form is […] the product of the interaction between 
past patterns of strategic selectivity and the strategies currently adopted for their trans-
formation” (MacLeod and Goodwin 1999: 517). 
 
Thus, the strategic-relational approach helps to understand how new modes of regula-
tion are established. The state is the principal site of negotiation for a new mode of 
regulation, based on hegemonic state projects and strategically selective institutions. 
The struggle for a new mode of regulation taking place through the state is, however, 
always based on past struggles. Therefore, the institutional context of the state matters 
for the negotiation of a new mode of regulation. 
 
2.1.3 Uneven Development and the Local Mode of Social Regulation 
 
Whereas early regulation approaches took space as a pre-given fact,
28
 third generation 
regulation theorists analyse the production of space, seeing space as the effect of the 
coupling between regime of accumulation and mode of regulation. Furthermore, there 
has been a shift from the analytical focus on the national state towards a more multi-
scalar analysis of regulation (Jessop 1997c). At first, the focus was on supra-national 
or sub-national scales of regulation. This new focus was related to the debate over the 
global-local relation (Swyngedouw 1992, 1997). On the one hand, the process of 
globalisation and the increasing importance of the European Union and other suprana-
tional institutions have highlighted the supranational scale. On the other hand, the 
observation that the local level regained importance in the accumulation process fos-
tered research on the local level (Scott 1988; Amin and Robins 1990). This research 
came from an interest in the uneven development at the sub-national scale and the 
question why successful regional economies such as the Silicon Valley or the third 
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 For Jones (1997: 832), the integration of geography as the outcome of different path-dependent stra-
tegic selectivities that are specific to space and time is not sufficient. He introduces the concept of 
‘spatial selectivity’ which “implies that the state has a tendency to privilege certain places within ac-
cumulation strategies, state projects, and hegemonic projects”. Thus, the institutional setting of the state 
does not only privilege the access of certain interests over others but also certain places. 
28
 Tickell and Peck (1995: 373) mention three things that early regulation theory had to say about 
space. First, the regime of accumulation and the mode of regulation vary between nation-states. Sec-
ond, the coupling must be stabilised at the level of the nation-state. And third, uneven development is 
an intrinsic characteristic of capitalism. The authors point however to the lack of a conceptualisation of 
uneven development at the sub-national and supra-national level. See also Peck and Tickell (1995). 
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Italy emerged.
29
 While these studies shed light on the reasons for specific successful 
industrial spaces, they overemphasised the agglomeration effect and missed out on the 
social mode of regulation (Tickell and Peck 1995; MacLeod 1997). 
 
Other authors’ (Peck and Tickell 1995; Jones 1997)
30
 attempts undertaken to under-
stand the uneven development at the sub-national level are more valuable because 
they analyse the interaction of different regulatory scales and the effects they have on 
each other and on the uneven spatial development. The spatial dimension of regula-
tion theory is thus addressed through an analysis of regional restructuring embedded 
in national and supra-national restructuring (Peck and Tickell 1995). In order to 
understand the social regulation of industrial districts and sub-national uneven devel-
opment, Peck and Tickell (1995: 26 et seq.; see also Goodwin et al. 1993) argue for 
an integration of concepts such as Massey’s (1984) ‘spatial division of labour’ or 
Harvey’s (1985) ‘structured coherence’. These concepts, they claim, provide a theo-
retical framework for an analysis of sub-national economic spaces as integrated enti-
ties in the wider context of global economic development. The spatial division of la-
bour reflects the social relations within the production process. Similarly, structured 
coherence depicts a particular set of social relations playing out within a specific 
place. 
 
Based upon these concepts, the local state is a necessary product of the division of 
capitalist production systems and its uneven development. Peck and Tickell (1995: 27, 
original emphasis) argue for the need to “explore the possibility that different regula-
tory functions may be sited at different spatial scales and that it may be possible to 
distinguish distinctive ‘local modes of social regulation’”. Thus, the spatial division 
of labour creates a specific spatial division of the state with local modes of regulation. 
Different scales and different places have different modes of regulation depending on 
the specific conditions of the respective place. Uneven development therefore emer-
ges due to diverging local modes of social regulation. Whereas Peck and Tickell 
(1995: 24 et seq.) argue that these local modes of regulation are the outcomes of the 
uneven development of capitalism and analyse the changing regulatory processes of 
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 Regulation theory has also been extensively used to analyse the transformation from a Fordist accu-
mulation regime to a more flexible accumulation discussing such examples as the third Italy or Silicon 
Valley (Piore and Sabel 1984; Scott 1988; Storper and Scott 1992). This has however been widely 
criticised as “unsubstantiated empirical claims” because the literature fails to analyse how this new 
regime of flexible accumulation is socially embedded and regulated (Jones 1997: 831; see also Peck 
and Tickell 1995; Tickell and Peck 1995; MacLeod 1997). Regulation theorists that have been closest 
to the original French school, have emphasised that regulation theory is a method, a framework for the 
analysis of institutional transformation over space and time, and does not rest on the durability of post-
Fordist models. In accordance with Jones (1997: 831; see also Peck and Tickell 1995), this research 
sees regulation theory as an ongoing research “whose strength rests on accounting for the operation and 
unevenly developed fabric of capitalism”. 
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 See also Tickell and Peck (1992, 1995) and Chorianopoulos (2008). 
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the national state affecting the local level, other authors (Duncan and Goodwin 1988: 
41; see also Goodwin et al. 1993) attribute a stronger autonomy to the local state. In 
these accounts, the sub-national levels contribute to the differentiation of local modes 
of social regulation, and therefore to uneven development because of the local level’s 
interpretative and representational roles. The local state transforms upper state level’s 
strategies by interpreting them in a specific way. “These local spaces of regulation 
arise not only because of the uneven development of capitalist societies, but also be-
cause local agencies are often the very medium through which regulatory practices are 
interpreted and ultimately delivered” (Goodwin et al. 1993: 67). The interpretation of 
regulatory practices also depends on the local state’s representational role, whereby 
the local state gives locally constituted groups that otherwise might be marginalised, 
access to state power (Duncan and Goodwin 1988: 41). Thus, the local government is 
seen as a possible agent to challenge the upper-level governments’ hegemonic project. 
 
Within this strand of regulation theory, uneven development is no longer seen as the 
mere effect of macro-economic transformation processes, from Fordist regimes of 
accumulation towards flexible accumulation, for example. Moreover, these regulation 
theorists (Duncan and Goodwin 1988; Goodwin et al. 1993)
31
 approach uneven de-
velopment at the local scale as the effect of a restructuring that is also orchestrated 
through local institutions that act as regulatory agents. Uneven development at the 
sub-national level is therefore understood as the outcome of a sub-national coupling 
between a regime of accumulation and a local mode of social regulation. A local 
mode of social regulation is, however, not exclusively based on local regulatory prac-
tices. It is also characterised through the integration within national and global regula-
tory processes that are partly, but not exclusively, structured through local systems. 
The existence of local modes of social regulation then has two implications. First, the 
regulation is spatially unevenly developed at different scales, but also between differ-
ent places. Second, local modes of social regulation result from an uneven develop-
ment but also contribute to it. Local modes of regulation are a result of uneven spatial 
development, but reinforce it at the same time, because they can filter upper-level 
regulations in different ways. 
 
                                                 
 
31
 Duncan and Goodwin (1988) have written about the local scale as the result of national uneven de-
velopment and as an agent for reinforcing uneven development. 
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2.1.4 From Abstract to Concrete 
 
Based on this strand of regulation theory, three aspects are crucial for the particular 
theoretical model that this thesis is founded upon. First, social regulation helps to re-
produce capital accumulation. Therefore, there is a continuous struggle between the 
crisis tendency of capital accumulation and a form of social regulation that is capable 
of stabilising capital accumulation and enabling economic growth. Second, the strug-
gle for new forms of social regulation takes place through a complex relationship of 
political and social institutions, which is defined as the state. The state, however, is 
based on previous struggles. Therefore, the historical institutional context of a specific 
mode of social regulation matters. Third, there are different social regulations within 
different places and scales, which leads to uneven development. However, uneven 
development also reproduces different local modes of social regulation. Thus, the 
historical spatial context of each locality equally matters. 
 
In order to apply the above discussed concepts of regulation theory to a “specific his-
torical process” (Duncan 1981: 231), there is however a need for more concrete con-
cepts theorising current regulatory processes of the local state. The notion of local 
modes of social regulation that are represented through state strategies is not sufficient 
enough to understand specific processes of state intervention. As Duncan (1981: 235) 
points out: “[A]bstract analysis informs concrete research. But this explanation of 
actual state intervention can only be made to the extent that such a connection exists 
in itself, nothing can be deduced from such abstraction about the form, extent and 
nature of state intervention in any one society.” Thus, there is a need for intermediate 
concepts that link the general categories of local mode of social regulation and uneven 
development to “specific historical relations of urban change” (Duncan 1981: 249). 
 
Even though the historical relations of urban change can eventually be understood 
within the regulationist theory of capital accumulation, urban change at a given time 
depends on specific processes. Thus, in order to analyse the specific historical change 
of the reorganisation of Berlin’s state-led housing provision and its regulatory and 
spatial consequences within the last decade, there is a need for intermediary concepts 
which refer to the current regulatory processes at the urban level. These intermediary 
concepts are drawn from the theoretical debate on the entrepreneurial city. 
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2.2 The Entrepreneurial City 
 
Continuing from a regulationist perspective, the current historical-specific form of 
regulatory processes at the local state level is referred to as the entrepreneurial city or 
urban entrepreneurialism.
32
 Scholars define urban entrepreneurialism in contrast to the 
pre-existing mode of urban managerialism (Harvey 1989; MacLeod 2002). Within the 
post-war Fordist-Keynesian system, the managerialist mode was concerned with “ex-
tending the provision of public services and decommodified components of welfare” 
(MacLeod 2002: 604) based on the national state’s politics of redistribution. The oil 
shock in 1973, followed by a global recession, however, triggered a crisis of the Ford-
ist-Keynesian coupling of accumulation and regulation. This transformed the global 
economy and the national welfare state (Lipietz 1994). With the breakdown of the 
Bretton Woods institutions that regulated the global financial flows and increasing 
financial deregulation (Smith 2002), national states were no longer able to protect 
their national economies. As a consequence, manufacturing industries relocated to 
countries with lower production costs (Dicken 2007). At the same time, major manu-
facturing regions in the US and Europe faced rapid decline (Beauregard 1993; Power 
and Mumford 1999).  
 
While at the beginning of the 1970s, national states tried to adhere to their Keynesian 
state model grounded in redistributive regional policies, they increasingly faced fi-
nancial difficulties. This led to a reorganisation of the Keynesian welfare state that 
dismantled the “entrenched managerial-welfarist framework of urban governance that 
had previously prevailed” (Brenner 2004b: 465). Within this reorganisation, national 
governments abandoned their redistributional policies and local governments were 
forced to adjust to this new fiscal austerity environment. Local governments sought 
new sources of income through economic development policies and entrepreneurial 
strategies. The entrepreneurial mode, in contrast to the managerialist mode, is thus 
“concerned with reviving the competitive position of urban economies” with the con-
sequence of a “recommodification of social and economic life” (MacLeod 2002: 604). 
 
Three processes characterise the entrepreneurial city. First, the entrepreneurial city 
has to be viewed within the context of cities’ newly gained importance as motors of 
the national and global economy. Second, the entrepreneurial city shifts the priorities 
from the provision of welfare to the preoccupation with economic growth oriented 
policies. Third, the entrepreneurial city is characterised by an institutional transforma-
tion through a reorganisation of local governments towards new forms of governance, 
including non-state actors in policy formulation and implementation. These transfor-
                                                 
 
32
 The regulatory processes at the urban level is defined here not solely through the city government’s 
actions, but includes supra-national, national, and local state actions affecting the urban level.  
 34 
mation processes toward an entrepreneurial city go hand in hand with increasing in-
equality whereby large parts of the population are socially and spatially excluded. 
These processes are presented in more detail in the following sections. 
 
2.2.1 Increasing Importance of Cities 
 
Within the regulation approach, several authors have argued that the transformation of 
the Fordist-Keynesian system from the 1970s onwards has been accompanied by an 
institutional restructuring of the state in order to re-regulate the regime of accumula-
tion (Jessop 1997b; Swyngedouw 1997; Brenner 1998, 2004a; Marston 2000). The 
restructuring of capitalism gives rise to a reorganisation and re-territorialisation of the 
state. Global economic processes such as the restructuring of production, the global 
deregulation of finance and trade, and advancements in technology and communica-
tion (Jones and MacLeod 1999) have undermined the national state’s capacity to regu-
late and stabilise economic growth. Traditional production processes have been trans-
formed and with it the importance of different places, scales and territory. Thus, the 
restructuring of capitalism during the Fordist crisis led to a reconfiguration of the 
regulatory capacities of the state: the national level lost some of its capacities down-
wards to the sub-national and upwards to the supra-national institutional level 
(Brenner 2004b). Within this transformation to a glocalised world (Swyngedouw 
1992) the local, and especially the urban level, became more and more important in 
securing the local as well as the national economy. 
 
Whereas earlier accounts of this process attributed the re-territorialisation of state 
responsibilities to global economic forces (Brenner 1998, 1999), later accounts inte-
grate the role of the state as an agent in the re-scaling process. Jones and MacLeod 
(1999), for example, emphasise the role that the national state continues to play within 
this re-territorialisation. They argue that the national state continues to facilitate and 
promote regional and urban economic development. They promote an analysis that 
integrates the relationship of a state strategy with scalar governing capacities. Thus, 
the hollowing out of the national state is not just a simple down- and up-scaling, but 
rather a multidimensional process that depends on a specific state strategy. Similarly, 
Goodwin (2001), quoting Jessop (1995a), argues that even if economic forces have a 
direct influence on changes within urban politics, an analysis is needed of how these 
economic forces are translated into state strategies and how they are mediated and 
implemented through the state’s strategically selective institutions. And Meyer (1995: 
234-235) points to the fact that “most countries’ central state (as well as EU) pro-
grammes have been put into place that encourage (in more or less coercive fashion) 
the emergence at the local / regional level of such developmental concepts and of the 
necessary institutional structures, often by tying their subsidies to the condition that 
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the locality reach a consensus about the forms of cooperation among all the relevant 
actors”. Thus, the national state fosters economic development policies through spe-
cific forms of market-oriented policy-making and subsidisation. 
 
The transformation of the national state thus increases the competitiveness of cities. 
This growing inter-urban competition leads to a ‘race to the bottom’ (Peck and Tickell 
1994: 281), whereas the same discursively constituted process that has led to market-
oriented strategies at the national level is reproduced at the local level (Gordon 1999; 
Lever and Turok 1999; Peck 2002). Local regulatory and institutional change increas-
ingly facilitates the access of private actors in order to secure foreign investment and 
increase local fiscal revenue. Cities enter into competition with one another and adopt 
entrepreneurial forms in order to establish themselves as “strategic nodal points 
within global and European financial networks” (Brenner 2004b: 469). This urban 
entrepreneurialism is characterised by specific state-projects and the reorganisation of 
the institutional setting of the local state. On the one hand, there has been a policy 
shift from welfare towards economic development oriented policies. On the other 
hand, there has been a parallel process of institutional transformation accompanied by 
new urban policy priorities. 
 
2.2.2 From Welfare to Economic Development 
 
There has been a shift from social welfare policies (i.e. education, health, housing) 
oriented towards improvement of citizens’ well-being towards a preoccupation with 
policies focusing on economic growth (Harvey 1989; Meyer 1995; Hubbard and Hall 
1996). The argument is that cities can better benefit from attracting financial capital 
and the mobilisation of the local economy than from provisions through the conven-
tional welfare state (Hubbard and Hall 1996). This means urban decision-makers be-
come more aware of “highly mobilized capital” and the necessity for their city to re-
main competitive in such a globalised world (Hubbard and Hall 1996: 159). As such, 
political decisions are based on the criteria of economic competitiveness. And state 
subsidies are aimed at industries that promise innovation and economic growth. 
 
These growth oriented policies include the construction of large-scale development 
projects (Swyngedouw et al. 2002);
33
 the promotion of innovation (Porter 1998) and 
creative clusters (Florida 2003; Lee et al. 2004); the use of festive time strategies 
(Hughes 1999; Quinn 2005); or gentrification strategies (Smith 2002). These redevel-
opment policies are often linked to property speculation and fiscal incentives to 
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 Examples of these are the Guggenheim Museum in Bilbao (Gómez 1998), or the South Bank rede-
velopment in London (Baeten 2000). 
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“guide the place and pace of the speculative activity” (Weber 2002: 537; see also 
Leitner 1990). Thus, local states are actively preparing the extraction of value by in-
vestors in order to facilitate capital accumulation. The entrepreneurial city promotes 
itself “in the global economy” (Meyer 1995: 234) using various means such as cul-
tural and sport events. It tries to do two things: It seeks space to promote “market-
oriented economic growth” and it creates places for “elite consumption practices” 
(Brenner and Theodore 2002: 368). 
 
While promoting economic development policies, the entrepreneurial state is disman-
tling social welfare provision. This means that the local state withdraws from state 
support towards redistributional policies (Brenner and Theodore 2002), or applies 
market-oriented processes to these policy areas. Thus, the remaining domains of tradi-
tional welfare provision are deregulated, privatised and re-commodified (Jessop 
1994a). The traditional responsibility of the local state to provide collective consump-
tion goods has been abandoned (Meyer 1995; see also Jessop 2002) or integrated into 
the search for economic growth. Rather than continuing to support “allegedly unsus-
tainable welfare expenditures”, the state wants to create “enterprising subjects” 
(Jessop 2002: 459). This state strategy is embedded in new forms of institutional ar-
rangements promoting these growth oriented interests. 
 
2.2.3 From Government to Governance 
 
In order to effectively achieve a business friendly environment, new institutional 
forms are needed to support the state strategy (Meyer 1995; Hubbard and Hall 1996; 
Jessop 2002). There is an increasing involvement of private agencies in the formula-
tion and implementation of state policies. Specifically, economic development poli-
cies are shaped by public-private-partnerships involving business elites (Swyngedouw 
2000). Thus, within “various policy fields where the local state used to be the exclu-
sive service provider, non-governmental agencies have been upgraded or private mar-
kets have emerged” (Meyer 1995: 235). Government institutions are either abolished 
and left to market mechanisms, and public services such as policing are privatised 
leading to “a socially highly exclusive form of protection” (Swyngedouw 2000: 69). 
 
This “market imperative” (Swyngedouw 2000: 69) leads to a “structural increase in 
the power of capital” that is no longer constrained through state regulation (Coleman 
et al. 2005: 2519, original emphasis). Without regulation, profit maximisation can be 
pursued untamed potentially leading to the exploitation of consumers and workers 
(Coleman et al. 2005). The market imperative also replaces democratic legitimacy. 
Political and business elites exclude the public from the decision-making process ar-
guing that growth oriented strategies are necessary in order to remain regionally and 
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internationally competitive (Swyngedouw et al. 2002). Additionally, non-
governmental agencies often compete for contracts and a multiplicity of private actors 
is getting involved in policy implementation. This leads, on the one hand, to de-
politicisation and reduced transparency in policy implementation (Holm 2006: 316). 
On the other hand, economically powerful actors are privileged (strategically selec-
ted), because they are considered as the only ones capable to foster economic growth. 
These local non-elected agencies that are mandated to provide more efficient policy 
outcomes lack democratic legitimacy and are not accountable to the people (Tickell 
and Peck 1996). This creates a crisis of democratic participation. Without any gov-
ernmental management, these agencies work outside of the public realm.  
 
2.2.4 Social Inequality 
 
Little has been said so far on the consequences of urban entrepreneurialism on the 
socio-spatial development. The restructuring of the economy combined with the dis-
mantling of the welfare state has left large parts of the population unemployed and 
poor (Katz 2001; Rodriguez et al. 2001; MacLeod 2002). Through entrepreneurial 
state strategies, this stratum of the population is increasingly socially, but also spa-
tially excluded. Harvey (1989) defines these entrepreneurial policies as a state strat-
egy that is concerned with place rather than territory, because redevelopment projects 
are often targeted at “tourists and place-mobile capitalists” (MacLeod 2002: 605), but 
not planned for the urban citizenry. There are two forms of such exclusionary spaces. 
 
Spaces become more exclusionary through strategies of gentrification (Smith 1982, 
1996). Cycles of devalorisation of capital invested in the built environment followed 
by cycles of revalorisation through new investment create an uneven urban structure. 
These processes are often accompanied by “transitions in the tenure arrangements, 
occupancy, and physical condition of properties in a neighbourhood” (Smith 1982: 
147). This upgrading of neighbourhoods is increasingly within the purview of public-
private-partnerships, and the capital invested is increasingly global (Smith 2002). In-
vestments in former derelict neighbourhoods and an increase in land use values create 
different forms of displacement. Marcuse (1986) distinguishes these forms of dis-
placement as direct displacement, exclusionary displacement, and displacement pres-
sure. Direct displacement is defined as forced displacement due to physical reasons 
such as lack of maintenance, or economical reasons like increasing rent levels. In con-
trast to direct displacement, exclusionary displacement prevents specific households 
to move into an area for economic reasons. Displacement pressure is defined as the 
impact on a household due to a dramatically changing neighbourhood. For example, 
when stores go out of business, the social network is lost or facility structures change 
(Marcuse 1986). 
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Spaces become however also more exclusionary through new forms of social control. 
Places that are “seemingly public but actually private spaces” (Sibley 1995: xi) like 
gated communities, shopping malls, or redeveloped public plazas are ridden from 
undesirables like the homeless, often through private security firms. There is thus a 
combination of specific securitised architecture, legal measures, and ‘zero tolerance’ 
policing that regulates the use of space (Smith 1996; MacLeod 2002). “Concerned 
with […] making urban centres attractive to both footloose capital and to the foot-
loose middle classes, politicians and managers of the new economy in the late 1980s 
and early 1990s have turned to what could be called ‘the annihilation of space by law.’ 
That is, they have turned to a legal remedy that seeks to cleanse the streets of those 
left behind by globalisation and other secular changes in the economy by simply eras-
ing the spaces in which they must live” (Mitchell 1997: 304). Thus, while there has 
been a rolling-back of the welfare state, there has also been a rolling-out of the state 
via new forms of punitive regulation of the poor and the socially excluded (Wacquant 
2000; Peck 2003). 
 
2.3 The Entrepreneurial City, Uneven Development, and Housing Provision 
 
Summarising the theoretical debate on the current historical regulatory processes at 
the urban level, four main features can be attributed to the entrepreneurial city (see 
Figure 2.1): The priority of growth oriented economic development policies; the 
withdrawal and re-commodification of welfare provision; the inclusion of private ac-
tors in policy formulation and implementation; and new forms of social control and 
punitive regulations. The entrepreneurial city debate also analyses the consequences 
of these characteristics, notably the different forms of social exclusion and the in-
creasing socio-spatial inequality. These characteristics of the entrepreneurial city, 
especially economic development policies facilitated through public-private-
partnerships, as well as the outcome of increasing inequality, are well analysed. How-
ever, there is a missing link between the different features of the entrepreneurial city 
and what it is about them that create socio-spatial inequality. Both, regulation theory 
and the entrepreneurial city literature disregard the uneven causal mechanisms be-
tween regulatory and institutional changes and the outcome of socio-spatial inequality. 
Thus, the theoretical debate around the social mode of regulation and the entrepreneu-
rial city has left us with questions about how do the withdrawal and re-
commodification from welfare provision lead to socio-spatial inequality? What are the 
causal processes behind the re-commodification of welfare provision that create un-
even development at the urban level?  
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By disregarding the links between institutional change and socio-spatial outcome, the 
theory risks neglecting the multi-dimensionality of the entrepreneurial city processes 
and therefore the concept itself. Thus, the model is one-dimensional and does not ac-
count for different forms of urban entrepreneurialism or different strategy outcomes. 
The model of urban entrepreneurialism therefore underestimates the spatio-
temporality and the various forms of urban entrepreneurialism that exist within a spe-
cific context (Sayer 2004). Within urban entrepreneurialism, there are multiple regula-
tory dimensions with intended and unintended consequences (Painter and Goodwin 
1995). Depending on the institutional and spatial-temporal context, there might be 
constraints to the entrepreneurial strategy of the state. By disregarding these multiple 
dimensions, the intended and unintended consequences, the conceptualisation of the 
entrepreneurial city creates a black box whereas all the constraints and opportunities 
of the entrepreneurial strategies are hidden and remain unexplained (see Figure 2.1). 
The theory thus is not able to provide an adequate model for explaining concrete pro-
cesses of uneven development. 
 
Research therefore needs to avoid what Sayer (2004: 30) calls the “reduction of the 
concrete to the abstract or a fetishisation of certain transient and contingent social 
forms as the only possible results of capitalist development, with a consequent under-
estimation of the variety of forms that the latter can take”. There is a “need to move 
beyond ‘thick descriptions’ of state restructuring, policy reforms and new forms of 
governance to ask what it is that the state is actually doing – why, where and with 
Figure 2.1: The Entrepreneurial City 
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what political, social and economic implications” (Peck 2003: 222, original emphasis). 
Hence, there is a need to look at the spatial and temporal specifics, but also, and more 
importantly, at a particular domain of urban governance, such as the withdrawal and 
re-commodification of welfare provision, and more specifically the transformation 
towards a more entrepreneurial form of housing provision. 
 
Scholars of the entrepreneurial city have rarely focused on particular policy domains 
to investigate the transformation process and its consequences. In the cases where 
they did investigate a specific area of urban governance, they focused on economic 
growth oriented strategies, such as large-scale redevelopment projects. Much less, if 
any at all, has been said on the withdrawal from welfare services, and more specifi-
cally on the transformation of housing provision. There is however a considerable 
amount of housing research (see, for example, Lundqvist 1992; Whitehead 1993; 
Harloe 1995; Aalbers and Holm 2008), which investigates the transformation of hous-
ing provision during the last decades. The three processes that characterise the entre-
preneurial city – re-scaling, prioritisation of economic growth over social welfare, and 
institutional restructuring – are confirmed by housing researchers. The following sec-
tion briefly summarises the main arguments confirming an entrepreneurial turn within 
the governance of housing provision. 
 
2.3.1 Housing Provision within the Entrepreneurial City 
 
Since the 1980s, state responsibilities in the domain of housing provision have con-
tinuously been shifted. On the one hand, there has been a shift of state competencies 
towards the European Union, even though they are not as significant for the provision 
of housing as for other policy domains.
34
 On the other hand, and this is more signifi-
cant, there has been a devolution of competencies from the national level to the re-
gional and local state levels. Thus, housing development is increasingly organised 
based on the principle of  “local solutions to local problems” (Kleinman 1996: 8, 
original emphasis). 
 
At the urban level, a more entrepreneurial form of housing provision manifests itself 
in two ways. First, the withdrawal from social welfare is confirmed through a shift 
from state-led provision of housing for the masses to a drastically reduced form of 
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 The European Union has no direct competence in the provision of housing. However, it influences 
the provision of housing through directives that exist in other domains such as banking or construction. 
Furthermore, through its regional policy and the structural funds, the European Union also, even 
though indirectly, subsidises the provision of housing. See Blöcker and Hieber (2003), Ghékiere 
(1992), and Rudolph-Cleff (1996) for a detailed analysis of the influence of the European Union on the 
provision of housing within its member states. For an analysis of the specific influence of the European 
Monetary Union on housing provision in Europe, see Priemus and Dieleman (1999). 
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state intervention, which targets low income households (Harloe 1995). The gov-
ernment withdraws from the provision of social housing through changes in the fi-
nance system – from public loans to private loans – leading to a more competitive 
finance system. Moreover, the government privatises the social housing stock and 
promotes home ownership, reduces supply-side subsidies in favour of housing allow-
ance, and deregulates rents (see, for example, Priemus and Dieleman 1999; Turner 
and Whitehead 2002; Aalbers and Holm 2008). 
 
The second way urban entrepreneurialism manifests itself is closely connected to the 
first way. The privatisation of housing markets provides “the platform on which large-
scale multifaceted urban regeneration plans […] are established” (Smith 2002: 438). 
In the 1960s, gentrification was a marginal phenomenon characterised through the 
movement of middle class households into low income areas. This was often accom-
panied by the exploitation of a rent gap (Smith 1996), whereas landlords bought dere-
lict housing in low income areas cheaply, modernised it and rented it at inflated rates. 
This movement was however mostly independent from the public housing sector 
(Smith 2002). Since the end of the 1990s, governments have however increasingly 
started to promote “market-led gentrification as an instrument of both urban regenera-
tion and social and economic policy” (Lees 2003: 572). Through partnerships between 
the local states in charge of planning and private capital, cities increasingly use gentri-
fication as a means to improve their position in the interurban competition (Smith 
2002). 
 
While the housing literature provides the specificities, which are under-researched in 
the entrepreneurial city literature, it is most often concerned with explaining a particu-
lar form of housing provision. A gap, however, remains in understanding the causal 
relations between a particular form of housing provision – in this case a more entre-
preneurial form – and the socio-spatial inequalities this creates. Thus, to iterate my 
argument: The entrepreneurial city debate is unable to explain the causal links be-
tween the transformation of urban governance and uneven development because it is 
prone to generalisation and neglects to look at the specific processes. In contrast, the 
housing literature is too focused on explaining a particular mode of housing provision 
or housing policy and does not go beyond the specificities of housing. Using a realist 
approach, this thesis aims to find a middle way in order to understand the causal rela-
tions between the transformation of urban governance and uneven development. 
While using the provision of housing as an example of a particular sector, the thesis 
aims foremost to contribute to the debate on regulation theory, the entrepreneurial city, 
and uneven development. 
 
 42 
2.3.2 Processes of Uneven Development: A Realist Approach 
 
In order to understand uneven development within a specific place, research needs to 
address the causal mechanisms and necessary relations of regulatory processes (Sayer 
2004). Moreover, research needs to investigate real processes, such as the specifics of 
housing provision. Only then, can the concept of uneven development move away 
from a mere reflection on different outcomes through different modes of social regu-
lation in different places, territories or scales (Brenner 2009; Jessop et al. 2008). Un-
even development is then no longer the mere outcome of regulatory differences, but is 
part of the process itself (see Pratt 1994). In order to move away from the mere con-
firmation of the transformation toward an entrepreneurial city and an uneven outcome, 
the thesis takes a realist approach (see chapter 3).  
 
The realist approach emphasises the causal mechanisms between objects (transforma-
tion towards an entrepreneurial city) and events (processes of uneven development). 
Thus, through a method of abstraction between contingent and necessary relations of 
an object, “reasons which cause actors to act as they do” are identified (Sayer 2004: 
41). The critical realist approach reflects a “greater appreciation of the multifaceted 
nature of the empirical world than do middle-range theory and grounded theory, 
which tend to restrict themselves to one or two of these levels or dimensions” (Layder 
1993: 7). At the same time, the realist approach offers a “model of society, which in-
cludes macro (structural, institutional) phenomena as well as the more micro phenom-
ena of interaction and behaviour” (Layder 1993: 7). This enables an understanding of 
how the behaviour of particular actors creates, under specific structural influences, 
processes of uneven development. It also allows a sensitive perception to the geo-
graphical and historical specificities involved in social processes. 
 
The aim is to analyse the specific causal mechanisms of urban entrepreneurialism 
creating uneven processes. The thesis objects to a reconfirmation of general processes, 
which hide the causal relations of the transformation of urban governance and its un-
even consequences. This requires investigating not only the specificities of time and 
place, but also the real processes of a particular sector: in this case housing. Looking 
at the reorganisation of Berlin’s mode of housing provision, the focus lies on the en-
trepreneurial city’s withdrawal from and re-commodification of the welfare provision. 
By explaining the mechanisms hidden in the black box (see Figure 2.1), the thesis 
eventually contributes to a re-conceptualisation of the entrepreneurial city by bringing 
out its multidimensionality. 
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Conclusion 
 
This chapter first drew on the concept of local modes of social regulation in order to 
understand the relation between the local state and uneven development. Local modes 
of social regulation are negotiated through the state, defined as a complex form of 
social relations guided through specific institutions. The state institutions are, how-
ever, always based on previously negotiated modes of social regulation. The historical 
institutional context is therefore essential to understand current regulatory processes. 
Local modes of social regulation are furthermore always integrated within wider regu-
latory processes at different scales and within different places. This leads to an uneven 
development between scales and places which then reproduces specific modes of 
social regulation. Thus, for an analysis of current processes of uneven development, 
understanding the historical spatial context is of great relevance. 
 
In order to apply these abstract concepts within a specific historical and spatial con-
text, the thesis calls on the middle-range concept of the entrepreneurial city. This is 
useful in order to understand the reorganisation of the local state within the specific 
context of economic globalisation. It describes the current local mode of regulation 
based on entrepreneurial state strategies of promoting economic development and 
withdrawing from the provision of welfare. This state strategy is achieved through 
institutional change giving greater emphasis on private agents in policy formulation 
and implementation and new forms of social control and punitive regulations. The 
consequences of entrepreneurial state strategies are various forms of social exclusion 
and socio-spatial inequality. 
 
The approaches, on the more abstract level of regulation theory but also on the mid-
dle-range level of the entrepreneurial city debate, miss however the links between 
regulatory and institutional changes at the local state level and socio-spatial inequality. 
By disregarding these links, the theoretical model does not account for multi-
dimensional processes of the entrepreneurial city. The thesis addresses these missing 
links by analysing the causal mechanisms of the reorganisation of a particular domain 
of the local state. By looking at the reorganisation of Berlin’s mode of housing provi-
sion, the thesis analyses the causal mechanisms between the regulatory and institu-
tional changes and its uneven consequences. 
 
In order to analyse the causal mechanisms, the thesis turns towards a critical realist 
approach. Chapter 3 discusses the critical realist philosophy and its methodological 
approach. By identifying the key concepts of regulation, production, and consumption, 
and their relation within the provision of housing structure, chapter 3 outlines a model 
for analysing the particular mode of housing provision in Berlin and its causal mecha-
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nisms creating processes of uneven development. Chapter 3 further provides an ac-
count of the fieldwork and data collection process. 
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3 A Critical Realist Methodology 
 
Chapter 2 proposed a critical realist perspective in order to analyse the question of 
what is it about the entrepreneurial city and its withdrawal from social welfare, such 
as housing, that creates processes of uneven development. The aim of this chapter is 
to introduce critical realism and a method of iterative abstraction that links the theo-
retical conceptualisation with empirical research (3.1). The chapter provides a “hypo-
thetical conceptual model” (Lawson et al. 2009: 4) to analyse the particular mode of 
housing provision in Berlin. It proposes to research the contingently emerging rela-
tions of regulation, production, and consumption within their spatial and temporal 
context (Lawson 2006) (3.2). 
 
Having introduced the theoretical model for analysing the structure of housing provi-
sion, the second part of the chapter describes the practical aspects of the research pro-
ject. This part is divided into three steps: First, it is argued why a case study approach 
has been chosen (3.3) – the theoretically guided case selection is outlined and each 
case is shortly described; second, the fieldwork process is presented (3.4) – the main 
data source was in the form of semi-structured interviews with key informants, which 
has been triangulated with an in-depth document analysis and the participation in 
symposia on housing in Berlin; and third, the method of analysis of the collected data 
is discussed (3.5). 
 
3.1 Critical Realism 
 
Critical realism is a version of realist philosophy proposed by Bhaskar (1979) for the 
social sciences. In rejection of the positivist view as well as the constructivist view, 
critical realists believe in a world that is independent from our knowledge of it. Thus, 
while the theory, meaning our knowledge of a certain phenomenon, is likely to 
change over time, the phenomenon itself does not necessarily change (Sayer 2000: 
11). 
 
Critical realists do not try to find regularities, because causality is not based on the 
number of times something happens. Rather, causality is understood as the necessary 
and possible conditions of a causal mechanism to create a certain event, such as the 
processes of uneven development. “The conventional impulse to prove causation by 
gathering data on regularities, repeated occurrences, is therefore misguided: at best 
these might suggest where to look for candidates of causal mechanisms” (Sayer 2000: 
14). Thus, “identifying causal mechanisms and how they work, and discovering if 
they have been activated and under what conditions” creates explanations (Sayer 2000: 
14). The same event can be produced through different causal mechanisms and the 
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same causal mechanisms can produce different events. “[U]nintended consequences 
and unacknowledged conditions” influence these processes (Sayer 2000: 20). 
 
In order to identify causal mechanisms, it is important to analyse the power of actors 
and/or institutions, referred to as objects. The power of objects depends on the rela-
tion to other objects, but also on the specific context. Thus, the power of a specific 
object (necessary relations) is only activated under particular circumstances (contin-
gent relations). Necessary relations are therefore not fixed, but are “actualised in the 
context of” contingent relations (Lawson 2001: 35). As an example, the power of pri-
vate investors to act according to their strategy depends on their relation to other insti-
tutions like creditors, but it also depends on the specific context of the regulatory 
framework of Berlin’s housing provision. Thus, the behaviour of a private investor is 
not explained based on “formal similarities” like the size of the investment firm, but 
“by reference to the concrete conditions in which they were situated” (Sayer 2000: 
24). 
 
By emphasising the causal mechanisms, critical realism also resolves the tension be-
tween structure and agency (Giddens 1979, 1984). According to critical realism, 
structures are presupposed by actions that are themselves influenced by previously 
constructed structures. Thus, structures influence the event, but critical realism ac-
knowledges that structures themselves are constructed through agents. The structures 
are therefore determined by the way they play out in practice through individual ag-
ency. “Social structures do not endure automatically, they only do so where people 
reproduce them; but, in turn, people do not reproduce them automatically and rarely 
intentionally” (Sayer 1992).
35
 
 
In order to find the causal mechanisms of a certain event, critical realists move be-
tween concrete events and abstract models. While abstract theory analyses the power 
relations of certain objects, concrete research “looks at what happens” when the 
power relations of these objects are combined (Sayer 1992: 116). On the one hand, 
abstraction helps to theorise the characteristics and power of an object. On the other 
hand, abstraction helps to distinguish between contingent and necessary relations of 
objects and events. Thus, the process of abstraction isolates partial aspects of an ob-
ject. In the case of the mode of housing provision, an example for an abstracted con-
cept is the relation between finance and housing. The abstraction, however, is based 
on a real phenomenon (Yeung 1997). Thus, iterative abstraction is both inductive be-
cause it starts from a concrete observation, and deductive because the constructed 
                                                 
 
35
 See Pratt (1994) for a discussion on the differences between a critical realist approach to the struc-
ture-agency problem and Giddens’ (1984) theory of structuration. See Jessop (2005) for a critical dis-
cussion on the structure-agency problem within critical realism. 
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abstract model is again tested against the concrete phenomenon. It is an iterative pro-
cess of conceptualisation and re-conceptualisation (Pratt 1995). The abstract model 
can be adjusted, so that no more contradictory evidence between the causal relations 
of the empirical analysis and the abstract model is found (Yeung 1997). The thesis 
therefore started from a concrete event: The uneven spatial development of Berlin’s 
mode of housing provision. Guided by different concepts abstracted from the reor-
ganisation of the mode of housing provision (object), the empirical research then ex-
plored the causal relations of these objects. 
 
In a first step, the reorganisation of the particular mode of housing provision was ab-
stracted through the isolation of different concepts influencing the mode of housing 
provision (see Sayer 1992: 87). It is, however, not possible to establish all the abstract 
concepts and their causal powers contributing to the mode of housing provision “at 
the outset of the research” (Sayer 2000: 20) because an established model would only 
be misguiding and prevent the scrutiny of the multidimensionality of the particular 
mode of housing provision. Thus, discovering the causal powers and analysing the 
way they operate are a “key component […] of the research” (Sayer 2000: 20). A 
checklist of abstract concepts related to the mode of housing provision however helps 
as a starting point for the empirical research. In a second step, the aim of the empirical 
research is then to elaborate on these abstract concepts, feeding them with concrete 
power relations in the particular context of Berlin (see chapters 5-7). Only then, can 
we explain how the particular mode of housing provision in Berlin contributes to un-
even development. The next section outlines the abstracted concepts. 
 
3.2 Causal Mechanisms of Housing Provision 
 
As outlined in chapter 1 and 2, the aim of the thesis is to analyse the specific causal 
mechanisms leading to uneven spatial development of an ‘entrepreneurialisation’ of 
Berlin’s mode of housing provision, meaning the state’s withdrawal from, and re-
commodification of, housing provision. The thesis’ objective is however to go beyond 
the confirmation of whether Berlin’s government has withdrawn from and re-
commodified the mode of housing provision. Moreover, the goal is to analyse the 
consequences of urban entrepreneurialism of Berlin’s housing provision by revealing 
the uneven causal mechanisms generating temporary forms of social and spatial in-
equalities. In order to analyse the state’s re-regulation of housing and its causal 
mechanisms leading to uneven development, a critical realist approach was argued for. 
In housing research, this approach has been furthest developed by Lawson (2001, 
2006) who adopted Ball’s (1983, 1986; Ball and Harloe 1992) meta-theoretical tool of 
the structure of housing provision (SHP).  
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Contrary to what Ball calls the consumption-oriented approaches, which focus on 
isolated issues like, for example, the changing nature of housing subsidies (see Ball 
1986; Ball et al. 1988), Ball’s concept of the structure of housing provision takes into 
account all of the relevant agencies in the structure of provision and their effects on 
each other (Ball 1986: 152). This approach has however been criticised for missing a 
generalisation of social relations within housing systems, which is going beyond eco-
nomic relations. Moreover, it misses a clear distinction between the necessary power 
of certain relations and their contingent contextual factors influencing these relations 
(Lawson 2006: 27; see also Lawson 2001: 34).
36
 
 
Lawson (2001, 2006) therefore developed Ball’s SHP through an “explicit application 
of critical realist ontology and notions of causality, comparing contingently defined 
emergent relations underlying different modes of housing provision through compara-
tive historical analysis” (Lawson et al. 2009: 6, original emphasis). In order to analyse 
causal mechanisms of the changes of a particular housing provision and their conse-
quences, it is therefore more valuable to single out key internal (necessary) and exter-
nal (contingent) relations of housing provision (Lawson 2006: 64). Internal relations 
are defined through the interdependence of the concept to its object. For example, the 
housing developer cannot exist outside of the mode of housing provision. The rela-
tionship between the two is therefore necessary. External relations, in contrary, are 
not dependent on each other and are therefore contingent in the way they affect the 
particular mode of housing provision (see Sayer 1992: 89). Thus, external relations 
are contextually determined factors influencing the particular mode of housing provi-
sion. Defining a cluster of the three necessary relations of property rights, investment 
and savings, and labour and welfare, Lawson (2006) proposes a more general model 
to investigate the particular provision of housing structure. 
 
These necessary relations bind the different agents within the provision of housing 
structure, such as the relation between tenant and landlord, or borrowers and lenders 
(Lawson 2001: 35). The way these relations play out in practice depends on contin-
gent relations. The necessary relations help however to explore the “realm of the pos-
sible” (Lawson 2001: 37) for the agents. Lawson (2001: 37) builds upon the concepts 
of risk and trust, arguing that agents in the structure of housing provision adapt their 
strategies based on the risks posed by the contingent relations. This means agents 
change their strategies based on the specific spatial and temporal context. 
 
                                                 
 
36
 See also the more general debate on systems of provision (Fine and Leopold 1993) which overcomes 
the dualistic opposition of consumption versus production by analysing systems of provision of particu-
lar commodities, such as food or clothes. 
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Aiming to explain the outcome of different types of housing provisions in a compara-
tive study, Lawson (2006: 85) defines the state as a contingent relation to the provi-
sion of housing. The state plays a “mediating, sometimes conflicting role establishing” 
a coherent cluster of housing provision. Coherence occurs when property rights, in-
vestment and saving, and labour and welfare are “able to sustain a particular form of 
housing provision” (Lawson 2010: 209). Periods of coherence are followed by periods 
of crisis when “one or more components of the emergent cluster evolve in such a way 
as to destabilise” the other components, which leads to adaptation (Lawson 2006: 87). 
Through a historical analysis of the contingently defined emergent relations of prop-
erty, investment and savings, and labour and welfare during periods of crisis and pe-
riods of coherence, Lawson (2001, 2006) explains the temporal outcome of particular 
types of housing provision, such as private rental housing or occupied-ownership 
housing.  
 
In contrast to Lawson (2001, 2006), the goal of this thesis is to explain particular pro-
cesses of uneven development that are triggered through a particular mode of social 
regulation. The thesis thus aims to find empirically grounded explanations for how 
housing provision works within a more entrepreneurial state strategy, creating pro-
cesses of uneven development. While remaining within Lawson’s (2001, 2006) ap-
proach, the conceptual model adapted for the purpose of this study, gives the state a 
more dominant role. Ball (1986: 161) argues for an inclusion of the state “where state 
agencies are necessary parts of structures of provision”. In accordance with Ball 
(1986: 161), the state’s mediating role is considered as a necessary relation of the 
structure of housing provision. The necessary relations of the structure of housing 
provision are therefore defined as housing regulation, housing production, and hous-
ing consumption. These relations emerge under the contingent relations of space and 
time (see Figure 3.1). In the following, the necessary and contingent relations are de-
veloped and possible routes for the following empirical analysis explaining how the 
state’s reorganisation of the housing provision influences housing regulation, produc-
tion, and consumption are explored in order to understand the causal mechanisms of 
processes of uneven development. 
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Source: Inspired by Sayer (1992: 109) and Lawson (2006: 165) 
 
 
3.2.1 Necessary Causal Relations 
 
Housing regulation, production, and consumption are considered as the necessary 
relations of the provision of housing structure. These relations are however not fixed; 
they change depending on specific combinations with other necessary relations under 
specific contingent conditions (see section 3.3.2) (Lawson 2006: 78). 
 
Housing Regulation 
 
The national, but also the local state intervenes in production and consumption for 
various reasons, from facilitating access to the housing market for low income house-
holds to promoting economic growth through the support of housing construction and 
therefore consumption (Lawson 2006: 74). The state mediates the consumption and 
production relations through regulatory conditions, which are referred to here as hous-
ing regulation. Housing regulation is perceived as constraining or enabling rights to 
develop, maintain, exchange, and use rental housing. Housing regulation includes 
property rights and subsidies.  
 
Property relations are defined as the rights of occupation, ownership, and exploitation 
of land and buildings. This in turn, affects the value of the land and the housing on it. 
In the case of rental housing, the value of a building depends at least partially on the 
building’s “capacity to generate rental revenue” (Lawson 2006: 68). Restrictions on 
private property rights such as rent or planning regulation therefore affect production 
External relations  
Space / Time 
Internal relations 
 
Housing Regulation 
Housing  
Production 
Housing 
Consumption 
Event  
Processes of uneven 
development 
Object  
New mode of 
housing provision 
Figure 3.1: Structure of Causal Explanation for Processes of Uneven Development 
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and consumption relations. Rent regulation can have constraining effects on the gen-
eration of rental revenue. Three rental systems can be distinguished based on rent con-
trol. First, there is no rent control and landlords can charge according to market cri-
teria. Second, landlords are restricted by rent control in the amount they can charge or 
increase the rent levels. Third, landlords are forced “to collectivise any inflation in the 
market value of housing, in essence feeding back profit to tenants in the form of lower 
rents” (Doling 1999: 160). Linked to rent regulations are the protection against ten-
ants’ eviction in cases where the tenant cannot pay the rent or where landlords have 
other interests to vacate the dwelling. Rent regulations determine the possibilities of 
making profit through rental revenue, therefore influencing the finance of and invest-
ment in housing. Planning regulations from zoning regulations to building regulations 
such as the specific rights to modernise housing under heritage protection can also 
affect the rental revenue. Property rights therefore influence the investment strategy 
and the form of surplus value extraction; they “[i]nfluence the nature of use, exchange, 
exploitation of land and subsequently, patterns of investment in land development 
over space and time” (Lawson 2006: 78).  
 
Through housing subsidies, the state can promote the production and consumption of 
housing. There are supply-side subsidies such as public or private loans or interest 
subsidies for the construction and renewal of housing, or demand-side subsidies such 
as housing allowances. The intervention through supply-side subsidies towards hous-
ing infrastructure can lower construction costs and rent levels (Turner and Whitehead 
2002). In order to support poorer households, the state grants demand-side subsidies 
(Doling 1999; Priemus and Dieleman 1999) (see below). Changes in these subsidy 
systems can impact rent levels and investment in housing. 
 
Housing Production 
 
Housing production is defined as the relations involving the production and exchange 
of rental housing. It involves finance in the form of equity or credit capital combined 
with profit targets. Finance in turn influences the investment, management and ex-
change strategies of housing owners. In the structure of rental housing provision, pro-
duction relations emerge through different types of housing owners that adapt their 
strategies based on the other necessary relations of housing regulation (see above) and 
housing consumption (see below) under the contingent spatial and temporal contexts 
(see section 3.2.2). 
 
The development and exchange of housing depends, to a great extent, on the availab-
ility of finance due to the high costs of housing. The purchase of housing requires 
significant credit capital. This can come in different forms such as loans or equity 
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share holding (Lawson 2006: 73). For loans, interest levels might be fixed or flexible 
and are predetermined for a specific time period. The conditions of interest levels de-
pend on the form of tenancy, but also on market mechanisms that affect the entire 
financial system (Lawson 2006: 75). For equity shareholding, different investors have 
diverging expectations regarding risk and return on investment. While some investors 
look for relatively long-term and risk-averse investments, albeit with low returns, oth-
ers pursue more short-term, high risk, and high return strategies.  
 
Real estate investment involves balancing risk and return with a lot of uncertain fac-
tors that are sometimes difficult to value: There are opportunities in the form of in-
creasing cash flow, financial management, and exit strategies. First, cash flow can be 
increased through higher rental income or reduction of expenditure. Depending on 
rent regulations, higher rents can be achieved through new tenancy agreements or by 
refurbishing the housing stock. Reducing operation costs by creating economies of 
scale or streamlining management also helps to generate cash flow. Second, invest-
ment opportunities also exist through leveraging via debt financing.
37
 Third, different 
exit strategies exist, such as re-selling the housing for a higher price or going public 
(Linneman 2004). 
 
Real estate investment however also involves the following risks: First, there could be 
unforeseen operation costs such as higher property taxes, insurance costs or manage-
ment salaries. Some of the costs can be reduced through longer-term contracts or 
passed onto tenants. However, depending on rent regulation or a depressed market 
situation, the costs cannot be passed on. Second, vacancy rates reducing cash flow 
from rent poses a considerable risk. This depends again on tenancy agreements and 
how fast a new tenant can be found when the existing one decides to leave. A third 
risk is that a house is much harder to sell than other assets such as government bonds 
or stock options. This could lead to liquidity problems due to real estate market fluc-
tuations whereby the seller cannot unload the asset at the anticipated asking price 
(Linneman 2004). 
 
Depending on the strategy, investors “rely on a financial return via the developments 
in rental revenue, improved land value or the sale of related mortgages” (Lawson 
2006: 74). These factors influence the housing provision in that the investor “may 
demand particular forms of marketable development, building processes and stand-
ards, or the minimum rent level and even specify the desired profile of eligible tenants” 
(Lawson 2006: 73). This in turn affects the ownership structure and consumption of 
housing (Ball 1986: 156, 160). Certain types of capitalist enterprises therefore profit 
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 See section 5 for an explanation of how financial leveraging works for real estate investment. 
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from housing provision in “particular historical circumstances” (Ball 1983; see also 
1990). 
 
Housing Consumption 
 
Housing consumption emerges through aggregated demand, defined here as income 
relations and household structure. Consumption is determined by the tenant’s capacity 
to pay for housing costs. In a rental housing market, the “ebb and flow of effective 
demand and supply” (Lawson 2006: 70) influence rent levels. If mortgages, for exam-
ple, become more expensive due to high interest rates, there will be more demand for 
rental housing, therefore increasing rent levels. “In an ‘open’ rental market, rents are 
set by the imperfect operation of the rental market, where tenants compete for dwell-
ings of different types, quality and location” (Lawson 2006: 70). However, rent levels 
are also influenced by rent regulation, and state intervention through supply or de-
mand side subsidies. 
 
The tenant’s capacity to pay for housing costs depends however not only on the rent 
level, but also on the tenant’s position in the housing market. A tenant in a stressed 
housing market is in a less powerful position to negotiate lower rent levels than a ten-
ant in a depressed housing market. The capacity to pay for housing costs depend also 
on the tenant’s position within the labour market (Lawson 2006: 75 et seq.). An un-
employed tenant does not have the same budget as a high-earning employee for hous-
ing consumption. Moreover, housing consumption also depends on the household 
structure. A single household needs comparatively more housing than a large family. 
Thus, the tenant’s economic, but also demographic and household specifics, influence 
the form of housing consumption (Ball 1986: 154). 
 
While income relations and household structure play a role in the provision of hous-
ing structure, I argue here that consumption of housing is mainly explained through 
production relations, but also mediated through the state (Lawson 2010: 209). Hous-
ing cannot be replaced with another good. This possibly constrains the consumer’s 
position in negotiating prices (Krätke and Borst 2000: 159). Smith (1996: 57) even 
argues that the “need to earn profit” is more important than consumption preferences. 
Thus, the expressed demand by different consumers have a minimal role to play in the 
uneven market mechanisms, which are best explained via the particular mode of hous-
ing production and regulation. 
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3.2.2 Contingent Causal Relations 
 
Critical realists have very little to say about space and time in the abstract. However, 
“abstract research, being concerned with the character, powers, and preconditions of 
social structures, has to take account of the fact that they are neither aspatial nor ‘a-
chronic’” (Sayer 2000: 136). Thus, the particular time and space makes a difference to 
the social relations of the provision of housing structure. In order to understand how 
time and space influences the provision of housing structure, there is however a need 
to “move to a more concrete kind of analysis”, in which we investigate the necessary 
relations proposed above within “concrete spatial conjunctures” (Sayer 2000: 112). 
 
Spatial context 
 
Theory cannot anticipate the influence space has on the necessary relations of the 
mode of housing provision. However, “by building into the theory an assumption 
about the form of the particular (contingent) spatial setting that happens to exist” 
(Sayer 2000: 122), the particular spatial setting influencing internal relations can be 
worked out. With regards to the provision of housing structure this means, for exam-
ple, “a housing market does not clear at a point in time over a whole area but evolves 
sequentially and is constrained by wherever and whenever vacancies and potential 
buyers crop up” (Sayer 2000: 123). Moreover, housing is highly interwoven with “its 
location in social and physical space” (Ball 1986: 162), but also with its morphology 
in terms of design and production quality. Due to the heterogeneity and inflexibility of 
housing, there are different market segments. On the one hand, the immobility of the 
good means that there are spatially differentiated market segments. On the other hand, 
there are factually differentiated market segments based on such characteristics as 
quality, age, and size of housing.
38
 The housing owner’s strategy is therefore closely 
linked to a specific market segment. At the same time, a segmented housing market 
influences the consumption. There is no equal access of tenants to all the housing 
units: Based on location, economic and social criteria, different groups of tenants have 
access to different market segments. 
 
                                                 
 
38
 See Krätke and Borst (2000) for a discussion of the concept of ‘segmented housing market’ and its 
impact on social segregation. 
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Temporal context 
 
Time is as important as space in influencing a particular mode of housing provision. 
Specific events such as general financial and economic crises influence the housing 
provision by inducing “shifts in the operation of specific financial institutions and in 
their regulation” (Ball 1990: 36). The restructuring of the financial system and the 
globalisation of capital can influence the investment process in housing. Similar to an 
economic crisis, political and social events such as state transformation processes in-
fluence the mode of housing provision. 
 
This conceptual model guides my empirical research, investigating how the necessary 
relations play out in the particular spatial and temporal conditions of Berlin’s provi-
sion of housing structure. 
 
*** 
 
The next section presents the practical process in terms of case selection, fieldwork 
and data analysis. It serves three purposes. First, the section presents the reasoning for 
a case study approach and the theoretically guided case selection (3.3). Second, it dis-
cusses the fieldwork and data collection process including some of the challenges 
encountered (3.4). Third, the section presents the methodological approach for data 
analysis (3.5). 
 
3.3 Case Study Approach 
 
Critical realist work is predominantly conducted as intensive research because it is a 
useful mean to analyse “what makes things happen in specific cases” (Sayer 2000: 20). 
This means individual cases are studied in their specific contexts in order to detect the 
substantial causality between necessary and contingent relations of a phenomenon. 
The case study approach is particularly useful when analysing “complex social phe-
nomena” (Yin 1994: 3). The empirical research therefore focuses on case studies.  
 
A case study is defined as the process of analysing a specific case and the reporting of 
the inquiry (Stake 2008: 121). A case, in turn, can be described as a system with clear 
boundaries whereas certain activities take place within the case, and others outside of 
it. In this thesis, the case study approach was used in the sense of what Stake (2008: 
123) calls a “multiple case study”. The aim of the research lied not in understanding 
one particular case, but several: Multiple cases were studied in order to understand a 
specific phenomenon, in this context, the consequences of the reorganisation of Ber-
lin’s mode of housing provision. As such, I did not compare the four neighbourhoods 
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selected for the study, but used them as a point of entry to understand Berlin’s provi-
sion of housing structure as a whole. 
 
3.3.1 Case Selection 
 
The theoretically guided case selection is based on the assumption that a detailed 
understanding of these individual cases creates a better understanding of the general 
phenomena studied (Stake 2008). Thus, I selected the cases according to a purposive, 
meaning theoretical sampling based on categories defined by the causal mechanisms 
of my conceptual framework (see Pratt 1994: 69).
39
 The aim of purposive sampling 
was to cover the necessary and contingent relations relevant to the study. The sam-
pling was diverse which enabled the exploration of the impact of specific contexts. By 
selecting cases that vary from each other, it was possible to analyse the central themes 
that cut across all of them (Ritchie and Lewis 2003: 78). The cases were chosen to 
expand on theoretical concepts.
40
  
 
The case selection was guided by the theoretical concepts on the provision of housing 
structure established in section 3.2. The aim was to have a wide variety of cases in-
volving the key relations and the contextual factors of the established model for ana-
lysing a particular mode of housing provision. Therefore, the selected neighbour-
hoods
41
 covered a variety with regards to regulation, production, consumption, as well 
as to their spatial context.
42
 
 
• Spatial context: The selection of neighbourhoods with regards to the spatial 
context is based on the main housing types (see chapter 4); late 19
th
-century 
block developments; Nineteen Twenties, Thirties, Fifties row developments; 
and post-war high-rise developments. 
                                                 
 
39
 This realist interpretation of the case study approach differs slightly from a grounded theory ap-
proach (Glaser and Strauss 2009) in that it avoids the pitfalls of emergent categories, which are solely 
deduced from empirical research. Thus, the realist interpretation evades a categorisation, which possi-
bly “reduces any structural factors to those of individuals” and which are “derived from ‘the analyst’s 
head’” instead of being “informed by the abstract theoretical analysis of causal mechanisms” (Pratt 
1994: 69). 
40
 See Glaser and Strauss (2009) for a detailed discussion on how theoretical sampling is used to de-
velop and extend theory. 
41
 The neighbourhood is defined based on the historical development of the housing structure (see 
chapter 4) in this neighbourhood. This means that a certain type of housing has been built in this neigh-
bourhood and a specific name designates the area. For example, a housing development from the 1920s 
was called “Grüne Stadt” (Green City) and the blocks that are built within this housing development 
define the neighbourhood. 
42
 The temporal context is given by the period studied, from 1998 to 2008. 
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• Regulation: The selection of neighbourhoods is based on different regulatory 
means: free-market housing, social housing, neighbourhood management, 
urban renewal area, milieu protection area, and restructuring ordinance. 
• Production: The way the neighbourhood was financed, through credit capital 
or equity share holding was not identifiable beforehand. However, it was ex-
pected that privatised housing companies have different approaches to finan-
cing housing provision and therefore to investment, management, and ex-
change of housing. 
• Consumption: Since it is rarely possible to get exact data on the tenant struc-
ture of specific neighbourhoods, the selection is based on the quality of the 
residential area, assuming that higher quality residential areas are more expen-
sive and therefore attract tenants with a high socio-economic status; and lower 
quality housing provides for the poorer households.
43
 
 
Table 3.1 presents the case selection. Based on these criteria, the cases were selected 
through an analysis of the media coverage that took place during the years of reor-
ganisation of Berlin’s housing provision and four preliminary interviews with housing 
experts in Berlin (see appendix 1). 
 
                                                 
 
43
 Berlin’s government defines three types of quality of residential areas: good, middle and basic. The 
housing currently or previously owned by state-owned housing companies have primarily housing 
within the middle and simple residential areas. Since the focus of research lies on these two types of 
ownership, only these two categories are represented in my case selection. 
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Table 3.1: Cases and Selection Criteria 
CASE 
Neighbourhood  
(Main Street) 
SPATIAL  
CONTEXT 
Housing type 
REGULATION 
Regulatory means 
PRODUCTION 
Majority owner 
CONSUMPTION 
Quality of residen-
tial area44 
(A) Grüne Stadt  
(Anton-Saefkow-
Str.) 
1930s row devel-
opment 
Free-market hous-
ing, restructuring 
ordinance, heritage 
protection 
Privatised housing 
company owned by 
institutional inves-
tors 
Basic 
(B) Chamissoplatz 
(Arndtstr.) 
19th-century block 
development 
Former urban 
renewal housing, 
now milieu protec-
tion area 
State-owned hous-
ing company 
Middle 
(C) High-Deck-
Siedlung (Leo-
Slezak-Str.) 
1980s row devel-
opment 
Social housing, 
neighbourhood 
management 
Privatised housing 
estate owned by 
institutional inves-
tors 
Basic 
(D) Gropiusstadt 
(Liepschitz-Allee, 
Wutzkyallee) 
Post-war high-rise 
development 
Partly social hous-
ing, partly free-
market housing, 
neighbourhood 
management 
State-owned hous-
ing company  
Basic 
 
 
3.3.2 Four Cases 
 
As mentioned, I used cases as an entry point to understand Berlin’s provision of hous-
ing structure and not in order to compare them. The aim was to understand how pro-
duction, regulation, and consumption play out spatially, meaning in different types of 
housing. As such, the neighbourhood’s characteristics along the above discussed cri-
teria were important and not the cases themselves. In the following, the four cases are 
therefore only shortly described with regards to their characteristics listed in Table 3.1. 
See Map 3.1 for an overview of where the neighbourhoods are situated within Berlin. 
For more details on the different housing types within the housing provision in Berlin, 
see chapter 4. 
 
 
                                                 
 
44
 Because each housing unit is individually evaluated, the residential area was based on the majority 
type within the neighbourhood. One – or where necessary – two of the main streets within the neigh-
bourhood have been taken as point of reference. The data is based on the comparative rent index (Miet-
spiegel) of 2007. See Senatsverwaltung für Stadtentwicklung (2007b, 2009). 
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Map 3.1: Berlin Districts with Case Studies 
 
 
 
Grüne Stadt, Pankow (A) 
 
The Grüne Stadt is located in Prenzlauer Berg, in the district of Pankow. This cen-
trally located area was the “biggest urban renewal site in Europe” (Holm 2006: 12, 
author's translation) that has become highly gentrified after Berlin’s reunification. The 
Grüne Stadt was built in the modern style between 1937 and 1939 (GSW 2007). Parts 
of the row development are under heritage protection. The Grüne Stadt has around 
1,800 apartments, most of which had still been in the original state until they were 
renovated in 2005. The tenant structure was characterised by a high degree of low 
income households either because they are pensioners, unemployed, or on social wel-
fare. Only 36 percent of the households were gainfully employed. 
 
The Grüne Stadt apartments belonged to a state-owned housing company which prior 
to 2004, was the largest state-owned housing company. In 2004, Berlin’s government 
privatised the company, and an investment consortium of two investment banks 
bought it. Thus, the apartments were no longer in the purview of state-ownership. In 
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2005, the privatised company sold one part of Grüne Stadt to a smaller investment 
fund. When modernisation started that same year, the district imposed a restructuring 
ordinance that obligated the owners to draw up a social plan for the tenants who could 
not bear the higher rents. Because of an administrative delay, only the part owned by 
the smaller investment fund was under this restructuring ordinance. The part owned 
by the privatised company is now available through private ownership. The other part, 
owned by the smaller investment fund, is still rental housing. 
 
Chamissoplatz, Friedrichshain-Kreuzberg (B) 
 
Chamissoplatz is situated in the district of Friedrichshain-Kreuzberg. Kreuzberg is 
famous for its politically left-wing oriented population during the division of the city, 
welcoming young men who did not want to serve in the West German army.
45
 The 
Chamissoplatz neighbourhood consists of late 19
th
-century block developments built 
between 1889 and 1911 which were not destroyed during the Second World War. 
There are 1,600 apartments in the neighbourhood of Chamissoplatz, often with stores 
located on the ground floor of the blocks. The apartments were mostly renovated be-
tween 1978 and 2003. The quality of the housing and the location contribute to the 
relatively high standard of living in this area. This is reflected in the government’s 
“middle” category of quality measurement (see above). 
 
The apartments at Chamissoplatz are foremost in the ownership of a state-owned 
housing company. In the 1970s, the state mandated the state-owned housing company 
to buy the housing stock because private landlords were not able to pay renovation 
costs. The neighbourhood thus became a designated urban renewal area whereas its 
modernisation was highly state subsidised. Since 2003, the neighbourhood is no 
longer a designated urban renewal area, the district government however decided to 
confer the neighbourhood the status of a milieu protection area. This means that there 
are some restrictions on further renovations in order to keep a similar social structure 
within the neighbourhood (Bremer et al. 2007). The housing remains state-owned. 
 
High-Deck-Siedlung, Neukölln (C) 
 
The High-Deck-Siedlung is a row development neighbourhood at the fringe of the 
inner city area, in the district of Neukölln. The estate was built as social housing on 
the West side, close to the Berlin Wall, between 1975 and 1985. It has around 2,300 
apartments. The division of car traffic and pedestrian sidewalks, the so-called high-
decks, was considered an innovative housing model at the time. The status of social 
                                                 
 
45
 West Berlin’s residents did not have to do military service. 
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housing meant restrictions on allocation, and households whose income reached a 
certain ceiling had to pay additional fees on the rent. Today, the estate is considered 
as one of the most problematic neighbourhoods in Berlin. In 2007, around 600 apart-
ments were vacant. The neighbourhood is under the neighbourhood management pro-
gramme which adresses the social problems within the neighbourhood. 
 
A state-owned housing company built the High-Deck-Siedlung. In 2006, the state-
owned housing company sold the estate to an investment firm. The sales contract ob-
liged the new investor to modernise the estate, which happened between 2007 and 
2009. The state-owned housing company owns a remaining 427 apartments within the 
same estate. However, these apartments were only built between 1983 and 1993 and 
are therefore in better condition (Simons 2007). A few apartments also belong to a 
housing co-operative. 
 
Gropiusstadt, Neukölln (D) 
 
The Gropiusstadt is a large-scale housing estate with post-war high-rise developments 
in the district of Neukölln, in the outskirts of Berlin. Named after its planner, the ar-
chitect Walter Gropius, the housing estate was built between 1962 and 1975. However, 
the final housing estate has little in common with Gropius’ original plan. One of the 
reasons was the construction of the Wall, which meant less available space to remedy 
the housing shortage. The need for densification resulted in high-rise developments 
that were higher than originally planned by Gropius. There are 18,500 apartments in 
the Gropiusstadt, 90 percent of which were constructed as social housing, mostly by 
two state-owned housing companies. The status as social housing meant that most 
apartments were under allocation restrictions as long as they were supported by state 
subsidies. However, in 2001, the restriction was released. Pensioners, often the ones 
who moved in during the 1960s and 1970s and an increasing amount of immigrants 
inhabit Gropiusstadt. Gradually, the different high-rise developments are coming onto 
the free market and are getting modernised (Kolland 2002). Part of the housing estate 
is under the neighbourhood management programme that is trying to address the ris-
ing social problems within the estate.  
 
While one of the two initial housing companies is still state-owned and remains the 
owner of the majority of the apartments in the Gropiusstadt (approximately 6,000 
dwellings), there are an increasing number of other owners. The other state-owned 
housing company has been privatised and is now part of a German housing company 
owned by institution investors. This privatised company has sold most of its apart-
ments in the Gropiusstadt, either to individual homeowners or to smaller investors. It 
maintains approximately 2,000 dwellings in the housing estate. The owner that pos-
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sesses the third largest amount of apartments (approximately 1,500) in the 
Gropiusstadt is a social housing company (see chapter 7) owned by the protestant 
church. 
 
3.4 Fieldwork Process 
 
The data collection process was predominantly based on semi-structured interviews 
(Gaskell 2000; Kvale 1996; Wengraf 2001). There were three reasons for using this 
approach. First, a qualitative approach was prioritised in order to understand the 
underlying causal mechanisms of the reorganisation of Berlin’s housing provision. 
Second, semi-structured interviews were used for exploring different views on a sin-
gle empirical event. In contrast to more quantitative oriented surveys, the main object 
was to receive a wide range of viewpoints in order to understand the processes under 
scrutiny. Third, semi-structured interviews were based on an interview guideline 
along the theoretical concepts established above, but leaves enough space for explor-
ing unanticipated relations (Gaskell 2000). Thus, the conversation remained open to 
information that the previously established theoretical model might not have taken 
into account.  
 
The information collected through the semi-structured interviews was then comple-
mented by a method of data triangulation
46
 whereas other data sources are used to get 
a more complete picture of the processes studied (Blaikie 1991; Denzin 1970; Seale 
1999). Multiple data sources are compared and contrasted for the analysis of the same 
processes (Yeung 1997). This increases the validity and reliability of the data col-
lected and helps to understand the phenomenon studied. The fieldwork also involved 
in-depth document analysis and the participation in conferences on the provision of 
housing in Berlin. The different data sources and the challenges involved collecting 
and analysing them are discussed in the following sections. 
 
3.4.1 Semi-structured Interviews 
 
Semi-structured interviews are trying to create knowledge through conversations be-
tween the interviewer and interviewee (Kvale 1996: 124). However, in order to ex-
tract evidence from these interviews, a theory-based guideline and contextual know-
ledge is necessary. Thus, the interviews are not just conversations on any topic 
(Wengraf 2001), but are based on the previously established theoretical model. There-
                                                 
 
46
 For a critical discussion on the concept and various definitions of triangulation, see Blaikie (1991). 
Here, the term is used to describe the different data sources that were combined within a critical realist 
methodology. 
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fore, the interview process involves different steps; from the preparation of an inter-
view guideline to the interview situation itself. 
 
Constructing the interview guideline 
 
The interview guideline (Patton 2002: 343) was based on an elaborate case study pro-
tocol that I developed before fieldwork. This involved the establishment of expected 
relations guided by the theoretical framework. Once key causal relations had been 
identified, a detailed list of questions was worked out. These were then summarised 
and transformed into a language that was accessible for interviewees who might not 
be familiar with the theoretical language. The questions formed the basic structure of 
the interview guideline. However, the general guideline was kept flexible and was 
constantly adapted. Depending on the role of the respondent and the information 
gained from previously conducted interviews, the focus and therefore the guideline 
were slightly reformulated before each interview. For the general interview guideline, 
see appendix 2.  
 
Selecting actors and informants
47
 
 
In order to analyse the reorganisation of Berlin’s housing provision, key actors were 
first identified (Wengraf 2001) informed by the causal relations of the conceptual 
model. On the one hand, this involved the identification of actors involved in the 
regulation of housing. These ranged from government bodies to non-governmental 
agencies that were involved in lobbying for tenants or housing companies. In accord-
ance with a strategic-relational approach (Jessop 1990b, 2007), it is argued that all 
these actors use the state to promote their interests. Thus, they play a crucial role in 
the regulation of the provision of housing in Berlin and its reorganisation. On the 
other hand, key actors of each case were identified in order to analyse how they use 
the regulatory framework in order to pursue their own interests in the production of 
housing. This involved investment firms, housing companies, and agencies for urban 
renewal and neighbourhood management, and district government officials. The ac-
tors on the regulatory level together with the actors on the case level provided a wide-
ranging picture of the reorganisation of Berlin’s mode of housing provision and its 
uneven consequences.
48
 
                                                 
 
47
 I distinguish between key actors and informants/respondents/interviewees, whereas the key actors are 
the institutions or organisations involved in the process and the informants represent these organisa-
tions. 
48
 In accordance with the conceptual model, which argues that consumption relations are determined by 
regulation and production mechanisms (see section 3.2), individual tenants were not interviewed. The 
consumption side was however still represented through tenant organisations and neighbourhood man-
agers. 
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Three steps were involved in the identification of relevant actors. First, research was 
conducted with the help of the Internet and of newspapers. Key actors in the provision 
of housing were identified and information on the neighbourhoods was collected. 
Through this, two to three actors per case could be identified and used as a starting 
point. Second, for each key actor, a possible respondent was identified. The aim was 
always to get to the manager level of the institution because it was assumed that the 
strategies of the actor were decided at this level. Third, the identified respondents 
were contacted and an interview was requested. At this stage, the potential interview-
ees were also asked if other key respondents could be recommended for interviews. 
Furthermore, at the end of each interview, the interviewee was again asked to identify 
other informants. 
 
Accessing informants 
 
This snowballing system helped to establish a network of respondents and provided 
an openness to identify unanticipated activities and processes. It was relatively easy to 
get appointments with representatives from the district and Berlin governments as 
well as with non-governmental organisations. Fieldwork was done during the summer 
which turned out to be unproblematic and an LSE letterhead proved to be a gate-
opener. In contrast to the public sector, it was more difficult to access actors from the 
private sector, such as representatives of investment firms or privatised housing com-
panies. A first problem was to identify the right contact within a company. This was 
partly because private companies and especially investors do not have extended or-
ganisational structures publicised on their website. Once having established the right 
contact, often through other respondents, a second problem was the gatekeeper. It 
proved difficult to get beyond the secretary of the fund manager or of the director of a 
housing company. Sometimes, this was not possible at all. It proved to be much easier 
where personal email or phone numbers were available, or a mediating contact that 
could be referred to.  
 
Another challenge with actors from the private sector was the non-disclosure informa-
tion policy they often adhered to. As a CFO of a housing company pointed out during 
the interview: “We are shy in regards to our information policy” (ID 12, author’s 
translation). These companies are not willing to reveal their investment strategies. 
Another reason for their non-disclosure may be the fact that privatised housing com-
panies and their respective investment firms have received negative publicity in the 
last few years. In some interviews, the respondents did not reveal as much insider 
information as hoped for. Nevertheless, through building up a network of contacts and 
establishing trust with the actors that were interviewed, some of the representatives 
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from the private sector could be accessed and information gathered. This proved to be 
important for gathering the complete picture of Berlin’s reorganisation of its housing 
provision. 
 
In the end, 30 interviews (with a total of 39 respondents) were conducted. This was 
sufficient in order to assess the different viewpoints on the reorganisation of Berlin’s 
housing provision and its uneven consequences. The interviews covered representa-
tives from all the different actors relevant to the governance of Berlin’s housing pro-
vision and the specific cases. And even though the private sector might have been 
slightly underrepresented, there are only a certain number of interpretations of the 
same event (Gaskell 2000). While the first few interviews provided new and surpris-
ing insights into the topic, a saturation point was reached as more interviews were 
conducted. Once a point was reached where interviews became too repetitive and 
even a departure from the guideline proved to corroborate the existing understanding, 
no further interviews were conducted (Gaskell 2000). For a complete list of the inter-
views conducted, see appendix 1. 
 
Interviewing informants 
 
The interviews were mostly conducted in the office of the interviewee. There were 
three occasions where the person suggested meeting in a café or in a hotel. This was 
because these respondents did not have an office in Berlin, but had no impact on the 
interview process. While I felt the conversations outside of the office were more in-
formal and also more informative, I attribute this more to the personality and position 
of the interviewee than to the location. 
  
The interviews were always set up as a conversation, whereas I set the parameters and 
controlled the conversation, but did not intervene in the flow of it. I only intervened in 
order to guide the conversation where necessary. While I emphasised to the inter-
viewees that neither their name nor their company’s name will be mentioned in the 
thesis and that I am more interested in general processes than in the specific company 
itself, I encountered two respondents
49
 who did not want me to record the conversa-
tion. In these instances, I wrote down as many notes as I could and tried to recapture 
the whole interview on paper right after it happened. There is the possibility that I 
have missed out some details because I could not go back to the record. However, I do 
not think that this impacts in any way my data, since I still gathered the opinions and 
views of the respondent. 
                                                 
 
49
 One of the respondents was from a privatised housing company. The other was from the investment 
side. 
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It struck me how strongly the opinions of the interviewees were shaped by ideology. 
This reflected the perception I got from the preliminary analysis of the media cover-
age of the privatisation debate of Berlin’s state-owned housing companies. At the 
same time, it was still surprising how little detailed knowledge of the regulatory struc-
ture the respondents had and how much their position was based on their political 
leanings or their social milieu. 
 
This also brought up the reflection on my own position in the interview process 
(Patton 2002: 329). What impact does my own political views, but also my gender, 
my status as a PhD student, and me as a Swiss researching a German city have on the 
interview process? My own political view seemed to be the least concern in the field-
work process since I was aware of it, but I was also aware that by not commenting 
(negatively or positively) on anything said in the interview itself, I could hide my own 
point of view well enough. My gender, my status as a student as well as being Swiss, 
was less easy to hide. While there was in almost every conversation a hint about the 
Swiss-German diplomatic fight over taxation and bank secrecy going on at the time of 
my fieldwork, I was mostly welcomed doing research as an outsider, hopefully bring-
ing some more objective insights into the debate. Thus, while I was seen very much as 
an outsider, I strongly believe that this had the advantage of being trusted as non- or 
less-judgemental. My status as a female student was probably the most affecting fac-
tor in the interview process. I was highly regarded when mentioning the LSE as my 
home-university. However, in a few interviews with private actors but also with gov-
ernment administration personnel, I felt being looked down upon. I do not necessarily 
consider that as a disadvantage in the interview process though, since it often meant 
that they explained processes in more detail. 
 
An external factor that highly affected my research was the financial crisis. When I 
established my research project and research question, the financial crisis had not 
broken out yet. However, during my fieldwork, Berlin – even though less hit by the 
crisis because it could not fall further as many interviewees pointed out – started to 
feel the consequences. One interviewee, working for an investment fund, explained, 
for example, that he had to negotiate for a credit over six months whereas before he 
would have gotten the credit with one telephone call. Furthermore, the hype around 
investing in Berlin was extremely moderated and statistics show that the selling and 
re-selling of apartments stopped (see chapter 5 for an analysis on the impact of the 
financial crisis). Thus, the financial crisis was a specific historical event referred to in 
the analytical model (see section 3.2.2) that influenced the particular mode of housing 
provision at the time of investigation. 
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3.4.2 Participation in Conferences 
 
During my fieldwork time in Berlin, I also attended different conferences related to 
the city’s housing provision. They ranged from academic conferences, industry gath-
erings, political symposia, and government discussion panels. This helped me, on the 
one hand, to build up my contact network. On the other hand, I was able to confirm 
and extend the understanding of the different viewpoints in the debate on Berlin’s 
housing provision. A list of the conferences I participated in is in appendix 3. 
 
3.4.3 Document Collection 
 
A third part of my fieldwork involved the search for primary documents. I was inter-
ested in three types of documents: political and legal documents such as government 
and parliamentary decisions related to the changing of regulations or law in housing 
provision; housing market reports discussing the investment climate in Berlin’s hous-
ing; and evaluation reports analysing the impact of housing policy on the social struc-
ture of the neighbourhoods studied. The document analysis was relevant for two rea-
sons: First, it helped to establish the basic facts around regulatory changes in the pro-
vision of housing in Berlin. This proved to be crucial because interviewees were often 
not familiar with the regulatory details. Being myself familiar with them, it helped me 
on the one hand to establish mutual respect and trust with the interviewees. Second, I 
was able to compare the statements given by the respondents with the information 
from the documents. The document analysis, therefore, helped me to gain a more 
complete understanding of the underlying processes because I could put the inter-
viewees’ statements into perspective. Thus, for example, a statistical report on the 
changes of a social structure within a certain neighbourhood helped to confirm the 
statements made with regards to an increasing exclusion of better off tenants from this 
neighbourhood. There is a complete list of the documents analysed in appendix 4.  
 
The search for political documents turned out to be not entirely satisfying because 
government decisions in Berlin are not public. While I was able to access protocols of 
parliamentary debates and decisions at the legislative level, I was not able to access 
the documents that involved decision-making on the executive level of Berlin’s gov-
ernment. There is a decision by the government to change its strategy regarding the 
state-owned housing companies that several interviewees referred to, but either they 
did not know the exact content of it themselves or they were not able to give me the 
document. The same applied to the sales contract between private investors that 
bought the state-owned housing company from Berlin’s government. While the 
statements from the interviews referring to the government decision and the purchase 
contracts often pointed in the same direction, and therefore started to confirm one 
another, I was not able to confirm the statements through the documents themselves. 
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While some documents proved to be helpful in triangulating the findings from the 
interviews, the lack of access to other documents meant that it was not always pos-
sible to yield complementary information through this method and I had to rely on 
triangulation through interviews. 
 
3.5 Analysis of the Collected Data 
 
For the analysis of the collected data, I relied on Kelle (1995) and Prein and Kelle 
(1995). Through a method of coding, I aimed for reduction of information. The pur-
pose was to reveal the different processes within the reorganisation of Berlin’s mode 
of housing provision that have occurred, the social relations between the key actors, 
and the viewpoints of the respondents with regards to each of the processes and its 
consequences. For this data reduction process, the software AtlasTi helped me to or-
ganise the data once all the interviews were transcribed. The programme also assisted 
me with the coding process and the reduction of information. 
 
A three-step approach was chosen. First, I identified key themes, some of them were 
concepts that emerged from the theoretical model and some of them were surprise 
discoveries in the fieldwork process. Six interviews were test-coded in order to estab-
lish the main codes. However, I left the coding structure open enough that unexpected 
themes could still be added that would have been lost otherwise. Thus, a “rough pre-
liminary coding scheme” was established along the previously developed theoretical 
model, but modified in line with new emerging elements (Prein and Kelle 1995: 63).  
 
Second, all of the interviews were coded using the same coding structure. After this 
first revision of the interviews with a rather detailed coding, the process was repeated 
in order to identify the main actors and their relations with the themes that were re-
vealed in the first run. This helped me to see which of the key actors were involved in 
the different themes and how they perceived the processes. An example would be the 
code “PS-PR: increasing rent levels” that meant the privatisation process (PS) led to 
increasing rent levels within privatised housing companies' (PR) housing stock. If 
another respondent claimed the opposite, it was also coded in order to acknowledge 
and identify their different viewpoints. 
 
Third, networks of the established codes were created. Networks are graphs that link 
the different codes and their content with each other. This helped to “give account of 
the emerging theory by displaying its main categories” (Prein and Kelle 1995: 66). I 
created four different networks under the themes of ‘State Restructuring’, ‘Regula-
tion’, ‘Institutional Investors’, and ‘State-owned Housing Companies’. This served to 
identify relations between the codes in order to understand power relations. The rela-
tion between codes was identified as either opposing each other, as being associated 
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with each other, or as caused by each other. See appendix 5 for the four networks. 
Through this three-step approach, I was able to identify the key processes and actors, 
and the respondents’ viewpoints. 
 
Conclusion 
 
This chapter established the methodological approach in order to tackle the question 
of how a particular mode of housing provision creates processes of uneven develop-
ment. Using a critical realist perspective, the necessary relations of a particular mode 
of housing provision such as regulation, production, and consumption as well as the 
contingent relations of the spatial and temporal context have been identified in order 
to analyse the reorganisation of Berlin’s mode of housing provision. The second part 
of the chapter dealt with the practical process of research and the challenges involved 
in fieldwork. 
 
The next chapters turn to the analysis of the reorganisation of Berlin’s state-owned 
housing provision. The first of the empirical chapters (4) analyses the historical and 
spatial development of Berlin’s provision of housing structure in order to contex-
tualise the analysis. Having established the context, the three following chapters (5-7) 
analyse the different processes of the reorganisation of Berlin’s mode of housing pro-
vision and its uneven consequences. First, the process of privatisation of state-owned 
housing companies and estates, and the impact of institutional investors on the provi-
sion of housing is analysed (5). Second, the reformation of the remaining state-owned 
housing companies and its consequences on how they operate is investigated (6). And 
third, the abandonment of supply-side subsidies is under scrutiny, looking at the im-
pact this had on the previously established production relations of institutional inves-
tors and state-owned housing companies (7). 
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4 Historical and Spatial Development of Berlin’s Housing  
 
Current regulatory changes have to be contextualised within historical developments 
because they are embedded within inherited legacies produced by specific social and 
political struggles (Brenner and Theodore 2002). This is especially significant in re-
gards to the built environment and the provision of housing, since housing was built at 
one point, evolved sequentially, and is continued to be used today (Sayer 2000: 123; 
see also section 3.2.2). The high production costs and the long-term use of housing 
imply that the historically developed housing, which still exists, is pivotal to under-
standing current changes in the mode of housing provision. With the purpose to ana-
lyse the transformation of Berlin’s mode of housing provision and its uneven mecha-
nisms in the last decade (see chapters 5-7), this chapter looks at the historical devel-
opment of Berlin’s housing provision before the mid-1990s.  
 
The chapter builds the argument that the evolution of Berlin’s housing provision, over 
the past century, created particular conditions which play a significant role in the pro-
cesses of uneven development triggered through the transformation of Berlin’s hous-
ing provision in the last decade. In order to understand how the reorganisation of Ber-
lin’s mode of housing provision created processes of uneven development, the chapter 
addresses the following question: How have different types of housing spatially, 
physically, institutionally, and socially developed? 
 
Housing is a highly heterogeneous and inflexible good (Krätke and Borst 2000: 158 et 
seq.). Four characteristics are crucial to its understanding. First, the spatial location of 
housing is significant due to its immobility. This creates spatially differentiated mar-
ket segments. Second, the institutional form is important for understanding price 
mechanisms. Three forms are distinguished: Owner-occupied, private rented, and 
social rented housing.
50
 Third, diverging physical characteristics such as age, quality, 
design, and size create factually differentiated market segments. And fourth, the het-
erogeneous character of housing influences the social structure of the occupants. The 
highly segmented housing market means that there is not equal tenant access to all the 
housing units. This is what makes housing a good reflection of the socio-spatial urban 
structure. 
 
                                                 
 
50
 Berlin’s housing market is dominated by social and private rented housing. 86.5 percent of the hous-
ing stock is rented. The percentage of rented housing is especially high in inner city districts (Mitte, 
Friedrichshain-Kreuzberg, Lichtenberg) with more than 94 percent of rented housing. While there has 
been a successive increase in home ownership, from 11 percent in 2000 to 13.5 percent in 2008 
(Investitionsbank Berlin 2010), it remains relatively small and is therefore largely neglected in the 
analysis! 
 71 
The chapter investigates these characteristics along three different types of housing: 
(1) late 19
th
-century block developments, (2) Nineteen Twenties, Thirties, and Fifties 
row developments, and (3) post-war high-rise developments.
51
 
 
• Block developments: built during the late 19
th
-century, block devel-
opments are predominantly located within an urban belt around the 
historical core of the city. 
• Row developments: built from the beginning of the 1920s through the 
1950s, row developments are located within the train loop of the inner 
city and at the periphery of West Berlin. 
• High-rise developments: built in East and West Berlin from the 1960s 
onwards, high-rise developments are located in the outskirts of Berlin. 
 
Map 4.1 shows Berlin’s housing structure with the three types of housing.
52
  
 
The chapter is structured along these three types of housing, which still play a signifi-
cant role in Berlin’s housing provision today. The chapter investigates their historical 
development during the division of the city and discusses their spatial, physical, insti-
tutional, and social legacy that has implications for the transformation of Berlin’s 
mode of housing provision analysed in the following chapters 5, 6, and 7. This new 
approach, which contrasts with a conventional chronological approach to investigate 
the historical development of Berlin’s housing provision, exposes the question of how 
regulation, production, and consumption mechanisms affect the three housing types. 
The chapter ends with a more detailed spatial analysis of Map 4.1 and raises the ques-
tions that will be addressed in the following chapters. 
 
 
                                                 
 
51
 These three types are based on the broadest summary categorisation by the Senate Department for 
Urban Development for the Urban Structure of the Berlin Digital Environmental Atlas 
(Senatsverwaltung für Stadtentwicklung 2008). The English terms used here are based on the official 
translation by the Senate Department for Urban Development. 
52
 The category of low buildings with yards is a fourth category distinguished by Berlin’s Senate De-
partment for Urban Development’s broadest summary categorisation. This category is relatively het-
erogeneous with one to two storey row houses built before 1945, single family houses built after 1945, 
villas, and mansions with surrounding land. The buildings in this category take up significant space. 
They do however play an inferior role in the provision of housing structure because of their low-
density. Moreover, the housing units in this category are often owner-occupied. This category has 
therefore been neglected. 
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Map 4.1: Spatial Distribution of Different Housing Types in Berlin 
Data set: Informationssystem Stadt und Umwelt (ISU) der Senatsverwaltung für Stad-
tentwicklung Berlin 
 
4.1 Late 19
th
-Century Block Developments 
 
The block developments
53
 are closely linked to Berlin’s urbanisation and the city’s 
rise to a modern metropolis. At the end of the 19
th
-century, Berlin underwent a rapid 
industrialisation causing exceptional population growth. During this time period, also 
referred to as the Wilhelmine Berlin, housing construction predominantly occurred in 
the form of block developments (see Photo 4.1 and Photo 4.2). These developments 
were built starting in the 1870s resulting from public street planning, construction law, 
and private investment (Schwenk 2002). While previous housing was primarily built 
by landowners, private corporations started to invest in new housing, hoping to make 
high profits (Häußermann and Kapphan 2002). The president of the police was in 
                                                 
 
53
 Late 19
th
-century block developments are also referred to as tenement buildings (Mietskasernen). 
19th-century block development
Twenties, thirties, fifties row development
Postwar high-rise development
Low buildings with yards
Other built environment
Natural environment
Water
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charge of planning and building regulations and decreed strict rules regarding the 
form of housing structure, leading to uniform five-story buildings.
54
 
 
The block developments were built along a belt that surrounded the urban core of the 
city at the time.
55
 Railway lines defined the exterior boundary of this belt. In some 
cases though, this boundary was crossed and the developments went beyond the rail-
way lines (Schwenk 2002: 208 et seq.). The developments are characterised by their 
closed structures with a front house, side and rear wings. Several rear wings follow 
each other creating a sequence of courtyards (see Photo 4.1). 
 
With this housing structure, the police president at the time wanted to avoid the de-
velopment of working class slums within the city-centre. The cheaper and smaller 
apartments in the rear wings that were very densely built and the more generous 
apartments in the front buildings created a social mixture within each block. However, 
this structure did not prevent the development of working class neighbourhoods in the 
North and East of the city. In these neighbourhoods, the apartments were generally 
smaller in size and the rear wings of the blocks were more densely structured. The 
petty bourgeoisie and craftsmen inhabited the front buildings while unskilled workers 
lived in the rear wings. In western districts such as Charlottenburg and Wilmersdorf, 
the apartments within these block developments were built more generously. In these 
districts, front buildings were often connected with the side wings, constituting 
apartments of five rooms or more. The bourgeoisie occupied these apartments and the 
people working in the trades or in the public sector lived in the rear wings of these 
houses (Häußermann and Kapphan 2002; Bernet 2004). Häußermann and Kapphan 
(2002: 35, author's translation) call this development “a ‘social mix’ within segre-
gated structures”.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
54
 See Bernet (2004) for a discussion on the ‘Hobrecht-Plan’ (named after the head of the commission 
in charge of the construction police in Berlin – the urban planning department at the time) and how its 
assessment has changed over the past 150 years. 
55
 A city wall that marked the fiscal boundary delimited the urban core. The wall was however torn 
down in 1860 (Schwenk 2002: 112). 
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Photo 4.1: Bird’s Eye View of a late 19th-Century Block Development with Side and 
Rear Wings (here Hackesche Höfe, Mitte) 
 
 
At the beginning of the 1910s, the block developments came under criticism from the 
general public, but also from the professional planning guild.
56
 Besides planning and 
aesthetic critiques, the block developments were criticised for their increasingly dete-
riorating social conditions (Häußermann and Kapphan 2002). Private corporations 
were not capable of producing enough dwellings for the growing population. Often, 
rear buildings were overcrowded leading to sanitary deficits. New solutions for a 
more humane housing provision to accommodate the growing working class popula-
tion had to be found. This resulted in the state-led construction of row developments 
during the Twenties, Thirties, and Fifties (see section 4.2 below). At the same time, 
the block developments became increasingly neglected until their physical reconstruc-
tion which began in the 1970s. 
 
After the Second World War, during the division of the city, the two governments had 
diverging approaches on handling the old block development housing stock in the 
inner city. West Berlin’s government aimed to tear down the block developments and 
replace them with new ones. The government came however under increasing pres-
sure from the population to preserve and renovate them. East Berlin’s government 
mainly abandoned the old block development housing stock. The particular way in 
                                                 
 
56
 The German term Mietskaserne (tenement) for this housing type manifests itself in this critique. The 
term is still used, but no longer with this negative connotation. See Häußermann and Kapphan (2002) 
for a discussion of the different critiques. 
This image has been removed, as the copyright is owned by another 
organisation. 
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which the two governments dealt with the block developments influences the provi-
sion of housing structure still today. The following sections analyse the diverging 
paths in more detail. 
 
4.1.1 Sensitive Urban Renewal of Block Developments in West Berlin  
 
In the immediate post-war period, the government of West Berlin had a rather am-
biguous position regarding the late 19
th
-century block developments. On the one hand, 
public subsidies existed to remove the stucco on the facades because it was con-
sidered to be out-of-date. On the other hand, there were efforts to protect the few re-
maining historical sites that were not bombed out during the war. However, despite 
state subsidies to renovate the block developments, private owners rarely had the 
means to renovate their properties. The housing stock of Wilhelmine Berlin therefore 
continued to decay (Bremer et al. 2007).  
 
At the beginning of the 1960s, Berlin’s government decided to replace these block 
developments. West Berlin’s government designated several neighbourhoods with 
block developments for demolition. This was partly motivated by the aim to support a 
construction industry that suffered from a vanishing interest to invest in Berlin. The 
goal was to replace the block developments with socially financed high-rise buildings 
(see section 4.3.1 below). State-owned housing companies led this urban renewal. 
They had to buy the apartments and a whole block had to be emptied before it could 
be demolished. It usually took 13 years from the announcement to the demolition 
phase due to the rigidity of the demolition regulations. 
 
The social structure of the inhabitants of this type of housing remained relatively 
mixed until the announcement of the demolition at the end of the 1960s. The an-
nouncement however, fostered an exodus of the more mobile population, mostly to 
the post-war high-rise developments in the periphery (see section 4.3.1 below). Dur-
ing the time period between the announcement and the actual demolition itself, the 
apartments were sublet to migrant workers that were expected to return to their home 
country. The proportion of immigrants, mostly from Turkey, increased quickly, espe-
cially within the districts of Wedding and Kreuzberg. Because immigrants were ex-
cluded from the newly built (social) housing units at first, they remained within the 
old block developments. Besides the immigrant population, students also increasingly 
squatted the block developments.  
 
Towards the end of the 1960s, however, tenants began to protest against this form of 
‘comprehensive renewal’ (Flächensanierung). The squatters were the first ones to 
protest against the demolition of these housing units (Häußermann and Kapphan 
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2002). This protest led to a rethinking at the political level which resulted in the reori-
entation of urban renewal to preserve the built environment and social structures of 
the block developments (see Photo 4.2). The state started subsidising the renovation 
of these neighbourhoods (Häußermann and Kapphan 2002; see also chapter 7.2). At 
first, state-owned housing companies implemented this new form of ‘sensitive urban 
renewal’ (behutsame Stadterneuerung); later, private landlords also benefitted from 
the state subsidies to renew the housing themselves. 
 
Photo 4.2: Renovated Front Buildings in a late 19
th
-Century Block Development Neigh-
bourhood (here Chamissoplatz, Kreuzberg) 
 
© Sabina Uffer 
 
The sensitive urban renewal strategy significantly increased the physical quality of the 
block developments in West Berlin. Through the demolition of some of the rear wings, 
the block structures were opened up, and more light was able to reach the remaining 
buildings. This made living in the rear wings more comfortable because the apart-
ments were better protected from street noise. The high ceilings, the wooden floors, 
and the large rooms also contributed to the increasing popularity of this housing type. 
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4.1.2 Complete Abandonment of Block Developments in East Berlin  
 
In East Berlin, the situation of the housing stock from Wilhelmine Berlin was differ-
ent. The block developments were considered as a “relic from the former capitalist 
system” (Kemper 1998: 18) and were mostly abandoned. At the same time, new pre-
fabricated housing estates were built, first in the bombed out inner city areas and later 
in the outskirts of the city (see section 4.3.2 below).  
 
During the GDR era, private land ownership, and therefore housing, was abandoned.  
Rent levels in the existing housing stock were kept at pre-war levels and allocation 
was organised by the state. Even where the ownership of housing formally remained, 
the owners could not rent the housing cost-effectively. There was no possibility of 
profit-making from renting apartments. Owners who left for West Berlin either do-
nated the house to the state or were expropriated (Häußermann and Kapphan 2002: 
179). 
 
A lot of apartments were emptied due to the increasing neglect of this housing stock. 
Others were occupied by young people who did not want to move out to the monoto-
nously newly built housing (see section 4.3.2 below) and considered this form of liv-
ing more attractive (Häußermann and Kapphan 2002: 68). There were a lot of critical 
intellectuals and artists among them. Due to a politically motivated allocation policy, 
the old neglected housing stock was also inhabited with socially discriminated citi-
zens. These were, for example, the elderly and people who applied for an exit permit. 
A third group consisted of families on the waiting list for the new housing 
(Häußermann and Kapphan 2002: 77 et seq.). The social structure was therefore rela-
tively heterogeneous. 
 
Only since the 1980s did some block development renovations take place in the 
shadow of the large-scale housing construction at the periphery (see section 4.3.2 be-
low). The initial efforts to modernise the block developments could however not stop 
the decay of this housing in East Berlin. The construction industry of the GDR was 
too focused on new buildings. This made a reorientation of the necessary capacities 
for the modernisation of the old housing stock difficult. However, also in East Berlin, 
experts and increasingly residents of the block developments mostly in the district of 
Prenzlauer Berg, demanded a rethinking towards the preservation of block develop-
ments. It was however only from the mid-1990s onwards that this housing stock got 
renewed on a large scale (see section 7.2). 
 
After reunification, the owners of the housing who were expropriated either during 
the Nazi-Regime or during the GDR could reclaim their property based on the 
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national law for unresolved property questions.
57
 Restitution claims were made for 
most of the inner city areas in East Berlin.
58
 Solving restitution claims often took sev-
eral years, delaying the modernisation process immediately after reunification.
59
 
However, most previous owners were no longer interested in the housing and sold it 
relatively quickly after restitution. Individuals, owners’ associations, and small-scale 
private investors bought the majority of this housing stock. The housing stock without 
restitution claims came into the ownership of state-owned housing companies 
(Häußermann et al. 2002). 
 
* 
 
The analysis of the different pathways that late 19
th
-century block developments 
underwent in East and West Berlin shows that the physical, but also institutional and 
social conditions of this type of housing in the mid-1990s depended on their location. 
In West Berlin, the block developments were increasingly renovated through state 
subsidies. They were either in the ownership of state-owned housing companies or 
small private landlords. The tenant structure constituted of tenants that were not able 
or did not want to move into newly built social housing, such as immigrants, students, 
and elderly people. In East Berlin, the block developments, in contrast, were mostly 
decaying. Through the restitution process, they were transferred to small-scale inves-
tors or remained in the ownership of state-owned housing companies. A high social 
mix, from intellectuals, and artists to families and elderly people made up the tenant 
structure. These previous rounds of uneven development between East and West Ber-
lin’s 19
th
-century block developments raises the question of how the transformation of 
the mode of housing provision starting in the mid-1990s played out under these cir-
cumstances. How do regulation, production, and consumption relations occupy and 
transform these spatial characteristics?   
 
The following section turns towards the second category of the three housing types, 
the Nineteen Twenties, Thirties, and Fifties row developments, analysing their spatial, 
physical, institutional, and social development. 
 
                                                 
 
57
 Gesetz zur Regelung offener Vermögensfragen. In West Germany, the restitution of expropriated 
housing during the Nazi era had already taken place earlier. 
58
 In the district of Prenzlauer Berg, for example, restitution claims were made for 90 percent of the 
properties (Häußermann et al. 2002). The high amount of restitution claims in inner city areas was due 
to the relatively high percentage of Jews owning this type of housing before 1933. It was however also 
due to the fact that the GDR expropriated the housing for the substitution of urban infrastructure 
(Häußermann et al. 2002). 
59
 The housing companies, which managed the housing stock during the restitution process, did not 
have any incentives to modernise, since most likely restitution meant that they had to return the hous-
ing to its rightful owner (Häußermann et al. 2002).  
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4.2 Twenties, Thirties, and Fifties Row Developments 
 
The 1920s and 1930s row developments are closely linked to the origins of state-
subsidised housing provision in Berlin. The collapse of the privately funded housing 
industry that built the 19
th
-century block developments until the Great War became a 
major challenge for Berlin during the Weimar Republic (Haspel and Jaeggi 2007: 12; 
see also section 4.1). The urgent housing shortage that resulted in the overcrowding of 
block developments demanded state intervention. Social and planning reforms of the 
Weimar Republic targeted the misery of the working class districts. These reforms 
had two major impacts on the provision of housing.  
 
A first impact concerned the ownership of the development and management of the 
housing. The reforms introduced the publicly financed housing provision subject to 
certain regulatory conditions. This generated a different structure of housing develop-
ers (Burkhardt 1999: 26). It marked the beginning of non-profit housing construction 
(Gemeinnütziger Wohnungsbau), which continues to impact the mode of housing 
provision until today (see chapter 6). In comparison to the small-scale private inves-
tors that built the tenements of the Wilhelmine Berlin, the non-profit housing com-
panies had the capacity to build compact housing estates with several hundred dwell-
ings. Considering the non-profit housing companies as a solid partner, the state sup-
ported the construction of housing (Bernhardt 1999: 59). In exchange, these housing 
companies, restricted in their profit-making, built affordable housing for the masses. 
Between 1925 and 1930, 135,000 apartments were built in Berlin, of which 75 percent 
were built under the principle of non-profit housing construction (Bernhardt 1999: 59; 
Häußermann and Kapphan 2002: 49). In this time period, state-owned housing com-
panies were founded and established as non-profit companies. These state-owned 
housing companies, even though transformed from the 1990s on, still play a major 
role in Berlin’s mode of housing provision (see chapter 6). 
 
A second impact of the social and planning reforms concerned the design of the hous-
ing. Avant-garde architects
60
 started to design high quality housing at affordable 
prices. These row developments soon became nationally and internationally ac-
claimed for their modern style architecture. Less dense structures with a high amount 
of green areas characterised them. Even though the size of the apartments was not 
necessarily bigger than the size of those in a block development, they had higher liv-
ing standards with modern facilities (such as bath, kitchen, hot water, central heating 
                                                 
 
60
 These architects (Gropius, Mies van der Rohe, Taut are some of the best-known among them) were 
later canonised under the term International Style and they became famous for their aesthetics of func-
tionalism. See Hake (2008) and Haspel and Jaeggi (2007) for a more in-depth discussion of the archi-
tectural features of these housing estates. 
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system, and balcony). Hake (2008: 106) described this type of housing as “[t]he sim-
ple materiality of glass, iron, and concrete announced the levelling of social and 
national differences, while flat roofs, unadorned façades, and horizontal window 
bands captures the dynamism of the times in this clearest manifestation of the new 
mass body” (see Photo 4.3). 
 
The row developments of the 1920s and 1930s were built within the inner city loop 
demarcated by the railway lines. Often, these developments filled sites of existing 
gaps within the urban structure. The more centrally located row developments were 
densely built with open structures and a lot of greenery (see Photo 4.3). More periph-
eral housing estates were integrated in park-like areas. The row developments created 
residential areas introducing a clear functional division between living and working 
(Haspel and Jaeggi 2007: 9). 
 
White-collar employees from the private and public sector and better off manual 
workers mainly occupied these new housing estates. The lower working class did not 
have access to these estates for three reasons. First, the housing was often constructed 
by corporations owned or closely related to companies, which provided housing for 
their white-collar employees.
61
 Second, despite subsidies, rent levels were comparably 
high. And third, the allocation through the housing office was discriminating against 
families and households that were “perceived as less desirable” (McElligott 1992: 
107).
62
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
61
 For example Siemensstadt (Siemens-City). 
62
 For a more detailed account of the historical development of housing provision in the first part of the 
Twentieth century, see Häußermann and Kapphan (2002) and Puchta and Koop (2008). 
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Photo 4.3: Bird’s Eye View of a Twenties Row Development (here Carl Legien Estate, 
Prenzlauer Berg, Constructed between 1928 and 1930) 
 
 
 
 
During the Second World War, the provision of housing mostly gave way to the con-
struction of representational buildings for the Nazi Regime, despite continuous hous-
ing shortages (Schäche 1999: 194). The housing problem became even more pressing 
after the war when Berlin struggled with the destruction. After the Second World War, 
Berlin was badly bombed
63
 out and suffered from a structural housing shortage. Phys-
ical reconstruction was therefore an urgent task. In the immediate years after the war 
repairing existing buildings was a priority. Private investment was however scarce. 
State intervention was therefore considered essential to the rebuilding of the city. The 
increasingly divided city followed however slightly different approaches, not only 
with regards to the renewal of the old housing stock (as seen in sections 4.1.1 and 
4.1.2 above), but also with regards to the construction of new housing. The following 
sections explore the early post-war construction of housing that was, at least in West 
Berlin, still dominated by row developments. 
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 The estimations of destruction vary widely from between 10 and 20 percent of all buildings that were 
completely destroyed and around 70 percent that were partially destroyed (Sewing and Hannemann 
1999: 208). 
This image has been removed, as the copyright is owned by another 
organisation. 
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4.2.1 Continuation of the Modern Style Row Developments in West Berlin 
 
In West Berlin, row developments continued to be built after the Second World War, 
however, under a slightly changed institutional form. Housing subsidies orchestrated 
on the national level became even more pivotal than during the interwar period. State 
intervention was based on legal regulations and direct economic means. The legal 
regulations were dominated by rent regulations.
64
 Direct economic intervention was 
accomplished through supply-side subsidies that were going into housing construction. 
The housing subsidy system that was implemented in this early post-war period con-
tinues to influence Berlin’s mode of housing provision today.  
 
The immense housing shortage and the lack of private investment led to a highly sub-
sidised housing system, a considerable part being financed with special Berlin subsi-
dies from the national government and the Western Allies. With the First Housing 
Construction Act that West Berlin adopted from the national government in 1951,
65
 
the city started the housing subsidisation at a large scale in order to remedy the short-
age and provide housing for a broad cross-section of the population.
66
 State-financed 
housing became an essential part of the housing provision. Between 1952 and 1961, 
90 percent of the new housing construction was social housing and non-profit housing 
companies built 39 percent of it (Hanauske 1999). 
 
In contrast to the Weimar Republic where non-profit companies exclusively under-
took the construction of subsidised housing (see section 4.2 above), the Housing Con-
struction Act entitled all house builders to receive government assistance for a certain 
time period – either through direct subsidies or low interest loans – in return for rent 
ceilings and occupancy control. Once the government assistance was paid back, the 
housing units became private property (see also section 7.1).
67
  
 
                                                 
 
64
 Because of a dramatic housing shortage – a lack of six million dwelling units after World War II –, 
there was a system of housing control where rents were frozen at pre-war levels and letting of units was 
done by local housing offices which alone were responsible for allocation (Heinz 1991). This control 
system was removed in 1960 (Gesetz über den Abbau der Wohnungszwangswirtschaft). Only in 1963 
were new rent regulations introduced (Egner et al. 2004). New tenant protections were introduced as 
part of rent regulations in 1971 (Heinz 1991). In certain cities however, the termination of rent control 
for the old housing stock was postponed. In West Berlin, this was not abolished until 1987 (Heinz 
1991; Krätke and Borst 2000). 
65
 With West Berlin’s implementation of the national Housing Construction Act in 1951, the city be-
came integrated in the structure of housing provision of West Germany. 
66
 Until the beginning of the 1950s, the repair of the still functional dwellings had priority over new 
construction. However, due to a lack of material and skilled workforces, the immense housing shortage 
could not be remedied in West Berlin. 
67
 Direct government loans with no, or reduced, interest rates were gradually curtailed in favour of 
capital market money (Heinz 1991). 
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This form of state intervention helped to augment the housing supply at a large-scale 
when private investors were not able to construct at a sufficient enough pace on their 
own. From the very beginning however, state intervention was viewed as an emer-
gency and temporary measure until the free market could take over again. A with-
drawal of the state “in favour of the free forces of the market and of property forma-
tion” was therefore pre-programmed (Novy 1991: 20; see also Heinz 1991).   
 
As mentioned, the housing during this period was still predominantly built as row 
developments. In contrast to the 1920s and 1930s, the 1950s row developments were 
mostly built in the periphery due to the higher prices in the inner city, but also be-
cause the open structure of these developments allowed no interaction with the his-
torical urban structure of the built environment. Only towards the mid-1950s, were 
row developments also built in inner city areas. They were mostly linked to the com-
prehensive renewal, meaning the demolition of old block development housing (see 
section 4.1.1 above) although these projects were few. 
 
With regards to their physical form, the 1950s row developments did not incorporate 
new urban visions. Second-rate architects have copied the open structures of the 
1920s and 1930s developments, which had long become standardised. The apartments 
were relatively small and had a higher standard than the rest of West Germany due to 
the higher subsidies (Sewing and Hannemann 1999: 217 et seq.). As with the earlier 
row developments, the 1950s row developments were built as residential estates 
segregated from other functions such as employment and retail. None of the estates 
had more than 2000 units. In comparison to the 1920s and 1930s row developments, 
the 1950s row developments soon became criticised for their moderate modern style, 
being too monotonous, too functional, and too small. At the same time, the rent levels 
of the social housing units were higher than the average rent levels in Berlin due to 
the relatively high costs for land and construction (Hanauske 1999: 101). 
 
4.2.2 Socialist Realism Replaced Row Developments in East Berlin 
 
The ideological position of the GDR, created especially at the beginning of the divi-
sion a different form of housing. Later, the two forms of housing provision became 
surprisingly convergent (see section 4.3 below). However, at the beginning, the ri-
valry between the two cities was also fought out on the grounds of housing provision. 
Only very few 1950s row developments were built in East Berlin. The GDR gov-
ernment discredited the housing model of the 1920s and 1930s row developments that 
was at the time initiated as a modern, social, and functional housing model. The suc-
cess that this model gained in North America turned the 1920s and 1930s row devel-
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opments into a capitalist housing model, which was no longer acceptable to the GDR 
government (Sewing and Hannemann 1999: 213). 
 
Socialist realism propagated the integration of “habitation, recreation, consumption, 
and political self-projection in the public realm” (Sewing and Hannemann 1999: 213; 
author's translation). This meant that living took place in the inner city. Housing was 
constructed as “palace-like” high-rises with retail spaces on the ground floor. Apart-
ments were generously sized with luxurious standards (Sewing and Hannemann 1999: 
214; author's translation). This led to the construction of the Stalin-Allee, today’s 
Karl-Marx-Allee in East Berlin (see Photo 4.4). 
 
Photo 4.4: Bird’s Eye View of Socialist Realist Housing in East Berlin Built Between 
1952 and 1960 (here Karl-Marx-Allee, Friedrichshain and Mitte)  
 
© Sabina Uffer 
 
The luxurious standard of this socialist realist model of housing provision could how-
ever not been kept up for long. Already from 1954 onwards, the GDR government 
reoriented its mode of housing provision. While the new technology of the prefabri-
cated slabs was already developed in the 1950s, it took until the 1970s to mass-
produce them at a large scale (see section 4.3 below). 
 
* 
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In the mid-1990s, the Twenties, Thirties, and Fifties row developments were in rather 
desperate condition. Because subsidies were paid back, they were no longer part of 
the social housing stock, but integrated into the free market. They were rarely up-
graded to a newer housing standard and needed urgent renovation. There was how-
ever a clear difference between the Twenties and Thirties developments and the Fif-
ties developments. The Twenties and Thirties row developments were centrally lo-
cated. The Fifties row developments, in contrast, were mostly located in the urban 
periphery. Moreover, while the former were increasingly celebrated for their historical 
significance as a representation of modern design,
68
 the latter degenerated into insig-
nificance. Row developments have continued to be built in one form or another until 
today (see case of High-Deck-Siedlung, section 3.3.2). However, none of the post-war 
built row developments gained the same cult status of the Twenties and Thirties row 
developments. How did these differences in location and popularity play out under the 
transformed mode of housing provision in the last decade? How did the fact that the 
Twenties and Thirties as well as the Fifties row developments needed renovation af-
fect the regulation, production, and consumption relations? 
 
The analysis of the Twenties, Thirties, and Fifties row developments illustrate the rise 
of state-led housing provision whose legacy continues to play a significant role in 
today’s mode of housing provision in Berlin (see chapters 5-7). Within both parts of 
the city, the government played an essential role in the construction of these housing 
estates. In East Berlin, construction was directly organised by the state. In West Berlin, 
construction of the housing estates was almost entirely supported by social housing 
subsidies. Both states gave high importance to housing as part of their welfare provi-
sion (Sewing and Hannemann 1999). This institutional form of housing provision 
peaked with the development of new urban visions at the edge of both cities: the post-
war high-rise developments. The next section turns towards the analysis of this third 
type of housing. 
 
                                                 
 
68
 Six of the Twenties and Thirties row developments have been designated with UNESCO World 
Heritage Status in 2008. 
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4.3 Post-war High-rise Developments 
 
From the 1960s onwards, the urban visions of East and West Berlin started to con-
verge. These new planning visions appeared in the form of post-war high-rise devel-
opments. In West Berlin, the focus was no longer on the development of single hous-
ing estates such as row developments, but the construction of large-scale housing es-
tates with high-rise developments. From the mid-1970s onwards, East Berlin solved 
the problem of housing shortage similarly, but on an even larger scale. The high-rise 
developments in East and West resemble each other also with regards to the techno-
logical approach. Both applied prefabricated slabs to construct different entities 
within a large-scale housing estate, which covered whole neighbourhoods. Moreover, 
in East and West Berlin, the post-war high-rise buildings were constructed to accom-
modate small families and integrated different facilities into the neighbourhoods. 
 
4.3.1 Three New High-rise Housing Estates in West Berlin 
 
Towards the end of the 1950s, the national housing subsidies system started to change. 
With the Second Housing Construction Act in 1956, the national state also subsidised 
home ownership for low income households (Egner et al. 2004). At the same time, the 
free housing market was indirectly promoted through tax-deductible amortisations 
(see Stimpel 1990). Additionally, starting from 1965, demand-side subsidies sup-
ported tenants on lower incomes and therefore strengthened their position in the hous-
ing market (Egner et al. 2004).
69
 Supply-side subsidies however continued to play an 
important role. In the 1960s, 85 percent of the housing construction was still state 
subsidised (Hanauske 1999: 113; see also chapter 7). As in the 1950s, the non-profit, 
mostly state-owned housing companies, predominantly acted as developers of large-
scale housing estates. 
 
Starting in the 1960s, new urban visions were constructed in the outskirts of West 
Berlin (see Photo 4.5). Under the direction of state-owned housing companies, three 
large-scale housing estates with high-rise developments were built. The names of 
these housing estates made clear that they covered whole neighbourhoods. The 
Gropiusstadt and the Märkisches Viertel each with 18,000 housing units, and the Fal-
kenhagener Feld with 11,500 housing units were finished between 1962 and 1975. 
These estates were characterised by their high density and the integration of infra-
structure such as schools and shopping facilities (Hanauske 1999: 105). However, 
while the neighbourhoods were equipped with these types of facilities, they often 
lacked job opportunities within the area. 
                                                 
 
69
 For a more detailed account of the different subsidy systems and how they developed over time, see 
Stimpel (1990), Norton and Novy (1991), Egner et al. (2004), or Kofner (2004). 
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Photo 4.5: Entity of Post-war High-rise Development (here Gropiusstadt, Neukölln) 
 
© Sabina Uffer 
 
The aim of these large-scale housing estates was to overcome the schematic row de-
velopments of the Nineteen Twenties, Thirties and Fifties. Different high-rise devel-
opments constituted the area of these large-scale housing estates. While the design of 
the high-rise developments varied, they mostly had more than ten floors. Also, they 
were constructed with prefabricated slabs (Hanauske 1999: 105). Knorr-Siedow and 
Droste (2005: 16) characterise these estates as “distinctly different built entities, as-
sessed as being a unitary type of an urban entity”. As with the state subsidised hous-
ing in earlier years, the housing was built according to the latest standards. Because of 
state subsidies, the government determined allocation and rent ceilings. The post-war 
high-rise developments were predominantly inhabited by the German middle class, 
young couples, small families and some pensioners (Häußermann and Kapphan 2002: 
82). Migrants and students remained in the old block developments of the inner city 
(see section 4.1.1 above). 
 
In West Berlin, the construction of high-rise buildings was halted from 1974 onwards. 
This change in housing construction was not only induced by protests against the 
demolition of housing in the inner city; it was also connected to the starting decline of 
socially financed housing construction for the masses (Bodenschatz 1999: 231; see 
 88 
also section 7.1). The national state level had already been reducing its intervention in 
the provision of housing from the 1950s onwards. The 1980s however, marked a his-
torical moment with a dramatic decrease in the provision of new state-aided housing. 
 
The slower growth rate of West Germany’s economy coupled with high inflation that 
was hard to tackle, but also an increasing over-supply of housing, led to the retreat of 
the national state from the provision of housing. Already under a socialist party gov-
ernment, but even more so under a more right wing oriented government, cuts in 
social welfare, and therefore housing provision became the main priority. Housing 
specific reasons also contributed to this re-thinking. There was a fading trust in state-
owned housing companies and a belief that private housing companies would do a 
more cost-efficient job (see also chapter 5). At the same time, there was a growing 
concern that state-subsidised social housing was not targeting those who needed it the 
most because of the continuing occupancy by better off tenants (see also section 7.1). 
Another critique of the existing subsidies system was the fact that the rent levels in 
new social housing were higher than in the old housing stock (Harloe 1995: 460 et 
seq.; see also section 7.1).  
 
The reduced intervention of the national state can be distinguished by two major 
transformations. First, the national state continuously decreased the volume of supply-
side subsidies for housing construction (Kuhn 1999: 119). Housing allowances in-
creasingly became the central instrument of the federal government’s housing policy. 
Second, there was a shift from subsidising (social) rental housing towards the promo-
tion of home ownership through tax-subsidies.
70
 With this transformation, West Ber-
lin’s housing provision construction fell into a crisis. The expectation of ever-
increasing economic growth was shattered. Instead, construction costs and interest 
rates exploded due to high land prices and an uncertain political future (Kuhn 1999: 
119 et seq.). As mentioned, a reduction of the housing output from 1974 onwards was 
the consequence.   
 
While West Berlin’s housing construction began to decline starting in the 1970s, 
housing construction in East Berlin started to take off. It stood by the promise to solve 
the housing problem until the 1990s. Within twenty years, each family had to be ac-
commodated within a housing unit that included heating (Bodenschatz 1999: 232). 
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 In 2006, based on the federal state reform (Föderalismusreform), the national government completely 
devolved the regulatory and financial responsibilities for the construction of supply-side subsidised 
housing onto the regional governments (Länder) and to the communities (Deutscher Bundestag 2007). 
This means that the national state did not only provide the Länder and cities with increased governing 
capacity, but also withdrew from the financial responsibilities of the housing provision. The law states 
that the housing market is more and more differentiated between and within the cities and therefore the 
Länder and cities can better target the specific local needs on the respective market (Egner et al. 2004). 
 89 
 
4.3.2 Large-scale High-rise Developments in East Berlin 
 
The GDR government tried to solve the housing problem with the construction of 
industrialised high-rise housing. Compared to West Berlin, East Berlin’s high-rise 
buildings were first constructed in inner city areas, “on the ruins of the rest of the old 
city” (Bodenschatz 1999: 225, author's translation). Only from the mid-1970s on-
wards did East Berlin’s approach to housing construction converge with West Ber-
lin’s. 
 
Between 1975 and 1990, three neighbourhoods with 68,000 (Marzahn), 34,000 (Ho-
henschönhausen), and 40,000 (Hellersdorf) housing units respectively, were con-
structed (Häußermann and Kapphan 2002). Schools, kindergartens and shops were 
integrated in these housing complexes. The goal was to have these facilities as well as 
a public transport hub within walking distance (Hannemann 1996). State-run housing 
companies built these estates and allocation was entirely state-led. Rents were stand-
ardised and only slightly higher than rents in the old housing stock in the inner city
71
 
(Kemper 1998). The housing was highly standardised, built with prefabricated slabs 
(see Photo 4.6). In terms of housing quality, it was regarded as a higher standard than 
the rest of the housing stock because it had central heating. Criticism arose, however, 
because of the small room sizes (Hannemann 1996).   
 
Through the construction of housing developments on an even larger scale than in 
West Berlin, the government hoped to relocate the population from inner city areas 
into new housing with better standards. The aim was to annihilate social classes. Thus, 
the development of new ‘housing complexes’ was considered the opposite of capi-
talist segregated urban development (Hannemann 1996). While there was a high mix-
ture in terms of social status, the allocation policy of the state fostered other forms of 
segregation: The government gave priority to young couples and families, and ignored 
non-conforming and elderly people (Häußermann and Kapphan 2002: 70 et seq.; 
Kemper 1998). 
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 Rent levels within the old housing stock of the inner city remained at the level of 1936. 
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Photo 4.6: Bird's Eye View of Prefabricated High-rise Developments in East Berlin 
(here, Marzahn, Marzahn-Hellersdorf) 
 
Source: Deutsches Bundesarchiv (German Federal Archive)
72
 
 
* 
 
The analysis of the post-war high-rise developments shows that the mode of housing 
provision in East and West Berlin did no longer significantly differ, at least with re-
gards to the construction of new housing. Both cities solved the housing problem in 
the post-war era with the construction of state-directed large-scale housing estates in 
the outskirts even though the dimensions in the East were considerably larger.  
 
While the attraction of these high-rise developments in West Berlin already began to 
fade since the 1980s, the prefabricated high-rises in the East quickly came under at-
tack after reunification for their monotonous structure. Moreover, criticised for their 
peripheral location, the high-rise structures and the lack of social infrastructure, have 
increasingly been neglected. In East and West Berlin, the high-rise estates increas-
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 Picture Number 183-1987-0128-310. Photo: Link, Hubert, 01.01.1987. Licenced under Creative 
Commons (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/3.0/de/deed.en [accessed 29.03.2011]). 
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ingly fought against a poor reputation. How do regulation, production, and consump-
tion relations play out in this type of housing? 
 
4.4 Summary Illustrations of the Different Housing Types 
 
Having explored the historical development of the different types of housing, this 
section provides a spatial overview of the current housing provision in Berlin, still 
largely dominated by the three types of housing analysed in this chapter. Looking 
closer at Map 4.1 (see introduction of the chapter), it becomes apparent how the three 
types are spatially distributed within the city and shows the relatively clustered distri-
bution of the late 19
th
-century block developments and the post-war high-rise build-
ings in comparison to the scattered distribution of the Twenties, Thirties, and Fifties 
row developments. The late 19
th
-century block developments mentioned in 4.1 are 
located in a “Wilhelminian”-belt around the urban core, which constitute the inner 
city districts in today’s urban structure.  
 
The Nineteen Twenties, Thirties, Fifties row developments are distributed all over 
Berlin, representing the earlier Twenties and Thirties developments within the inner 
city areas which were all connected to the city rail and subway network. The distribu-
tion of these row developments, however, also reflects the construction of the Fifties 
row developments, which were predominantly built at the periphery of the urban 
centre in West Berlin; and closer located to the urban core in East Berlin. 
 
The post-war high-rise developments are clearly concentrated at the edge of the city. 
The large-scale developments are especially striking in the eastern part of the city, 
where the dimension of the construction of high-rise developments exceeds the ones 
in the West by far. In the western part of the city, the three large-scale housing estates 
with post-war high-rise buildings are however also apparent in the South, the North, 
and the West of the city. The small-scattered high-rise buildings in the inner city areas 
represent mostly newer developments from the 1990s onwards. 
 
Figure 4.1 below shows the distribution of the housing types within the different ad-
ministrative districts of Berlin in terms of area coverage (hectares). As in Map 4.1, 
Figure 4.1 also ignores the density of housing types, showing the land area, not the 
number of dwellings. It therefore needs to be taken into account that while low build-
ings with yards have a density of between 30 and 50 residents per hectare, post-war 
high-rise developments feature a density of between 220 to 290 residents per hectare. 
Late 19
th
-century block developments even have a density of between 280 and 490 
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residents per hectare, depending on how much of the rear and side wings still exist 
within the block.
73
  
 
Figure 4.1: Distribution of the Housing Types Among Berlin's Districts (in % of ha) 
 
Source: Berlin Digital Environmental Atlas 06.07/08 Urban Structure (Edition 2008), Senate 
Department for Urban Development 
 
Figure 4.1 nevertheless portrays the dominant building type within each district, re-
vealing the specific housing structure within each administrative boundary. The inner 
city districts of Charlottenburg-Wilmersdorf, Friedrichshain-Kreuzberg, and Mitte 
have predominantly late 19
th
-century block developments. Again, the Nineteen Twen-
ties, Thirties, and Fifties row developments are relatively evenly distributed. Post-war 
high-rise developments make up only a small percentage of the whole housing struc-
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 See Senatsverwaltung für Stadtentwicklung (2010a) for a detailed table of the different levels of 
density within each housing type. 
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ture in the districts. This housing type is relatively prominent in the outer districts of 
Lichtenberg and Marzahn-Hellersdorf, reflecting the large-scale construction in East 
Berlin. Due to the relative high density of these post-war high-rise developments, they 
take on an even more important role within these districts than reflected in Figure 4.1. 
 
Conclusion 
 
Arguing that the historical development of Berlin’s mode of housing provision creates 
particular conditions for how regulation, production, and consumption relations 
played out in the past decade, this chapter established the spatial, institutional, phys-
ical, and social characteristics that continue to influence Berlin’s current mode of 
housing provision along three different housing types.  
 
First, the 19
th
-century block developments were built within an urban belt around the 
historical core of the city. West Berlin’s block developments have undergone a pro-
cess of sensitive urban renewal since the 1970s. In the mid-1990s, they were charac-
terised by moderate rent levels and a social structure of immigrants, young, and el-
derly people living there. East Berlin’s 19
th
-century block developments, in contrast, 
were decaying and rents were at pre-war levels. A considerable number of apartments 
were vacant. Other apartments were occupied by intellectuals and artists, as well as 
elderly people. Second, the Nineteen Twenties, Thirties, and Fifties row developments 
were built within the urban centre demarcated by the railway line and at West Berlin’s 
periphery. In the mid-1990s, most of these apartments were below modern housing 
standards and in need of renovation. While the Twenties and Thirties row develop-
ments were centrally located and became acclaimed for their architectural style, the 
row developments built during the Fifties and later were at the urban fringe and criti-
cised for their monotonous and small structure. Third, the post-war high-rise devel-
opments were constructed at a large-scale in the periphery. After reunification, the 
post-war high-rise developments in East and West Berlin got a poor reputation. They 
were criticised for their mass-produced character, for their monotony, and for their 
prefabricated structure. In the mid-1990s, these post-war high-rise developments were 
increasingly falling into decay.  
 
The historical analysis of the three housing types also shows the institutional devel-
opment of Berlin’s mode of housing provision and its particularities, especially with 
regards to the high volume of social rented housing, which marked Berlin’s housing 
provision. The following quote summarises the particularity of Berlin’s mode of hous-
ing provision. 
“Berlin was not only a tenement city, Berlin was the city of social housing construc-
tion par excellence, on this side as well as the other side of the Wall. The housing 
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provision was therefore a field for experimenting with new urban planning visions of 
the welfare state. In both cities of Berlin, rent was subsidised to a degree that is no 
longer imaginable. This was due to the particular view on housing. Housing should 
not be a good, but a service, which needs to do justice to a basic needs of the human 
being. As such, housing had to adhere to a minimal standard, which was not exactly 
moderate. The non-profit housing industry in West Berlin and the communal housing 
provision in East Berlin were a significant part of this development. […] With such a 
housing policy, a relatively low socio-spatial differentiation has been achieved, in 
East and West Berlin. The object of a socially even city became reality within certain 
limits” (Bodenschatz 1999: 237; author's translation). 
This quote stresses the socio-spatial evenness of Berlin’s housing provision. Due to 
the state-directed and standardised housing, the social segregation of Berlin’s tenants 
was relatively low. However, the analysis of the different types of housing also shows 
that the quality of housing varies significantly with regards to its spatial, institutional, 
physical, and social legacy. There were thus differentiations not suggested in the 
quote above. This historically evolved unevenness has implications for the current 
mode of housing provision which is analysed in the following chapters. 
 
With the economic and demographic decline from the mid-1990s onwards, the de-
scribed particularities started to vanish. The reunified government increasingly strug-
gled with a lack of finances while Berlin’s housing market suffered from an oversup-
ply. This led to dramatic changes in the city’s mode of housing provision. Immedi-
ately after reunification there was a boom in housing construction (see chapter 1) that 
was triggered by special national subsidies and tax incentives for housing renovations 
and construction in East Germany. Experts and government officials first estimated 
that 800,000 new apartments would be needed. However, these growth numbers soon 
turned out to be illusionary.  
 
In Berlin, most of the new housing construction happened between 1994 and 1998, a 
time when the population was already in decline. The construction was predominantly 
based on compact structures, with mixed height buildings which often evoked the 
resemblance with garden cities. These housing estates were mainly constructed at the 
urban fringe. The construction boom coupled with a declining population
74
 created a 
housing surplus for the first time in Berlin’s urban development during the Twentieth 
century (Häußermann and Kapphan 2002: 100). As a consequence, a lot of housing 
units were vacant (see chapter 1), especially those with substandard conditions and in 
need of renovation. The transformation of Berlin’s mode of housing provision (see 
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 Between 1990 and 1998, the housing stock grew 6.4 percent, while the population decline was 2 
percent (Häußermann and Kapphan 2002: 100)  
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chapters 5-7) from the end of the 1990s onwards took place under the premises of a 
relatively depressed housing market.  
 
The analysis of this chapter thus raises two types of questions. 
• How has the mode of housing provision with regards to regulation, 
production, and consumption changed in the last decade? 
• How do the spatial, institutional, physical, and social differences of 
housing play out under the particular mode of housing provision? 
 
Having established the historical legacy of Berlin’s mode of housing provision, the 
following chapters turn to an investigation of how the particular mode of housing 
provision observed in the decade between 1999 and 2009 generated processes of un-
even development. The analysis is carried out along three identified processes of re-
organisation; the privatisation of state-owned housing and the entrance of institutional 
investment (chapter 5); the reformation of state-owned housing companies (chapter 6); 
and the abandonment of supply-side subsidies for housing (chapter 7). In order to 
understand the uneven processes that these transformation processes generated, the 
regulation, production, and consumption mechanisms of different types of housing 
providers are explored. 
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5 Privatisation of State-owned Housing and Institutional Investors 
 
The aim of the following chapters is to find empirical grounded explanations for why 
a particular mode of social regulation for housing provision creates processes of un-
even development. Exploring the regulatory changes of Berlin’s mode of housing 
provision towards a more entrepreneurial, meaning a more precisely market-oriented 
form (see chapter 2), three processes of reorganisation have been identified: The pri-
vatisation of state-owned housing; the reformation of state-owned housing companies; 
and the abandonment of state subsidies for construction and renovation of housing. 
Uneven development is either enabled or constrained through such regulatory pro-
cesses. It is therefore necessary to understand the specific mechanisms these regula-
tory changes create under the given circumstances. 
 
In order to understand the uneven development that the three identified processes of 
reorganisation created, it is essential to analyse its impact on the production mecha-
nisms of the provision of housing structure defined in the conceptual model (see sec-
tion 3.2). Production mechanisms contingently emerge through the different types of 
investors and housing companies that are active on Berlin’s housing market. Through 
the privatisation of state-owned housing (this chapter) and the reformation of the re-
maining state-owned housing (chapter 6), the state enabled a diversification of hous-
ing providers. The guiding question for the next two chapters therefore is: How do the 
different providers contingently emerge under the specific market conditions through 
their finance, investment, management, and exchange strategies? 
 
This chapter analyses the first transformation process towards a more entrepreneurial 
housing provision, namely the privatisation of state-owned housing. The aims of this 
chapter are fourfold: First, to understand how the specific regulatory conditions of 
privatisation enabled a diversification of housing providers, promoting the entrance of 
institutional investment (5.1); second, how global financial market mechanisms facili-
tated institutional investment (5.2); third, how local housing market conditions shaped 
profit expectations (5.3); and finally, how institutional investors who newly entered 
Berlin’s housing market re-shaped the provision of housing structure through their 
contingently emerging mechanisms (5.4). 
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5.1 Privatisation Encouraged Institutional Investors to Enter Berlin’s Housing 
Market 
 
Housing in Berlin was traditionally
75
 provided by either small private landlords or by 
non-profit housing companies that worked under the principle of the ‘common public 
interest’ (Gemeinnützigkeit). These companies were owned by churches, unionised 
companies, housing co-operatives, and in large part by the state (see also chapter 6). 
Berlin’s state-owned housing companies predominantly owned housing estates built 
in the 1920s and 1930s, and from the 1950s onwards. The state-owned housing com-
panies however also acquired some late 19
th
-century block developments in order to 
renovate them. After reunification, the housing stock built under the GDR regime was 
passed into the ownership of newly created state-owned housing companies, rapidly 
increasing the state-owned housing stock. In 1991, after reunification, Berlin owned a 
total of 19 housing companies, and through them 28 percent of Berlin’s 1.72 million 
housing units (Senatsverwaltung für Stadtentwicklung und Investitionsbank Berlin 
2002: 26). 
 
Starting in 1995, Berlin’s government began to privatise the state-owned housing 
stock.
76
 Berlin’s government instructed the state-owned housing companies to sell 15 
percent of its stock preferably to its tenants (Senatsverwaltung für Stadtentwicklung 
und Investitionsbank Berlin 2002: 36).
77
 The structure of the sell off was quite differ-
ent in East and West Berlin. While the aim to sell off 15 percent of the state-owned 
housing was practically achieved in the East by the end of 2000, only 5.4 percent 
could be privatised in the West during the same period. However, in the West, most 
apartments were sold to tenants and tenant associations (75 percent of units sold) 
whereas in the East, 80 percent of units sold were bought by investors 
(Senatsverwaltung für Stadtentwicklung und Investitionsbank Berlin 2002: 37). The 
privatisation process accelerated between 1998 and 2007 when the government sold 
two of its housing companies owning approximately 40,000 and 60,000 units respec-
tively. In addition to facing difficulties in increasing the rate of owner-occupiers, 
state-owned housing companies sold entire housing estates en bloc. 
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 If not mentioned explicitly, the traditional mode of housing provision refers to the regulatory context 
of West Berlin. After reunification, East Berlin’s housing provision was transformed into the social 
market economy of West Berlin under the Unification Treaty. For a more detailed account of the inte-
gration of East Germany’s housing provision, see Steinmetz (2003) or Kofner (2004: 193-210). 
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 This process was enabled through the national government’s deregulation of non-profit housing 
companies working under the principle of the common public interest (see section 6.1). 
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 In the eastern part of the city, the policy to sell 15 percent of Berlin’s state-owned housing stock was 
based on the national law for help on past debts (Altschuldenhilfegesetz) (Bundesministerium der 
Justiz 1993). In the western part of Berlin, the policy was based on a Senate decision (Senatsbeschluss 
vom 10. Juli 1994, Senatsverwaltung für Stadtentwicklung und Investitionsbank Berlin (2002: 36)). As 
much as possible, these housing units were supposed to be sold to tenants, tenant associations and co-
operatives.  
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The en bloc privatisation starkly contrasts with privatisation processes in other West-
ern European countries such as the right-to-buy policy in the UK (Murie 1976), or the 
promotion of home ownership in the Netherlands (Aalbers 2004). It also contrasts 
with privatisation processes of countries in the former Soviet bloc (Pickvance 1994; 
Struyk 1996a, 1996b). The privatisation process in Berlin, while similar in name, was 
quite different in process and scale to these other schemes. This was due to the diffi-
culties of increasing owner-occupation (see section 5.3.3), but also due to the aims of 
privatisation. In order to account for these differences, it is thus not sufficient to look 
only at the outcomes of privatisation. This thesis argues that it is necessary to explore 
more closely the mechanisms and contingencies which generate these differences. 
This chapter therefore addresses the particularities of Berlin’s privatisation process, 
interpreting the contingent regulation, production, and consumption mechanisms of 
the conceptual model established (see section 3.2).    
 
Aiming to improve the government’s budget created a process of en bloc privatisation 
 
According to the respondents interviewed, the government’s aim of the privatisation 
process was twofold. First, it aimed to improve its budgetary situation through selling 
the entire shares of two housing companies. Furthermore, the government anticipated 
that the selling of housing estates would help to reduce the remaining state-owned 
housing companies’ debt loads, and therefore indirectly also the state’s budget. The 
head of public relations of a private housing company summarised the two aspects of 
the privatisation process: 
“The privatisation has to be viewed from the perspective to relax the 
budget and it took place at a time when the government absolutely 
needed cash. We were not the only company that was sold; also other 
state-owned companies and other housing estates were sold. That 
means privatisation contributed to the strengthening of the gov-
ernment’s budget. From an economic standpoint, privatisation has 
definitely unleashed impulses for the modernisation of the housing 
economy and the investment in the housing stock.” (Head of public 
relations of a private housing company, ID 23)
78
 
The government’s second aim for privatisation, according to the respondents, was to 
trigger investment into the housing stock that the state-owned housing companies 
could no longer execute. In East and West Berlin, the housing estates built before and 
after the Second World War were mostly in need of renovation and modernisation. 
The state-owned housing companies however struggled with high debts.
79
 The priva-
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 The interviews were in German. I therefore translated all quotes. 
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 In 2000, the seven state-owned housing companies had an annual debt of 347.23 million Euros 
(Senatsverwaltung für Finanzen 2004a). 
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tisation created hope that investors would have the financial resources to modernise 
the housing stock. An urban planner and member of a district parliament stressed the 
necessity for renovation and the incapability of state-owned housing companies: 
“The prospects of privatisation are of course that the housing stock 
gets renovated. There are still bigger housing estates that were built 
before or shortly after the war and that have a standard that is today 
completely outdated in regards to sanitary or heating systems. And 
state-owned housing companies were apparently overstrained to invest 
in these housing units.” (Urban planner, member of a district parlia-
ment and head of the district’s urban planning commission, ID 15) 
The state’s financial situation was key to the privatisation of its housing stock. The 
privatisation process was however also facilitated through the depressed housing mar-
ket, which meant that housing had taken a back seat among political parties.
80
 
“Previously, each political party in Berlin gained popularity through 
their housing strategy because of the immense housing shortage 
everywhere. This was no longer the case in the mid-1990s.” (Manag-
ing director of a research institute for housing and urban development, 
ID 2) 
The government chose to improve its budget and to restore the financial capacities of 
state-owned housing companies through a novel strategy of an en bloc privatisation 
where entire state-owned housing companies or housing estates were sold off. This 
process is in line with a more entrepreneurial housing provision (see chapter 2), trying 
to attract private investment that takes over services that the state previously provided. 
The privatisation principle itself however, does not explain processes of socio-spatial 
inequality. It is necessary to understand the specific mechanisms by which the privati-
sation of state-owned housing has taken place to understand the outcome, the condi-
tions it created. This section therefore analyses the way the en bloc privatisation pro-
cess played out in practice. In particular, the section highlights how it opened up the 
market for a new and specific type of investor. 
 
Selling en bloc generated interest from institutional investors 
 
As noted, in contrast to the privatisation processes where home ownership is pro-
moted (see, for example, Murie 1976; Struyk 1996b), Berlin’s privatisation happened 
en bloc. This affected who was willing and able to buy the housing stock en bloc. The 
en bloc privatisation process of the housing estates and housing companies spawned 
                                                 
 
80
 There was a struggle between the Senate Department for Finance (at the time in the hands of the 
right-wing CDU party) and the Senate Department for Urban Development (in the hands of the social 
SPD party). However, the SPD party congress in 1997 decided to go along with the privatisation pro-
posal of the Senate Department for Finance to disencumber the state of Berlin and the state-owned 
housing companies (Oellerich 2011). 
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institutional investors’ interest as a result of two mechanisms: First, buying an entire 
housing company or an entire estate, institutional investors negotiated discount prices 
for the individual housing units (see also Holm 2010). Several informants expressed 
their concern that the housing stock was sold too cheaply: 
“If one looks at the price the state got for a single apartment, then one 
realises that it was apples and eggs that were sold. The selling price 
[for the housing company or the estate] sounds high; however when 
you divide it per apartment, you get an average price of 30,000 Euros 
per apartment. This is not a very exciting amount.” (Urban planner, 
member of a district parliament and head of the district’s urban plan-
ning commission, ID 15, see also ID 11) 
The second mechanism as to why the government’s en bloc selling appealed to insti-
tutional investors was the opportunity to increase management efficiency through 
economies of scale. Institutional investors do not have an interest in buying a single 
apartment, because it would not be worth the effort. Being able to buy a housing es-
tate, institutional investors saw the possibility to efficiently modernise and manage the 
housing units. The head of public relations of a privatised housing company explained 
this strategy: 
“Buying compact structures, efficiency models arise in regards to the 
modernisation, maintenance, and management of the housing. This 
means, it is easier to administer a compact housing structure, starting 
with addressing the tenants, the supply of support personnel for the 
maintenance and the complaints management, the exchange of tenants 
and so on, also with regards to energy provision, and garbage removal. 
When you have compact structures, you can generate high volume 
business where prices decrease and where technical equipment is 
cheaper.” (Head of public relations of a private housing company, ID 
23) 
The en bloc selling however also favoured institutional investors as purchasers be-
cause of their financial capacity. The fact that the government wanted to make the 
highest profit possible reinforced the institutional investors’ position vis-à-vis other 
possible purchasers. Thus, the government created a new market for investors. 
 
Aiming for the highest price favoured institutional investors as purchasers 
 
The emergent process that can be identified is that in both cases the government’s sale 
of the housing companies and the state-owned housing companies’ sale of the housing 
estates, the companies and the estates were sold to the highest bidder due to the focus 
on the financial benefit of privatisation. As a consequence, institutional investors were 
unintentionally favoured since they have the necessary equity to make en bloc pur-
chases and bid high in comparison to housing co-operatives or other forms of owner-
ship with lower access to capital. 
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The government however also largely ignored alternative forms of privatisation such 
as the possibility of forming housing co-operatives. In one case where tenants 
founded a co-operative to buy the estate themselves, was the state-owned housing 
company forced to give in.
81
 This happened however only because of a bottom-up 
initiative and public protests. The government did not promote this form of privatisa-
tion. Moreover, the state did not question the bidder’s strategy in the privatisation 
process. This was partly due to the constraint of achieving the highest return possible 
and partly due to a lack of understanding by the government and state-owned housing 
companies how particular types of investment funds would act in Berlin’s housing 
market. The government thus was conscious that their selling strategy would attract 
institutional investors above all. However, it was not aware of the consequences par-
ticular institutional investors’ strategies would have on Berlin’s housing market. 
 
The government therefore, did not differentiate between short-term and long-term 
investors (which is common in the private sector, see section 5.4). As a consequence, 
the government’s unintended default favoured one type of investor. Short-term inves-
tors, which follow a strategy of trading housing and not necessarily investing in it, 
often overrode long-term investors because they did not have to take into account 
possible renovation costs. Long-term investors in contrast needed to integrate renova-
tion costs into their bid. An informant confirmed the government’s ignorance: 
“Often financial and private investors are lumped together and it is not 
analysed what strategy they exactly follow. I always plead for a care-
ful analysis of the investor’s concept and there is nothing to say 
against long-term investors because they have to treat the housing 
stock economically and socially as reasonably as the state-owned 
housing companies have to. However, if you sell to a financial inves-
tor with a short-term asset strategy, then you don’t need to be sur-
prised about their behaviour. However, politicians apparently don’t 
have enough knowledge or interest to differentiate investors. There-
fore, the decision to sell to an investor is often based on the principal 
of the highest bid. And in the past, financial investors that could bid 
the highest prices were the ones with short-term interests while the 
long-term investors consider the need for investment and calculate 
modernisation costs. Short-term investors are not interested in that.” 
(Former project manager for the development of a housing estate em-
ployed by an asset management company, ID 13) 
A careful investigation of the bidder’s strategy is however also relatively difficult due 
to external factors such as financial market mechanisms.  The investor dynamically 
adapts a strategy based on the specific conditions of the financial and the housing 
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 There was a case in 1999 where tenants of an estate (Bremerhöhe) got together and founded a co-
operative. Supported by political protests, it prevented the sell off to a financial investor and ended up 
buying the housing estate. 
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market (see also section 5.4.1). The manager of a state-owned housing company that 
sold an estate explained the difficulties they had in assessing the bidder's strategy: 
“First, there is the observation of which strategy they follow. Second, 
which strategy can they follow [in the actual market-situation] and 
third, which strategy are they pretending to follow. In this case, the 
investor pretended to be a long-term investor and it was difficult to 
confirm. Because it was a fund, it could have been possible. However, 
as it turned out later, the investor was apparently more of a short-term 
investor.” (Managing director of a state-owned housing company, ID 
28) 
The analysis of the privatisation process shows that the state was rolling-back from 
the provision of housing, reducing the influence it could exercise on state-owned 
housing companies. The process however is complex and can take different forms due 
to the causal relations that triggered it. It is embedded in particular spatial and tempo-
ral contingencies, which need to be understood in order to reveal the specific mecha-
nisms it generated. In Berlin, the government privatised two entire state-owned hous-
ing companies in order to decrease its debts and urged the remaining state-owned 
housing companies to sell 15 percent of their housing stock to consolidate their budg-
ets. Due to financial pressure to sell within a short time period and difficulty selling to 
tenants the two state-owned housing companies and many housing estates were sold 
en bloc. The specific modality of privatising the housing stock en bloc to the highest 
bidder in effect favoured institutional investors. The entrance of institutional investors 
in Berlin’s housing market was however also triggered by changes in global financial 
markets. Having established the specific way Berlin’s government enabled the interest 
of institutional investors in the city’s housing market, the next section turns towards 
an analysis of the global financial markets which facilitated institutional investment at 
the time. 
 
5.2 Global Financial Market Mechanisms Directed Institutional Investors Towards 
Real Estate 
 
The internationalisation of financial markets made capital more mobile (Dicken 2003; 
Held and McGrew 2003) creating opportunities for institutional investors to diversify 
their investment portfolio by investing in different sectors and different geographical 
markets. Three processes drove the internationalisation of financial markets. First, the 
development of new communication technologies such as advanced telecommunica-
tion systems dramatically decreased transaction costs for financial institutions. A wide 
range of data can be instantaneously analysed and investment decisions can be 
promptly made. Thus, “[c]apital is managed around the clock in globally integrated 
financial markets working in real time for the first time in history: billion dollars 
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worth of transactions take place in seconds in the electronic circuits throughout the 
globe” (Castells 2000: 102).  
 
Second, the deregulation of financial markets and the liberalisation of cross-border 
transactions enabled saving and investment from anywhere to anywhere (Castells 
2000). Financial deregulation took place in most countries, starting in the US in the 
mid-1970s, but becoming more wide spread in the 1990s, moving to the ‘Big Bang’ in 
London in 1987, followed by France (‘Little Bang’ of 1987) and Germany (Dicken 
2003). Technological advances made financial regulation especially difficult and cre-
ated a global competition where governments became increasingly constrained to 
“maintain existing levels of social protection or welfare state programmes without 
undermining the competitive position of domestic business and deterring much-
needed foreign investment” (Held and McGrew 2002: 55). Financial institutions were 
able to move their activities to less regulated areas. This led governments to relax 
their domestic regulations in order to keep and attract new investment. A parallel pro-
cess of multilaterally dismantling capital control and unilaterally relaxing regulations 
generated increasing international financial integration (Herring and Litan 1995; 
Linneman 2004). 
 
The third process contributing to the internationalisation of financial markets was the 
invention of new financial products. Technological advances also fostered an innova-
tion of financial products where financial attributes are repackaged to redistribute the 
risk of those investing. The desired investment product can be achieved through a 
multiplicity of arrangements and risk can be spread among the investors (Herring and 
Litan 1995; Linneman 2004). These financial products “recombine value around the 
world and across time” (Castells 2000: 104), often moving financial capital in a 
speculative way. 
 
This development primarily benefitted investment banks that specialised in providing 
their clients access to the global financial market and offered “an entire package of 
services – a ‘one-stop shop’ – to customers” (Dicken 2003: 458). Thus, the interna-
tional financial market is increasingly dominated “by a small number of highly capi-
talized securities and banking houses” that primarily invest institutional capital via 
diversified activities (Hirst and Thompson 2003: 345). Institutional investors such as 
pension funds, insurance companies, banks, and university endowments began to 
dominate the financial markets. These types of investors have large amounts of capital 
that need to be invested. Harrison and Bluestone (1990) call this “impatient capital” 
where pension funds and other institutional investors are expecting short-term results 
for their investment and are under pressure to earn “competitive risk-adjusted returns” 
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(Herring and Litan 1995: 17). In order to boost returns and reduce the volatility of 
investment portfolios, institutional capital is diversified geographically and sectorally. 
 
After the stock market crash in 2000, most central banks in developed countries dras-
tically decreased interest rates, flooding “their economies with more financial li-
quidity, in order to prevent recessions” (Downs 2009: 8). In this financial envi-
ronment, real estate increasingly became a target for financial investors for two main 
reasons: First, the profitability of real estate is “greatest when interest rates are low 
and money can be borrowed easily” (Downs 2009: 8) which was the case at the time. 
Second, because financial investors suffered “from excessive exposure to the volatile 
technology market” in the late 1990s (Falzon et al. 2003: 68), they increasingly turned 
towards the supposedly “safe harbour” of real estate (Winograd 2004: 200; see also 
Rottke 2004: 61). Institutional investors previously avoided real estate because it was 
less liquid than other assets such as stocks. Furthermore, institutional investors did not 
have the required knowledge of local property markets that they assumed they would 
need. This changed however with the stock market crash in 2000: “Owning real estate 
in some form seemed desirable both because it increased the diversity of portfolios 
and because although nearly all stocks were plunging in value and bonds were vul-
nerable to possible increases in inflation, real estate property values kept rising” 
(Downs 2009: 13). With investment in real estate, capital takes material form and 
becomes embedded in place and time, and is subject to institutional and regulatory 
control. 
 
The en bloc privatisation in Berlin happened exactly at a time when institutional in-
vestors entered real estate markets, matching institutional investors’ demand.
82
 The 
combination of the effects of local regulation and global accumulation strategies cre-
ated the perfect storm. It was a mutual reinforcing mechanism. Berlin’s mass selling 
strategy of state-owned housing offered institutional investors the advantageous in-
vestment opportunities they were seeking. In addition, global financial market mecha-
nisms provided the required capital conditions necessary for real estate investments. 
The availability of cheap money and cheap housing were key factors for institutional 
investment. The process of privatisation was therefore accelerated by the global eco-
nomic conditions at the time. The specific conditions of the local housing market 
however influenced the way institutional investors operated in Berlin’s housing mar-
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 The role of institutional investors in private rental housing has also been acknowledged in other 
countries. Ball (2007), for example, sees an increasing role for large-scale investors in private rented 
housing in the UK. However, the matching between demand and supply in Berlin was especially strik-
ing. Obstacles observed by Berry (2000) and Berry and Hall (2005) in Australia’s rental market, such 
as high management costs due to a lack of intermediary structure between tenants and investors and 
poor market information, did not play a role in Berlin. 
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ket. The next section therefore analyses the local housing market conditions that insti-
tutional investors encountered and the profit expectations this fostered. 
 
5.3 Institutional Investors’ Profit Speculation and the Reality of the Local and  
Global Market Conditions 
 
In Berlin’s housing market, institutional investment has primarily taken place via real 
estate private equity funds.
83
 The hybrid of real estate and private equity presents a 
good investment opportunity since it combines the relative stability of real estate with 
the “opportunity for high degrees of value creation” in private equity (Falzon et al. 
2003: 78).
84
 According to Rottke (2004: 28) real estate private equity is a form of in-
vestment through which equity is provided based on non-regulated funds. 
 
Figure 5.1 shows the operational structure of a real estate private equity fund. Invest-
ment banks, investment houses or other real estate players (see Linneman 2004: 159) 
create and manage funds by collecting money from institutional investors.
85
 Invest-
ment banks often also contribute equity to the fund in order to stimulate the confi-
dence of institutional investors (Rottke 2004: 88). With credit capital from a bank, 
funds then invest directly in real estate like housing estates or indirectly through 
shareholding of housing companies.
86
 Often fund managements also collaborate via a 
joint venture with a local company, which has the valuable expertise of the local mar-
ket. 
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 A deterioration of the German national regulatory situation for traditional institutions providing 
credit in the real estate market contributed to the increasing popularity of real estate private equity 
funds. See Rottke (2004) for a detailed analysis of the regulatory changes within the financial market in 
Germany. 
84
 The hybrid between real estate and private equity became an interesting investment vehicle for both 
sides. On the one hand, institutional real estate investors have been “seeking higher risk-adjusted re-
turns” in an increasingly competitive environment. Private equity investors, on the other hand, were 
looking for an alternative because of the high volatility of other assets, in the technology market for 
example (Falzon et al. 2003: 68). 
85
 Large institutional investors often also have their own fund managements. 
86
 When not otherwise specified, housing companies that are referred to in this chapter are owned by 
real estate private equity funds. 
 106 
 
Source: my own illustration on the basis of Zingel (2006: 8). 
 
Due to favourable market conditions in Berlin’s housing market, real estate private 
equity funds were expected to make high returns. On the one hand, real estate private 
equity fund investors believed that capital gain could be achieved through returns 
from use (see section 5.3.1). On the other hand, they believed that capital gain could 
be achieved through rising prices independently from use (see section 5.3.2). The fol-
lowing sections explore the investors’ expectations comparing them with the actual 
market conditions. 
 
5.3.1  Speculation on Capital Gain Based on Rising Demand for Use 
 
Capital gain achieved through the use of housing is measured based on the yield of a 
property which is defined as the profit on the capital investment of housing.
87
 If there 
is an expectation for upward rents, yields are increased. This is especially true when 
the property was acquired at a low price. A central strategy for investors therefore, is 
to enter the market at the right time. This means that the optimal entry point occurs 
when prices are lowest and are due to rise, using inequalities in the real estate market 
cycle (Rottke 2004). An investor explained this method of assessing the potential of a 
market based on the example of Berlin: 
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 It is usually calculated as the annual rent minus the costs divided through the price paid for the prop-
erty. 
Institutional investor 
(Pension funds, insurance companies, 
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(Investment banks, investment houses, 
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ing company owning 
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Provides equity 
Provides credit capital 
Figure 5.1: Operational Structure of a Real Estate Private Equity Fund 
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“We have a top-down approach. This means, we invest internationally 
and analyse in which country there is disequilibrium in the real estate 
market and which scenarios could come out of this. We are asking 
ourselves a) why are apartments in Berlin so cheap? b) how attractive 
is Berlin as a location? and c) in which time span is the disequilibrium 
going to be balanced out? Because in the long run, real estate markets 
are always growing. Thus, for example, in 2003 we saw an increase in 
offers on the housing market in Berlin, but a relatively limited demand. 
This means it is attractive to buy because it is cheap.” (Principal of an 
investment firm, ID 7) 
Investors speculated on Berlin as a rising housing market despite the general macro-
economic situation not being very favourable at the beginning of the 2000s; a stagnat-
ing economy including high unemployment rates and little purchasing power.
88
 This 
speculation on a rising market was due to several mechanisms: First, low rent levels 
combined with a relatively high fluctuation rate of 9.4 percent in 2003 
(Senatsverwaltung für Stadtentwicklung 2005b) was considered interesting; it was an 
opportunity to increase rent levels through modernisation. Second, the extreme pre-
dominance of a rental market created hopes for the potential increase in owner-
occupation through the re-selling of single housing units. And third, because there 
was no new construction, the expectation was that the supply could not keep up with 
the anticipated demand. The CEO of a private housing company summarised these 
points: 
“The interest of investors stemmed from the fact that the quota for 
home ownership was low, that Germany is in general a fundamentally 
strong economy, and that there would be potential to increase the rent 
levels.” (Chief financial officer of a private housing company, ID 12, 
see also ID 7) 
The low prices and the lack of new construction would however not have raised the 
same interest if investors did not also have a perception that Berlin was gaining in 
popularity and growing by attracting new inhabitants (see chapter 1). Investors thus 
partly speculated on a rising demand for use. They also however, speculated on a ris-
ing demand for investment. 
 
5.3.2 Speculation on Capital Gain Based on Rising Demand for Investment 
 
While at the end of the 1990s, investment was still predominantly made by German 
investment firms, Berlin’s housing market experienced a veritable hype from 2004 
onwards when one of the world’s leading investment firms entered the market and 
created a herd-like movement of international investment firms.  
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 See discussion on Berlin’s urban development in chapter 1. 
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“Once that internationally well-known investment firm was here, 
other investors followed and have shopped around in Berlin.” (Chief 
financial officer of a private housing company, ID 12) 
Figure 5.2 illustrates the increase in sold housing portfolios from 2004 onwards. It not 
only includes the selling from state-ownership to private ownership but also re-selling 
among private investors. 
 
Figure 5.2: Sold Housing Units in Berlin 1999-2000
 
Note: Only big housing stocks of more than 800 housing units are considered. 
Source: Bundesinstitut für Bau-, Stadt- und Raumforschung (BBSR) Datenbank Wohnung-
stransaktionen, Juli 2009 
 
The investment hype fostered a self-reinforced speculation to make capital gains be-
cause the demand for buying real estate is higher than the offer. For these investors 
the demand for the use of housing did not play a significant role. More importantly, it 
was the availability of cheap credit capital that fostered the increase in price specula-
tion. Specific housing market conditions such as vacancy rates were therefore mostly 
irrelevant. One investor interviewed admitted that he does not know much about Ber-
lin’s housing market (ID 7). The projected return was therefore simply a speculation 
on the increase of value due to an increasing demand for investment. 
 
The real market conditions did however not match investors’ expectations. Different 
forms of market failure abated speculation on the demand for use and investment. The 
expectation to make returns from use was tempered by Berlin’s slowly growing econ-
omy. Moreover, the expectation to make returns from rising housing prices faced a 
severe drawback due to the financial crisis in 2008 and 2009, when credit capital be-
came scarce. Due to these local and global market failures, investors could not make 
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the expected return on investment. The following section explores how respondents 
perceived the actual situation of Berlin’s housing market. 
 
5.3.3 Local and Global Market Failures 
 
An analysis of the market situation in Berlin shows that investors’ expectations and 
needs to make a return on investment through higher rent levels and the transforma-
tion to owner-occupied housing were not realistic. In 2004, 17.7 percent of Berlin’s 
population was still unemployed (Amt für Statistik Berlin-Brandenburg 2009a). The 
income of Berlin’s population, with an average of 15,000 Euros per person per year, 
is significantly lower than in other German cities
89
 (Investitionsbank Berlin 2009). 
Moreover, income levels have not increased significantly over the last ten years. It 
was therefore difficult to achieve higher rent levels, especially in lower market seg-
ments. Furthermore, the transformation to owner-occupied housing is very slow be-
cause rent levels are still considerably lower compared to the costs of home owner-
ship (Holm 2010). Several informants confirmed that it is hard work to increase the 
rate of homeowners, because owner-occupation is not very common in Berlin:  
“The owner-occupied flat is still associated with a lot of disadvantages. 
There are more profitable investment possibilities than the owner-
occupied flat. A rented flat also offers more flexibility, especially 
when the professional situation is more and more flexible. And when 
people want to have their own house, it is still the idea of a detached 
home, because you have your privacy and there is no need to negotiate 
with a neighbour you don’t like.” (Managing director of a research in-
stitute for housing and urban development, ID 2) 
“We have a subsidiary company, which painfully operates the selling. 
[…] We sell now between 150 and 250 units per year, but we have to 
put huge efforts into it.” (Managing director of a state-owned housing 
company, ID 28) 
The lack of demand for owner-occupied housing and relatively low incomes are all 
signs that some investors overestimated the specific local conditions. A representative 
from the Senate Department of Urban Development confirmed that expectations were 
largely overrated: 
“The yield expectations that stood in the foreground when buying the 
housing units in Berlin are not realisable. On the one hand, we have a 
relatively depressed market. On the other hand, Berlin is one of the 
cities with the lowest income levels. This means the leeway for rent 
increase is not very large if you do not want to overburden your tenant, 
which would lead to a higher vacancy rate. And housing companies 
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 Hamburg 24,000 Euros; Munich 22,000 Euros; German average 18,000 Euros (Investitionsbank 
Berlin 2009). 
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normally try to prevent vacancies.” (Employee of the Senate Depart-
ment for Urban Development, ID 5) 
Investors therefore had many difficulties achieving the expected return from use. This, 
however, played a less important role as long as credit capital was cheaply available, 
maintaining and creating a demand for investment in real estate (see also section 0). 
With the financial crisis of 2008, however, the returns from speculating on buying 
cheap and selling high were also slashed. Credit was no longer as cheap and easy 
available as in the boom years. This drastically lowered the demand for real estate 
investment. Figure 5.2 (see above) reflects the dramatic decrease in housing transac-
tions.
90
 A financial officer admitted that the combination of local and global condi-
tions made it hard to achieve the anticipated profit expectations: 
“It shows now that the expectations to increase rent levels and con-
verting dwellings into owner occupied housing is not feasible. Inves-
tors have increasing problems to refinance their investment because 
their business plan was too short sighted. While the prices haven’t suf-
fered yet, there are just no transactions anymore. The market does no 
longer exist.” (Chief financial officer of a private housing company, 
ID 12, see also ID 9) 
The actual property market of Berlin starkly contrasted with investors’ speculation on 
rising demand for use and investment. Having entered Berlin’s housing market, insti-
tutional investors had to deal with the specific form of local and global market failures.  
 
Having analysed how and why institutional investors entered Berlin’s housing market 
and what local and global market conditions they encountered, the chapter turns to-
wards an analysis of the contingently emerging production mechanisms of the differ-
ent real estate private equity funds used as investment vehicles.
91
 The strategies of the 
funds to deal with specific market conditions depended on their contingently emer-
ging finance, investment, management, and exchange mechanisms. 
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 A report by the Senate Department for Urban Development equally confirms the impact of the finan-
cial crisis by showing that there were 19 percent less housing portfolio sales in 2008 compared to 2007 
(Geschäftsstelle des Gutachterausschusses für Grundstückswerte in Berlin 2009).  
91
 For simplicity, funds are regarded as agents in the following, even though it is the institutional inves-
tor that decides to invest in a particular fund and the fund manager who makes the strategic decisions. 
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5.4 Local and Global Market Failures Shaped the Strategies of Real Estate Private 
Equity Funds 
 
Thus far, the chapter analysed the specific way in which the privatisation process and 
the conditions of the global financial and the local housing markets created and 
shaped the entrance of institutional investors through real estate private equity funds
92
. 
In order to understand how the particular mode of housing provision that came into 
place with the privatisation of state-owned housing stock creates uneven development 
in Berlin, it is necessary to investigate the contingently emerging production mecha-
nisms of this new owner structure and the changing relations this has on the consump-
tion of housing. 
 
The explanatory model in chapter 3 defines production mechanisms that we should 
expect to find in any empirical situation in terms of finance, investment, management, 
and exchange. Based on these categories, one might expect different emerging types 
of investment funds under the specific market conditions. The following questions 
guided the analysis: 
• How do the production mechanisms of the different types of invest-
ment funds play out in practice under the local and global market 
failures? 
• How do the production mechanisms of the different types of invest-
ment funds affect the consumption under the local and global market 
failures? 
The remaining sections of the chapter turn towards an analysis of the contingently 
emerging types of real estate private equity funds and investigate how their specific 
mechanisms create processes of uneven development. 
 
5.4.1 Two Types of Real Estate Private Equity Funds 
 
The explicit investment funds’ finance strategy was mostly kept a secret by my in-
formants due to it being proprietary information. Specifically, the managers of large 
funds were not willing to reveal particular strategies (see also section 3.4.1). However, 
from the literature on institutional real estate investment, different strategic consider-
ations of investment funds can be interfered. The following sections, therefore, draw 
on the existing literature (Linneman 2004; Rottke 2004; Brueggeman and Fisher 2008) 
to portray the different characteristics of investment funds and the accumulation strat-
egies they pursue. Integrating this literature back into the empirical cases, the diver-
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 In the remaining part of the chapter real estate private equity funds are referred to as investment 
funds in order to make it easier for reading. 
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ging investment, management, and exchange strategies are then analysed, and the 
uneven mechanisms they created within Berlin’s mode of housing provision are re-
vealed. 
 
During the time that a real estate private equity fund is active,
93
 there are many differ-
ent strategies to achieve a return on the institutional investment and as such, several 
are often combined.
94
 A major criterion to distinguish between different investment 
strategies is the target return coupled with the degree of risk involved. The literature 
(Rottke 2004: 87; Falzon et al. 2003) on the real estate industry usually distinguishes 
three types of real estate private equity funds: core, value added, and opportunistic 
investment. Zingel’s (2006: 7) analysis of real estate transactions points however to 
the fact that the core investment fund, which bears the least risk but also the lowest 
return, did not play a significant role in the context of Germany. The case studies ana-
lysed confirmed this assessment and this thesis therefore concentrates on the two 
other types: value added and opportunistic investments. This differentiation of institu-
tional investment contrasts with the theoretical literature on the uneven development 
of regulation and accumulation (Harvey 2006), which seldom goes beyond a universal 
definition of finance capital. I therefore provide evidence for the multidimensionality 
of the causes for uneven development. 
 
Table 5.1 illustrates the differences between value added and opportunistic funds with 
regards to the finance strategy in order to achieve the target return. The value added 
investment fund runs for between five and seven years and it has a target return be-
tween of 11 and 15 percent per year. The most important factor for achieving return 
on investment is income from rent, followed by leveraging through high debt finan-
cing based on low interest rates. The opportunistic investment is more short-term ori-
ented with a period of around three years or less and a target return of 16 percent and 
more. The focus is clearly on leveraging (see sections 5.4.2 and 0 for a more detailed 
discussion of their finance strategies). 
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 In order to make above average returns on the invested equity, a disposition of the investment is 
necessary. Therefore, investment funds are always temporary. The funds have a finite period of be-
tween three and twelve years and generally end once the “opportunity has been realized in order to 
generate higher rates of return” (Linneman 2004: 149). There are several possible exit strategies. First, 
the investment fund can be refinanced through new investment. Second, the real estate can be securi-
tised for trading on the secondary market (Rottke 2004: 116). Third, the investment can be sold after 
the achieved aim of the fund. Fourth, the investment fund can go public (Linneman 2004: 156). The 
analysis here however, is focused on the mechanisms of investment funds while they are active. Since 
the specific exit strategies are not revealed in advance, here they only play a subordinate role in terms 
of exit timing. 
94
 See Brueggman and Fisher (2008) for an extensive list of strategies. 
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Table 5.1: Relative Importance of Strategies for Different Investors 
  Investment Strategy 
  Value Added Investment 
5-7 years 
Opportunistic Investment 
3 years and less 
Target Return 11% - 15% 16%+ 
Rental Income  
  
Leveraging 
  
Diversification 
  
R
el
at
iv
e 
Im
p
o
rt
an
ce
 
Legislation 
  
Note: The bigger the point, the more important is the respective strategic consideration. 
Source: adapted from LaSalle Investment Management (2009), see also Rottke (2004: 87).  
 
The two investment strategies are however not as easily distinguishable in reality. The 
specific strategy is also adjusted to the prevailing market situation. The market situa-
tion during the global financial crisis in 2008 and 2009 made leveraging and re-selling 
a lot more difficult (see section 5.3.3). Investment funds could no longer exit the mar-
ket and especially opportunistic funds had to change their strategy, becoming more 
dependent on rental income. A former project manager of an investment company 
explained how investors adjust their strategy based on the prevailing market situation: 
“If someone had arrived with an offer to buy the estate for 1,200 Eu-
ros per square metre, the investor would have sold it right away. 
However, if – like in the current situation – no one is here to buy, then 
an investor automatically becomes a long-term investor and he then 
also likes to emphasise this, because everything else would be a con-
fession to have had the wrong strategy.” (Former project manager for 
the development of a housing estate employed by an asset manage-
ment company, ID 13) 
This underlines the claim made above (see section 5.3.3) that demand for the use of 
housing is independent from the demand for investment. However, when the specula-
tive investment strategy fails as it did with the financial crisis, demand for the use of 
housing ends up playing a more important role. How great of a role depends however 
on the specific strategies of the investment fund. The specific finance strategies of the 
two investment funds affect the investment, management, and exchange strategies 
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differently, creating processes of uneven development. The following sections explore 
the two diverging investment funds in more detail, analysing how they play out in 
practice under Berlin’s housing market conditions and global financial market condi-
tions. 
 
5.4.2 Investment, Management, and Exchange of Value Added Funds 
 
As Table 5.1 shows, the value added real estate private equity fund makes its return 
on investment predominantly through rental income since it is generally a secure and 
low risk strategy. Rents are relatively stable, meaning they can be relatively well 
budgeted when acquiring the housing estate. However, the focus on rental income 
makes value added investment funds dependent on local housing market conditions 
and regulations. Large-scale value added investment funds therefore balance specific 
local market conditions with geographical diversification of their investment portfolio. 
As such, smaller investment funds have fewer possibilities for diversification.  
 
Value added investment funds optimise their rental income through the appreciation 
of property with development potential to rent or sell the property at a higher price, 
thus making a higher capital gain (see also Brueggeman and Fisher 2008). Property 
has development potential if the incoming cash flow (i.e. rent, government subsidies) 
is greater than the funding costs (i.e. interest rates on borrowing) and management 
costs; or if the potential profit when selling the housing estate is judged to be high 
enough. The determining factors for this evaluation are the location and the quality of 
the housing, the tenure structure and the credit conditions (see also Whitehead 1999).  
 
In order to increase cash flow from rental income, value added investment funds addi-
tionally apply an efficient management strategy. This can be achieved by outsourcing 
the management of the housing estate or through more flexible working contracts for 
the employees within the housing company (Holm 2010). The imperative to reduce 
costs and therefore increase the net cash flow, leads to a reduction of the maintenance 
budget and a restructuring of services. This is evident in cases where funds bought an 
entire housing company and “also own the claim on the creativity and execution skills 
of the people at the company” (Linneman 2004: 115; Rottke 2004: 131 et seq.), mean-
ing that the fund has the possibility to take over the team, restructure it, or make it 
redundant. 
 
The finance strategy of value added funds involves less risk because it depends on 
rental income, making the fund dependent on local market conditions including regu-
latory conditions such as rent regulations. The following section explores how this 
finance strategy influences the contingently emerging investment, management, and 
 115 
exchange mechanisms of value added investment funds under the specific market 
conditions of Berlin. 
 
Creating added value through a selective portfolio strategy 
 
The investment funds, which bought housing in Berlin with the aim to create added 
value, cherry-picked housing estates with development potential. This was perfectly 
logical and sensible from their point of view and Berlin’s housing market offered the 
conditions to do so. Value added investment funds selected good quality housing es-
tates in attractive locations for their investment, predominantly in late 19
th
-century 
block developments and housing estates from the 1920s and 1930s (see chapter 4). 
The rent gap between the existing rent level and the possible rent increase after mod-
ernisation or refurbishment that adds value to the property, shaped the investment 
decision. A principal of an investment firm described the selection process for in-
vestment: 
“We look where in the city we invest. We look if it is centrally located, 
how good the infrastructure is, and if there is a potential for increasing 
the rent level. We only invest in the property if we know that we can 
realise higher rents afterwards.” (Principal of an investment firm, ID 7) 
In the cases where the investment fund bought an entire state-owned housing com-
pany, it inevitably also acquired housing with less or no development potential be-
cause state-owned housing companies constructed and managed former and current 
social housing of the post-war period (see chapter 4). This was specifically the case 
for the investment fund that acquired the largest state-owned housing company in 
Berlin. At the same time as concentrating investment in properties with development 
potential, the value added funds that also acquired housing without development po-
tential divested these housing units as quickly as possible. The added value funds 
therefore sold post-war high-rise developments in disadvantaged or unpopular areas 
where investment costs were often deemed too high for making capital improvements. 
The portfolio manager of a privatised company confirmed this selective portfolio 
strategy, illustrating the influence of the physical outcome and the rent levels for the 
different types of housing: 
“We clearly invest in a way to make capital improvements. This 
means, we increase the rent levels, we lower the vacancy rates and we 
invest where we see potential for appreciation and divest where there 
is no potential for appreciation.” (Portfolio manager of a private hous-
ing company, ID 12) 
Divesting part of the portfolio however, did not mean that the company made a loss 
on it. While credit capital was available, the housing company could sell the housing 
estate with no development potential for a higher price than it acquired the estate be-
cause there was a demand for housing investment. There is thus always more than one 
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way to make profit. This strategy was however only possible when demand for in-
vestment in housing was high enough, fostering investment from other speculators. 
When the hype in Berlin abated as a result of the financial crisis (see section 5.3.3), 
investment funds could no longer divest. Value added funds therefore began to neg-
lect the housing with no development potential. 
 
This selective investment in housing with development potential and the divestment 
or abandonment of housing without potential starkly contrasts with an expectation 
that housing companies invest in all types of housing equally. Moreover, the analysis 
shows that investment funds, and the housing companies they own, selectively invest 
according to their finance strategy. This uneven mechanism is especially strong in 
Berlin due to the specific market conditions where market failure exists in certain 
housing segments (see chapter 4). In an ideal-type of well functioning housing market, 
investment and improvement in the housing stock is meant to be profitable because 
there is enough demand for housing – also in less prosperous neighbourhoods. In the 
case of Berlin, where demand in certain market segments is not high enough, housing 
companies are not able to realise profits by investing in these segments. They there-
fore invest very strategically, meaning selectively. 
 
Reducing management costs through an efficient management strategy 
 
In order to increase rental income, value added investment funds chose to optimise 
management of the housing by creating efficiency models. In the cases analysed, three 
specific processes could be identified as part of an efficient management strategy: the 
restructuring of the organisation, the reduction of tenant services, and the reduction of 
neighbourhood engagement. The deputy director of one of the umbrella tenant asso-
ciation summarised these processes, illustrating how the reduction of management 
costs has real consequences for the housing provision and more specifically the ten-
ants: 
“I don’t have any exact numbers because it is also not evident from 
the company’s annual report, but this is information we have from an 
employee of the company: The budget for maintenance has been re-
duced by a third. This is quite important for tenants. The company has 
also undergone major personnel restructuring and it has dissolved the 
service centres for tenants in the districts. Now, they operate one cent-
ral hotline.” (Deputy managing director of an umbrella tenant organi-
sation, ID 6, see also Holm (2010)) 
 
Restructuring the organisation: In the cases where the investment fund bought the 
entire state-owned housing company, a major restructuring of the company could be 
observed. This was especially true for the second state-owned housing company that 
 117 
was also privatised. While the first privatisation entailed a negotiated protection for 
the employees of the state-owned housing company, the second privatisation focused 
more on the protection of tenants.
95
 The second privatised housing company has 
undergone major restructuring of personnel; the new board of directors exchange of 
managers; and a new wage model was introduced, promoting flexible work hours 
(Holm 2010).   
 
The same mechanism also took place in the cases where the state-owned housing 
companies privatised an estate. In this case, the state-owned housing company trans-
ferred the management team for the particular estate along with the estate. The state-
owned housing company therefore also transferred the claim on how to manage the 
estate. The fund took over the two employees from the state-owned housing company 
and integrated them into the management team it established for the housing estate. 
The employees however, did not fit into the new management philosophy and left the 
management company shortly after (see ID 29). 
 
Reducing tenant services: The reduction of personnel within the housing companies 
or the restructuring of services created a deterioration vis-à-vis customer liaison and 
support. Traditionally, tenants had a direct link to the state-owned housing company 
that was on-site with a service centre. The privatised housing companies have cen-
tralised the service centres or reduced their business hours. Increasingly, the tenant 
organisation received more complaints from tenants. 
“The reduction of access for tenants has been taken negatively by ten-
ants. It has to be said that the state-owned housing companies were 
also not optimal in their management. However, the service has defi-
nitely deteriorated. That is obvious, because the housing company has 
reduced the personnel and has rented out the former service centres to 
generate more income through commercial rents.” (Deputy managing 
director of an umbrella tenant organisation, ID 6) 
The abandonment of the service centres created greater distance between the tenant 
and the housing company. The service has become more anonymous. This makes the 
relationship between the owner and the tenant also less transparent. This mechanism 
was reinforced in cases where ownership constantly changed through the re-selling of 
housing estates. With constantly changing owners that were often represented through 
a property management firm, it became less transparent to the tenant what strategy the 
owner pursued. The emphasis on profit maximisation and the indifference of the fund 
towards the specific location and housing development further created insecurity 
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 The different emphasis on protection of employees and tenants in the two cases was because the 
trade union of the first state-owned housing company to be privatised was successful in negotiating a 
deal, which however meant concessions on tenant protection. When the second state-owned company 
was privatized, the tenant associations had more power to influence the negotiated sales contract. 
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among tenants. An urban planner explained the relationship between the new owners 
and tenants: 
“When there is an investment fund that buys the housing, the fund is 
often from Luxembourg or Switzerland or anywhere else and is repre-
sented through another firm that is not locally situated. But the owners 
are even less reachable because they are in the US or Australia. And 
they are not interested in the condition of a particular apartment or if 
the tenant is dislocated, but they have bought it to make a profit and 
the manager of the estates are expected to implement this profit target.” 
(Urban planner, member of a district parliament and head of the dis-
trict’s urban planning commission, ID 15) 
 
Reducing neighbourhood engagement: The third form of efficient management that 
could be observed was a reduction of the privatised companies’ commitment to sup-
port the neighbourhood and its activities. While state-owned housing companies had a 
long tradition of supporting and initiating neighbourhood activities, privatised com-
panies often no longer felt responsible to go beyond their core business of managing 
housing. The pressure to reduce costs became very apparent. A collaborator of a ten-
ant consulting service described the relationship they have with the privatised com-
pany: 
“We generally have a good relationship with the [privatised] company 
that is in charge of this neighbourhood. However, we notice that de-
pending on the current direction from above, he [the company’s per-
son in charge of the estate] is more or less responsive to our proposals. 
Sometimes, he says that the company is in no way able to help out. 
Sometimes, he is more open for our projects as long as it does not cost 
too much money for them.” (Collaborator of a tenant consulting ser-
vice, ID 21) 
This mechanism is strengthened because while state-owned housing companies were 
traditionally anchored in specific neighbourhoods, privatised housing companies often 
re-sold a majority of their housing units in an area and therefore no longer felt respon-
sible to support the area. The consequence of the diversification of owners in a neigh-
bourhood is therefore an increasing lack of responsiveness on the part of the owners. 
The head of public relations of a privatised company confirmed the reduced commit-
ment due to the smaller housing stock in the area: 
“We do invest in public infrastructure such as playgrounds and parks 
within the housing development. We do that of course not with a phil-
anthropic aim, but with the aim to improve the neighbourhood and 
therefore create positive effects. However, and this is what we are 
criticised for at the moment, we do it within the dimension we feel re-
sponsible for. And because we are no longer owning 15,000 units in 
the area, but only 2,000 units, our commitment is reduced accord-
ingly.” (Head of public relations of a private housing company, ID 23) 
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The value added investment funds restructured the housing companies and reduced 
personnel. They consolidated tenant services through the closure of service centres 
and trimmed down their engagement in neighbourhoods. However, since value added 
funds aimed to increase rental income streams, they could not cut key services to ten-
ants such as maintenance under the particular market conditions. In Berlin’s housing 
market situation, a considerable deterioration of maintenance and services would have 
lead to higher vacancy rates. Better off tenants had relatively good options to relocate 
if they were not satisfied with the services provided by their housing company. The 
value added funds therefore, needed to provide a certain standard if they wanted to 
make their return on investment through the rental income stream. Because of this 
mechanism, the organisational restructuring of a housing company played a more im-
portant role in creating efficient management than the reduction of frontline services. 
The everyday life of tenants was therefore not dramatically impacted when a value 
added investment fund owned the housing.  
 
The tenant was however affected by rising rents. Having analysed the investment and 
management strategies of value added investment funds, the next two sections turn 
towards exchange strategies, looking at how value added investment funds increased 
rent levels and apply exclusionary allocation strategies. 
 
Increasing rent levels through modernising the housing stock 
 
In order to make the investment profitable and achieve their target returns, value 
added investment funds increased the rent levels and attracted a clientele with a 
higher socio-economic status after modernising the housing with development poten-
tial. The head of public relations of a housing company confirmed this: 
“We invest in the housing stock and furnish dwellings with attributes 
that increase the quality of the housing, either through energy saving 
means or through the improvement of kitchen, bathrooms, floors, out-
door façade, etc. in order to newly place them on the market, mostly in 
a higher segment.” (Head of public relations of a private housing 
company, ID 23) 
The possibility to increase rent levels however greatly depends on the housing and 
rent regulation. Berlin’s existing rent regulations are discussed in more detail in chap-
ter 7. Two points are important to understand here: First, rent regulations only apply 
to existing tenant agreements. Tenants often did not want to bear lengthy renovation 
periods so they moved out before it started. By announcing modernisation projects, 
investors created even higher vacancy rates which were already high enough because 
of substandard housing conditions. This suited them well because for new tenancy 
agreements there is no rent regulation allowing them to increase rent levels reflecting 
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market conditions. A portfolio manager confirmed the benefit of high vacancy rates 
during renovation: 
“Best is of course, if the whole estate is emptied. We had a vacancy 
rate between 30 and 50 percent. And of course, we would have pre-
ferred to boot out everyone, but that is of course not possible. Then 
you have to deal with the retired and the alcoholics, which makes the 
situation more complex.” (Director of a real estate fund at a bank, ID 
16) 
The second point of rent regulation, which is important here, is that investors can 
partly transfer modernisation costs onto the rent. This means that even if a tenant de-
cided to bear the renovation period and was therefore protected by existing rent regu-
lation, the regulatory conditions allow investors to partially transfer modernisation 
costs onto rent levels. This particular regulatory mechanism created an incentive to 
modernise the housing to a high standard. Tenants affected by modernisation were 
however, often not able to bear the higher rent levels after modernisation. The tenants 
living in these substandard housing estates were often the socially disadvantaged. This 
remaining clientele therefore, starkly contrasted with the investors’ aim to renovate to 
a high standard and increase rent levels. A district parliamentarian and urban devel-
opment consultant summarised the effects on the existing tenants when modernisation 
was announced in the neighbourhood of a 1930s row development: 
“It was already feared and it also happened that after the privatisation 
of the housing company owning this estate, the modernisation of the 
estate was announced. The modernisation process was then also any-
thing but pleasant for the tenants. It was clear that the now privately 
owned housing company wanted to renovate the entire estate and ex-
change the tenants because the existing tenant structure was not what 
the company wanted. It wanted to have a clientele that is able to pay 
higher rents and it wanted to restructure two-room apartments into big 
family homes also with the possibility to sell it afterwards as owner-
occupied housing units. That was catastrophic for the existing tenants, 
because a high percentage of elderly people lived there. Some moved 
into these apartments in the 1950s. It was horrible for them that they 
had to move because their apartment was getting renovated. A similar 
high percentage of people on social welfare lived in these estates. 
They were not able to bear the higher rent levels.” (Urban planner, 
member of a district parliament and head of the district’s urban plan-
ning commission, ID 15) 
 
The modernisation process was anticipated, and even wished for, when the gov-
ernment privatised the state-owned housing companies (see section 5.1). However, 
the particular way the mechanisms of modernisation and increasing rent levels played 
out generated two processes of tenant dislocation: First, the value added investors’ 
appreciation of the housing stock in better locations created a direct displacement of 
 121 
existing tenants. Second, it also produced an “exclusionary displacement” (Marcuse 
1986: 156) whereas households voluntarily vacated, but the barriers for new tenants to 
move into the neighbourhood were heightened. The exclusionary displacement is thus 
a process of gentrification which was induced by voluntary means.  
 
The process of modernisation that was anticipated through the privatisation of the 
state-owned housing legitimates the exclusion of the poor and vulnerable tenants. The 
modernisation therefore is not for the benefit of the existing tenants, but only for the 
wealthier ones in future. The barriers for moving into a modernised apartment are 
however not only heightened through increasing rent levels, but also through investors’ 
specific allocation strategy. 
 
Excluding low income households through a selective allocation strategy 
 
Value added investment funds not only physically, but also socially upgraded their 
housing stock. They aimed at upgrading the social structure when tenants vacated 
their homes voluntarily or involuntarily. Value added investment funds excluded dis-
advantaged households with a selective allocation strategy. A portfolio manager con-
firmed this selective allocation strategy: 
“We have clearly an allocation strategy, you can’t call it racist, but we 
do not rent out to a single alcoholic for example. I have two letting 
teams and they have clear instructions which profile they should rent 
out to. We want to have families with children. We are also lobbying 
for a kindergarten nearby. And we have kicked out the pub at the cor-
ner of the housing estate.” (Director of a real estate fund at a bank, ID 
16) 
The allocation strategy of the investment fund shows that a logical mechanism based 
on the finance and investment strategy of value added funds has uneven effects on the 
housing provision and consumption relations.  
 
Similarly to the exclusion of the poor, immigrants were often not welcomed in the 
upgraded housing stock because it could deter German middle class families from 
moving into the area for such reasons as the schooling of their children. This mecha-
nism was also confirmed in an interview: 
“The new investors take into account the demand in regards to the 
German groups who wish to live in homogeneous neighbourhoods. 
The investors have tried to create these neighbourhoods, for example 
in the row developments. Only middle class households that are tradi-
tionally anchored and things like that. This minimises conflicts and 
creates in the investor’s view a stabilised tenant structure which the 
investor’s housing company also advertises. They argue that they are 
contributing to an important stability for the neighbourhood and there-
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fore the city. It however means nothing else than that they displace the 
problems to other neighbourhoods, mostly to those in the outskirts.” 
(Deputy managing director of an association for housing and urban 
development, ID 8) 
The allocation strategy of value added investment funds therefore reinforce uneven 
development processes by shaping the exclusionary consumption of certain types of 
housing such as the 19
th
-century block developments or the 1920s and 1930s row de-
velopments in good locations. 
 
Value added investment funds shape an exclusive form of consumption 
 
Consumption emerges through aggregated demand. In order to understand the influ-
ence of consumption on processes of uneven development, the explanatory model (see 
section 3.2) defines consumption in terms of income and household structure. These 
categories help to understand how aggregated demand increases or decreases under 
specific conditions. The expressed demand of occupants however strongly depends on 
production mechanisms.  
 
The appreciation of the housing stock created by the investment, management, and 
exchange strategies of value added funds shaped an exclusionary demand for middle 
and upper income classes. The modernisation of the housing stock made living in the 
19
th
-century block developments attractive and therefore created a demand from the 
professional middle class whose taste is oriented towards particular aesthetics of the 
inner city (Ley 1996; Hamnett 2000). Berlin’s economic transformation towards a 
post-industrial city, with decreasing manufacturing jobs and an increasing labour 
force in business services and cultural industries (see chapter 1), contributed to the 
demand of 19
th
-century block developments in the inner city. Equally, Berlin’s reuni-
fication made inner city living attractive again. The fall of the Berlin Wall opened up 
previously deserted land. The consumers of the 19
th
-century housing developments 
consisted then of the incoming government workers, the growing business class, and a 
rapidly expanding number of creative entrepreneurs, often from abroad. 
“A very important process here in Berlin is that people from other EU 
countries enter the housing market. People from Britain or Denmark, 
to mention just two, who can afford a flat in London, can afford here 
the whole floor. Thus, the proportion of immigrants has not necessa-
rily changed. But the immigrants living here are no longer Turkish 
people, but come from other EU countries.”  (Collaborator of a tenant 
consulting service, ID 21) 
 
Value added investment funds have upgraded the housing stock, a task that most of 
the indebted state-owned housing companies were no longer able to provide without 
state subsidies (see section 5.1). The privatisation process therefore fostered the 
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state’s anticipated modernisation of the housing stock, however only in the market 
segment where investors saw potential for higher rents to achieve their target return. 
Under the existing market conditions, value added investment funds invested in the 
19
th
-century block developments and the Twenties and Thirties row developments in 
well-situated areas. At the same time, they divested or neglected post-war high-rise 
developments. It is then also the modernised housing in better locations that was most 
affected by higher rent levels. Housing in the lower market segment, for which de-
mand was not high enough to make investment profitable was divested or neglected. 
The uneven investment process is reinforced through the particular allocation strategy 
that value added investment funds followed regarding the housing with development 
potential. 
 
This analysis underlines the argument that the uneven investment mechanisms and 
outcomes of the privatisation process are not because of the privatisation per se, but 
because of the particular contingently emerging production mechanisms of the value 
added investment funds. The same process of privatisation led to differential out-
comes as a result of how value added investment funds modernised or neglected the 
different types of housing. The differential outcomes were however also due to inves-
tors’ diverging strategies. Value added investment funds were only one type of capital 
investment acting in Berlin’s housing market. The other type that was observed is the 
opportunistic investment fund. The next section turns towards opportunistic invest-
ment funds, investigating their contingently emerging finance, investment, manage-
ment, and exchange strategies. 
 
5.4.3 Investment, Management, and Exchange of Opportunistic Funds 
 
Compared to value added funds, opportunistic investment funds target higher returns 
within a relatively short time span. In order to achieve this return, rental income plays 
a less significant role for opportunistic investment funds. Opportunistic real estate 
private equity funds’ main yield strategy is financial leveraging (see Table 5.1 and 
Rottke (2004: 87)). Financial leveraging is the profit that occurs when the interest rate 
is lower than the return on the total investment in a property. Thus, “[i]f the return on 
the total investment invested in a property is greater than the rate of interest on the 
debt, the return on equity is magnified” (Brueggeman and Fisher 2008: 348). If this is 
the case, investing with high credit capital and low equity is advantageous because it 
increases the return on equity. This has the effect that profit is to a great part not resul-
ting from a particular investment project, but from the degree of credit capital on the 
investment (Rottke 2004: 145). However, leverage “works both ways in the sense that 
it can magnify either returns or losses” (Brueggeman and Fisher 2008: 352). The more 
credit capital invested in the property, the higher the loss when the property is de-
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valued or interest rates rise. The higher the debt on the investment, the higher is the 
return in good times but the greater the loss in hard times. Leveraging is a more risk 
prone strategy because it depends to a greater extent on the availability of cheap credit 
capital. It is therefore more exposed to the volatility of interest rates.  
 
Since opportunistic investment funds make their return through financial leveraging, 
their objective is to buy cheap and re-sell at a higher price as soon as possible to make 
profit on the credit capital. Winograd (2004: 205) summarises the opportunistic strat-
egy: “buy as much as they could, leverage it as much as they could, and wait for mar-
kets to recover.” As soon as the investment target is achieved, the housing is re-sold 
to another investor. For opportunistic investment funds, the availability of good credit 
conditions and a belief that the specific market for capital investment is still cheap but 
on the rise is therefore significant. These funds are more specialised on the trading 
aspect of real estate than on the management side. Often, they do not have in-house 
real estate expertise, but are solely financial engineers. 
 
Due to the opportunistic funds’ focus on trading, the possibility to increase rent levels 
by adding value is not relevant to them. Therefore, location and the condition of a 
housing estate are often neglected at purchase. Linneman (2004: 126) explains this 
neglect: “In fact, even a property with little or no residual value can still be extremely 
valuable.” This starkly contrasts with theoretical concepts such as the rent gap theory 
(Smith 1996) which postulate that profit is achieved through increasing rent levels. If 
a leveraging effect is possible, the existing and potential use value of the housing es-
tate has no priority. A portfolio of lower value housing is sometimes even actively 
sought because of the low purchasing prices. The following sections explore how this 
particular finance strategy influenced the contingently emerging investment, man-
agement, and exchange mechanisms of opportunistic investment funds under the spe-
cific market conditions of Berlin. 
 
Making profit through buying cheap and selling high 
 
In Berlin at the beginning of the 2000s, the availability of housing at low prices com-
bined with easy credit (see section 5.2) promoted investment from opportunistic funds. 
They bought housing estates from state-owned housing companies, but also from 
value added investment funds that divested the housing units without development 
potential (see section 5.4.2). In line with their profit-making strategy through leverag-
ing, regulatory conditions did not play a role because they aimed to re-sell the housing 
and were therefore only marginally affected by rent or planning regulations. A fund 
manager confirmed the funds’ ignorance when purchasing housing: 
 125 
“For financial investors, things like preservation orders, rent regula-
tions or difficulties with existing tenants are negligible details. They 
almost never appear in Excel-Spreadsheets. Investors did not look at 
these details, they saw the cheap housing and the cheap money and 
they wanted to enter the Berlin market.” (Director of a real estate fund 
at a bank, ID 16) 
Not only did regulatory conditions not play a role, opportunistic investors also fol-
lowed a portfolio strategy where they sought to buy the cheapest housing in order to 
re-sell it at a higher price. As a result of this investment strategy, the existing or po-
tential value of the housing estate played a subordinate role. Opportunistic investment 
funds bought the cheap post-war high-rise developments – often formerly or currently 
within the lock-in period of social housing (see chapter 7). They did not analyse the 
specific housing conditions (ID, 16). While credit was easily available and demand 
for investment high, opportunistic funds could count on the ‘bigger fool’, another in-
vestor that buys at an even higher price. The investment therefore was pure financial 
speculation, based on the assumption that the investment hype will continue. A repre-
sentative of an investment firm explained the bigger fool theory: 
“Investors just buy prefabricated housing
96
 and try to re-sell it as fast 
as possible at a higher price. This is called the ‘bigger fool theory’. 
That worked very well in the last years, not so much anymore nowa-
days.” (Principal of an investment firm, ID 7) 
This strategy works well in a rising market. The hype that existed in Berlin’s housing 
market provoked the trading activities of opportunistic investment funds. The strategy 
however, no longer worked when the financial crisis hit investment funds and invest-
ment came to a halt. Credit capital was no longer easy available and the market col-
lapsed (see section 5.3.3). Due to their high debts that became difficult to refinance, 
opportunistic funds ran into difficulties to serve their credit line. The portfolio man-
ager of a fund explained the risk of investing with high credit capital: 
“We have around 60 percent credit capital. Everyone wanted me to in-
crease this, but I refused to do it. Healthy is a credit capital of 55 to 60 
percent; everything above is pure financial speculation. In crisis times 
like these, we are now of course heroes, because we can pay the inter-
est on our credit. I am coming from the real estate sector and not from 
the financial sector.” (Director of a real estate fund at a bank, ID 16) 
Opportunistic investment funds were therefore forced to change their strategy in order 
to be able to serve their credit line. Since opportunistic funds were indifferent to the 
type of housing they bought, they were often stuck with housing that did not have so-
called development potential. These housing estates were in desperate condition and 
                                                 
 
96
 The prefabricated housing built by the GDR government in the outskirts of East Berlin are consid-
ered low standard housing today because they are very monotonous high-rises with outdated amenities 
(see chapter 4.3). 
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often suffered from high vacancy rates because state-owned housing companies were 
not able to stem the costs of renovation (see section 5.1) and value added investment 
funds did not want to pick up the costs for renovations (see section 5.4.2). The oppor-
tunistic funds’ indifference towards housing also shaped their management and ex-
change strategies. The next sections analyse how these strategies contingently em-
erged. 
 
Reducing expenses through neglecting maintenance 
 
In order to get the full positive effect of leveraging, opportunistic investment funds 
reduced expenses to a minimum while a new buyer was sought. This is how they in-
creased income, and therefore the difference between the profit and the interest rate, 
in order to maximise the leverage effect. Opportunistic investment funds reduced the 
management and maintenance of the housing estate to the most possible minimum. 
This efficient management strategy saves costs, but affects tenants’ homes. 
 
The opportunistic investment funds did not make the necessary renovations. More-
over, they cut caretaker jobs only replacing them once they were forced to change 
towards a longer-term strategy. When replacing the caretakers, the funds replaced 
them with cleaners who generally have lower salaries. They also reduced customer 
service to a higher extent than the value added investment funds. Opportunistic in-
vestment funds allowed the already problematic housing estates to further deteriorate. 
A district councillor and a neighbourhood manager confirmed this process for one of 
the cases analysed: 
“The estate has been rundown. The caretaker jobs were cut. The in-
vestor’s policy is a different one than the one of the state-owned hous-
ing company that owned the estate before.” (District councillor for 
social welfare, housing and environment, ID 22) 
This is in stark contradiction with the state’s intention to trigger renovation of the 
housing which could not be stemmed by the state-owned housing companies. The 
deterioration of the housing estates was an unintended consequence of the privatisa-
tion process which was in exact opposition to its stated goal. Failure to perform the 
necessary renovations was curbed in one case: The state forced the purchaser to reno-
vate the housing estate by adding a condition to renovate the estate in the sales con-
tract. In this case, the investor had to renovate the housing estate for a certain pre-
determined amount. However, this was only possible because a state-owned housing 
company sold the housing estate. When housing estates were re-sold from investor to 
investor, they did not force on each other renovation responsibilities.  
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Where the state enforced a renovation process, the state did not interfere in the way 
the estate got renovated, but only controlled the amount that got invested. This en-
abled the opportunistic investment fund to set the priorities in spending the agreed 
amount. The state could therefore not control the consequences. In the case where the 
state enforced this renovation process, the director of the state-owned housing com-
pany and the neighbourhood manager in charge expressed their disappointment at the 
renovation process after privatisation. 
“It is correct that in the sales contract we agreed with the investor on a 
certain amount that needs to be invested in the housing estate for 
renovation until 2010. We have also accompanied this process with an 
external expert and the money that we agreed upon will be invested 
until 2010. However, the renovation was not done as intelligently and 
professionally as we had wished for.” (Managing director of a state-
owned housing company, ID 28) 
“The renovation has been anything else than pleasant because the 
quality is very poor and the tenants are very discontented, also be-
cause they were promised more at the beginning than what was done 
in the end. […] We also had problems with the windows. They were 
only painted and sometimes even when it was wet. That means the 
tenants have now leakier windows than before.” (Project director of a 
neighbourhood management team, ID 29) 
The decline of the housing estate affected the everyday life of the residents. Living in 
a run down estate became increasingly unpleasant, especially when garbage was no 
longer collected and staircases no longer cleaned. 
“When the estate was privatised the lack of cleaning of the estate be-
came unbearable. It was so dirty in the communal areas outside and 
inside the estate. For weeks there was no cleaning, so that the tenants 
started to ask why they still pay rent. Now the property manager em-
phasises the fact that he newly employed these cleaners. However, 
these are not real caretakers.” (Project director of a neighbourhood 
management team, ID 29) 
In contrast to the efficient management of value added investment funds, opportu-
nistic investment funds were, at least as long as they followed their short-term strat-
egy, not dependent on rental income. Therefore, they could not care less how well the 
housing was managed. The effects on the housing and the tenants analysed here were 
therefore more dramatic compared to the ones of value added investment funds’ man-
agement strategies. Even after the opportunistic funds changed their strategy in order 
to be able to serve their credit line, they saved costs by keeping maintenance at a 
minimum. This neglect however, generated higher vacancy rates which had to be di-
minished, especially once the opportunistic investment fund started depending on 
rental income. Rent levels were therefore lowered and letting strategies were aggres-
sively targeting low income households. 
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Increasing occupancy rates through lowering rent levels 
 
Due to the neglect towards the condition of the housing estate, vacancy rates rose. 
Once the market collapsed and the opportunistic fund had to seek ways of serving its 
credit line, the reduction of vacancy rates became crucial to the new strategy. The 
managing director of the responsible property management firm confirmed that the 
investment fund behind the housing development sought a rapid re-sell and explained 
the new strategy: 
“Because of the banking crisis at the moment, the plan to re-sell has 
been modified, because the price that the investor aimed for is not 
achievable. No investor is currently able to get the credit for paying 
such a price. This is why the investor decided to go for a longer-term 
strategy. That means we have to ensure that the credit line can be 
served and therefore we need to have the estate fully rented in order to 
deal with the current situation.” (Managing director of a property 
management firm, ID 30)  
Since the estate was poorly maintained, opportunistic investors ran into increasing 
difficulties attracting new tenants and achieve a full occupancy rate. They were also 
not able to increase their income streams through higher rent levels due to the de-
pressed situation in these lower market segments. Opportunistic investors therefore 
created what Holm (2010) calls ‘discount housing’. Because they had to reduce va-
cancy rates in order to increase their income streams, they also accepted lower rent 
levels. The director of a property management company confirmed their attempt to 
reduce vacancy rates, even accepting lower rent levels:  
“We aim at a vacancy rate of five percent. This is however very diffi-
cult. We have to work hard for it and we have to move away from a 
strategy with high rents. We say, we want to rent out the apartment to 
generate a rental income stream and if we can’t get 5 Euros, we have 
to accept 4.80 Euros [per square metre and month].” (Managing direc-
tor of a property management firm, ID 30) 
 
This shows how rent levels depend on specific market dynamics and the type of hous-
ing within this market. Privatisation of state-owned housing does not necessarily fos-
ter increased rent levels in the privatised housing stock. The particular way in which 
opportunistic investment funds finance their investments strongly contrasts with an 
expectation that private-led housing contributes to higher rents. There is more than 
one way of generating return on investment. The particular way investment funds 
choose to make their return under the given market conditions influences the way they 
manage the housing stock and determine the rental rates. The particular finance strat-
egy also influences the way funds allocate housing to tenants. 
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Increasing occupancy through aggressive letting strategies 
 
Lower rent levels were not sufficient to attract new tenants, especially because the 
estate acquired a poor reputation due to neglect in maintenance. The fund therefore 
increasingly applied aggressive letting strategies, indifferent to the tenant that was 
moving into the housing unit. The fund hired an external agency, which it paid on the 
basis of the amount of housing units rented. The letting agency advertised the apart-
ment specifically to people with a poor credit history and promised new tenants three 
months rent free and a voucher of 200 Euros redeemable at a home improvement store 
(Du Chesne Immobilien GmbH 2009). A district head of a tenant association heavily 
criticised this strategy: 
“Other owners get also better off tenants, but they are committed to 
get the better off ones. It is simpler to get the apartments filled by ad-
vertising it with strategies like handing out 250 Euro vouchers for 
Media Markt
97
. This is how they get the apartments full. However, 
this is not sustainable because as fast as these people move in, the bet-
ter off ones become angry and move out just as fast.” (District head of 
a tenant association, ID 27) 
 
This discount housing strategy implemented by opportunistic funds is in contrast with 
Besecke and Enbergs’ (2008) findings that state-owned housing companies are the 
only actors that provide housing for the disadvantaged because neither housing asso-
ciations nor the privatised companies are willing to accommodate them. The analysis 
shows that opportunistic funds also provide housing for the socially disadvantaged. 
However, they are motivated by the possibility of decreasing vacancy rates and not by 
any social responsibilities they feel towards their tenants. The objective of opportu-
nistic investment funds is therefore not quite the same as the state-owned housing 
companies’ political mandate to provide housing for the more vulnerable ones (see 
chapter 6). This indicates that a dualistic interpretation of privatised versus state-
owned housing is not helpful in understanding the particular mode of housing provi-
sion and its consequences on uneven development.
98
 
 
The opportunistic investment funds’ strategy of buying cheap and selling high while 
ignoring to maintain housing estates and pushing for lower vacancy that favour low 
income households, shapes the consumption of such housing estates. In this last sec-
tion, the opportunistic investment funds’ production mechanisms are analysed with 
regards to their effects on the changing consumption relations of housing.  
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 A famous media chain store in Germany. 
98
 I develop this argument further in chapter 6. 
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Opportunistic investment funds shape an inclusive form of consumption 
 
Due to the neglect of the estates, households with a higher socio-economic status 
moved out. In the market conditions of Berlin, these households were able to find a 
housing estate that is better maintained. This is in contradiction with a tight market 
situation where tenants cannot necessarily vote with their feet. The tenants who then 
moved into the housing estate owned by the opportunistic fund were the ones that did 
not have access to other market segments. The majority of these tenants were on 
social welfare. The fact that the job centre, which is in charge of benefits for people 
on social welfare, guarantees the rent payment, created further incentives for the op-
portunistic fund to rent to tenants on welfare. Often, the tenants who had no access to 
other market segments were also immigrants: 
“In the last year, thanks to the letting agency, we had an increased in-
flux of Roma. They were not in one apartment but in four apartments 
and that was enough. This year, there is an increased influx of Arab 
families, many among them very religious. We have a mosque nearby, 
which is observed by the Federal Office for the Protection of the Con-
stitution. These are all things that cause distress.” (Project director of a 
neighbourhood management team, ID 29) 
The influx of different nationalities and ethnic groups also affected the everyday life 
of other tenants, creating conflicts within the estate because of their different degrees 
of integration into German society. While Turkish people as non-EU immigrants, for 
example, have to attend language courses, Roma and other EU immigrants do not 
need to demonstrate any language skills. These conflicts further deteriorated the repu-
tation of the housing estate: 
“It is dirtier and louder in the estate, there is a complete indifference 
towards it. All problems we had before, but not to such an extent. And 
the arrival of the Roma families last year created conflicts because 
they released a wave of grudges among other immigrants because they 
do not speak German. And in comparison to the Turkish people who 
move here and who have to show that they attend a language course, 
the Roma do not have to do this. They rented an apartment and thirty 
people lived in it. The staircase was used as a toilet and they drank 
without limits.” (Project director of a neighbourhood management 
team, ID 29) 
The neighbourhood management tried to counter the downward spiral of an influx of 
people on social welfare by collaborating with the job centre. Since the job centre has 
to approve the apartment of someone on social welfare, the neighbourhood manage-
ment tried to interfere so it would not approve everyone for the specific housing estate. 
This way, the neighbourhood management hoped to force the investor to increase its 
efforts to attract a clientele with a higher socio-economic status. The manner, in 
which opportunistic investment funds function however, makes it extremely difficult 
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to establish a social mixture in this type of housing estate. Moreover, under the spe-
cific market conditions, the contingently emerging investment, management and ex-
change mechanisms of opportunistic investment funds actively created a concentra-
tion of lower-income households. This is in stark contrast with the value added in-
vestment fund that displaced lower-income households and created enclaves of afflu-
ent tenants in inner city neighbourhoods. 
 
The concentration of the more vulnerable tenants in certain areas of the city is a 
common phenomenon (Van Kempen and Priemus 2002). The analysis of the contin-
gently emerging production mechanisms of value added and opportunistic investment 
funds shows the particular way this concentration came about in specific circum-
stances. The concentration of the socially disadvantaged is not solely generated 
through their displacement from inner city housing. It does also not solely happen 
because low income tenants are living in social housing (compare chapter 7). Concen-
tration is also actively created through the opportunistic investment funds’ specific 
finance, investment, management and exchange strategies. These mechanisms con-
trast the normalised expectations where finance capital creates pockets of gentrified 
neighbourhoods, where high-income households displace low income tenants who 
have nowhere to go. 
 
Conclusion 
 
The government’s privatisation of state-owned housing companies and housing es-
tates diversified the type of providers in Berlin’s housing market. The en bloc selling 
and the aim to make the highest profit possible to restore the precarious financial 
situation of the city, favoured institutional investment funds as purchasers of the for-
mer state-owned housing. At the beginning the 2000s, institutional investment funds 
guided by global financial market conditions of cheaply available credit capital found 
in Berlin’s privatisation process a matching supply for their demand. They entered 
Berlin’s housing market on a large scale through the vehicle of real estate private 
equity funds.  
 
Real estate private equity funds speculated on a rising housing market where rent lev-
els and owner-occupation could be increased. These types of funds however also 
speculated on a rising demand for investment independent from the use value of the 
housing resulting from credit availability and the matching supply. This was in con-
trast to the reality of Berlin’s development, where the general socio-economic situa-
tion of the city did not considerably improve to trigger a higher demand for the use of 
housing. Demand was rising, but only in the market segments of 19
th
-century block 
developments and Twenties and Thirties row developments in inner city areas. Post-
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war housing estates at the edge of the city still suffered from high vacancy rates (see 
also chapter 4). Moreover, when the financial markets collapsed in 2008 and 2009, the 
credit capital was no longer cheaply available. Real estate private equity funds, there-
fore, had to deal with specific conditions; the mismatch between speculative expecta-
tions and market reality. 
  
Under the specific market conditions, this chapter identified two types of real estate 
private equity funds: The value added investment fund and the opportunistic invest-
ment fund. The analysis of their contingently emerging mechanisms provides explan-
ations for the processes of uneven development. The added value fund predominantly 
relied on rental income. It upgraded the housing stock in order to be able to increase 
rent levels. This was however only possible in the market segments with rising de-
mand. The added value fund therefore invested very selectively, contrasting at least in 
part the state’s intention to deploy a modernisation of Berlin’s housing stock through 
privatisation. The increased rent levels coupled with a very selective allocation strat-
egy followed by added value funds created enclaves of neighbourhoods occupied by 
tenants with a high socio-economic status. 
 
In contrast to the value added fund, opportunistic investment funds depended on fi-
nancial leveraging to achieve their target return. They purchased the cheapest, often 
problematic, housing estates, financed them with high debt rates and re-sold them as 
quickly as possible to other investors for a higher price. They did normally not invest 
in the housing stock. Moreover, they were completely indifferent towards mainte-
nance and tenant allocation while they owned the estate. Trying to reduce expenses, 
they neglected the estates. In the market situation, where demand was only increasing 
for housing in the better neighbourhoods, the opportunistic funds’ applied aggressive 
letting strategies with the imperative to serve their credit lines through decreasing 
vacancy rates. This fostered a concentration of socially disadvantaged tenants that 
have no access in the housing stock to better neighbourhoods. 
 
The government’s privatisation of state-owned housing confirms Berlin’s trajectory 
towards a more entrepreneurial housing provision as outlined by the entrepreneurial 
city debate (see section 2.2). The process reduced the influence of Berlin’s gov-
ernment, creating incentives for private investors. Moreover, because the privatised 
system established by the government was not fully understood by the protagonists, it 
produced many unintended consequences. The analysis shows that finance had driven 
privatisation. A balanced development is tipped in favour of attracting capital and 
against tenants, especially the more vulnerable ones. This was expected. The mecha-
nisms of this privatisation process were however profoundly unequal. The chapter 
showed that the transformation towards a more entrepreneurial housing provision in 
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itself does not explain this inequality. It is the specific way in which the privatisation 
takes place that produce processes of uneven development. Moreover, it is the contin-
gently emerging production mechanisms of value added and opportunistic investment 
funds that create the specific processes of uneven development. The privatisation of 
state-owned housing did not create per se processes of uneven development, but the 
diverging production mechanisms under Berlin’s specific market conditions did. 
These different mechanisms analysed in this chapter start to fill the black box between 
the entrepreneurial housing provision and social and spatial inequality identified in 
section 2.3. 
 
With the analysis of the privatisation process, this chapter investigated the conse-
quences of the first transformation process of Berlin’s social mode of housing regula-
tion. The next chapter turns towards the second transformation process; the reforma-
tion of the remaining state-owned housing companies. Berlin’s government not only 
privatised part of its housing stock, but also reformed the remaining housing com-
panies. This generated increasing pressure on state-owned housing companies to work 
in a more profitable way in order to pay dividends to the state. At the same time, 
state-owned housing companies have a political mandate to provide housing for a 
broad stratum of the population and to contribute to the improvement of socially dis-
advantaged neighbourhoods. The next chapter investigates the tensions and uneven 
mechanisms of the contingently emerging production mechanisms of state-owned 
housing companies under particular guiding principles and compares them to the pro-
duction mechanisms of the different types of investment funds identified in this chap-
ter. 
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6 Reformation of State-owned Housing Companies 
 
The second transformation process towards a more entrepreneurial housing provision 
this thesis has identified is the state’s reformation of the state-owned housing com-
panies. In comparison to real estate private equity funds, public or state-owned hous-
ing companies have a different rational for acting in the housing market. Typically, 
the state provides housing for a particular income group that would not have access to 
housing on the free market. The provision of housing for low income households is 
therefore prioritised over economic profits. In Berlin, the state’s reformation of state-
owned housing companies challenged this rationale, creating a state-owned housing 
provision that can be considered as a more entrepreneurial and socially regressive 
form of housing provision. I argue that this is due to the particular way in which the 
state integrated profit-oriented goals. 
 
In order to comply with the specific entrepreneurial and social guiding principles of 
the state, state-owned housing companies were forced to adapt their production strat-
egies; become economically successful while adhering to a political mandate of pro-
viding housing for low income households. At the same time, state-owned housing 
companies started to feel increasing competition from a more diversified owner struc-
ture in Berlin’s housing market as a result of the privatisation process (see chapter 5). 
This chapter addresses the question How do state-owned housing companies contin-
gently emerge under the new guiding principles and market conditions through their 
finance, investment, management, and exchange mechanisms? 
 
The chapter explores this second transformation process in three steps. First, it ex-
plores the state’s reformation process of state-owned housing companies, outlining 
the new guiding principles they had to follow (6.1). Second, the chapter investigates 
how the new owner structure of Berlin’s housing market shaped the state-owned 
housing companies’ market position (6.2). Third, the chapter analyses how the state-
owned housing companies influence the provision of housing structure through their 
contingently emerging production mechanisms, ultimately contributing to processes 
of uneven development (6.3). The chapter closes with a comparative synthesis of key 
mechanisms analysed among privatised (see previous chapter 5) and state-owned 
housing (6.4). 
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6.1 Reformation Enabled Berlin’s Government to Redefine the Aims of State-led 
Housing Provision 
 
In principle, the state holds public housing with the goal to provide it for the socially 
disadvantaged and low income households (Turner and Whitehead 2002: 211). The 
state commonly intervenes in the housing market through supply-side housing support, 
especially in times of housing shortage, when housing costs tend to be too high for 
low income households, or private housing construction cannot keep up with a rising 
demand (Ball et al. 1988: 11; Golland 1998: 6; see also Harloe 1995). In comparison 
to private-led housing provision, public-led housing provision usually aims not to 
make profits through the construction and management of housing, but aims to im-
prove “the consumption possibilities of households, either in general or for particular 
targeted social groups” (Ball et al. 1988: 15). The state, therefore, has diametrically 
opposing objectives compared to the profit orientation of private landlords. Public-led 
housing is non-profit oriented offering below market rents that the state subsidises. 
Public-led housing is associated with “socially financed, large-scale, standardized, 
and monotonous housing” (Lawson 2006: 68).  
 
The practice of public housing provision is less clear. The dualistic distinction be-
tween private-led (equalling profit-oriented) and public-led (equalling low income) 
housing provision is in reality rarely as clear-cut as the literature often normatively 
asserts. It is therefore necessary to investigate the mechanisms defining public-led 
housing provision in more detail. This chapter addresses the particular way public-led 
housing provision worked in Berlin based on the interpretation of the conceptual 
model of regulation, production, and consumption mechanisms. 
 
Changing vision for state-owned housing fostered a reformation 
 
In Berlin, the government holds housing through state-owned housing companies. The 
state-owned housing companies are public limited companies (AG) or companies of 
limited liability (GmbH) and therefore guided by private law.
99
 However, the gov-
ernment of Berlin is the sole owner. Until 1990, the state-owned housing companies 
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 German law makes a distinction between public and private law. Public law regulates the relation-
ship between a citizen and the state or different entities of the state. Private law regulates the relation-
ship between citizens or companies. State-owned housing companies, guided by private law, are legally 
treated as a private company and not as an entity of the state. 
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acted as non-profit housing companies
100
 under the principle of the common public 
interest (Gemeinnützigkeit) with the aim to provide housing for a broad cross-section 
of the population. Housing companies under this principle benefitted from tax exemp-
tions, but were in return limited in their profit-making. They were not allowed to pay 
out more than four percent in dividends, limiting profit maximisation strategies. Their 
field of activity was also regulated, limiting it to building and managing subsidised 
social housing units (see section 7.1) as well as rental units on the free market that 
could be no more than 120 square metres (Stimpel 1990: 104). In contrast to other 
public housing systems (see, for example, Lundqvist 1992; Whitehead 1999 for the 
UK), state-owned housing companies in Germany were therefore not exclusively op-
erating in the social housing market; there was therefore never a sharp line between 
state-led and private-led housing provision in Germany (see also section 7.1). 
 
Starting in 1990, the state’s vision for state-owned housing changed. The national 
government abandoned the status of non-profit housing companies acting under the 
principle of the common public interest. The non-profit companies were no longer 
exempt from tax payments. At the same time, they were released from the restrictions 
with regards to their activities on the housing market.
101
 The housing companies could 
therefore widen their portfolio and increase profit margins. With this deregulation, 
these formerly non-profit housing companies became considerable income generators; 
the owner could extract higher dividends or sell the company. It became an oppor-
tunity to improve their financial situation, especially for owners that were under fi-
nancial pressure, such as the government of Berlin. The abandonment of the principle 
of the common public interest for housing companies enabled Berlin’s government to 
change its strategic goal for holding state-owned housing. It increasingly saw state-
owned housing companies as a way to make profit and improve the state’s budget. 
The abandonment of the principle of the common public interest not only enabled 
Berlin’s government to privatise state-owned housing (see chapter 5), but also al-
lowed it to merge state-owned housing companies.  
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 Non-profit housing companies are here referred to as housing companies that were acting under the 
law of the common public interest (Wohnungsgemeinnützigkeitsgesetz) enforced starting in 1940, but 
rooted, however, in the long tradition of co-operatives promoting social reformation dating back to the 
late 19
th
 century. The Nazi Regime integrated the co-operatives as institutions of state-run housing 
politics. After the Second World War, these state-owned housing companies played a major role in the 
provision of housing (Rudolph-Cleff 1996). There were however also other owners of non-profit hous-
ing companies. In 1990 there were 1850 housing companies following the principle of the common 
public interest in Germany, owned by such diverse groups as the national and regional states, co-
operatives, the church, and unionised companies (Stimpel 1990). 
101
 The abandonment of the status of non-profit housing companies was part of a tax reform. With the 
expected tax income from the non-profit housing companies, the national government aimed to balance 
out tax benefits it made to other interest groups. The government argued that around 60 percent of the 
non-profit housing companies were in state-ownership and therefore protected from increasing rent 
levels by the state. See Stimpel (1990) for a more detailed analysis of the national government’s de-
regulation of non-profit housing companies.  
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From the mid-1990s onwards, before privatising the first state-owned housing com-
pany, Berlin’s government started to merge state-owned housing companies with each 
other. The process was the following: One state-owned housing company raised en-
ough capital to purchase another one, or – as in the majority of the time – two other 
ones. Berlin's government then received the proceeds of this ‘internal sale’ and could 
decrease its own debt without loosing the housing stock. Eleven housing companies 
were sold in this way until 2002. At the end of 2008, after the privatisation process 
(see chapter 5) and the mergers, Berlin owned a remaining six housing companies 
with 15.8 percent of the city’s housing stock (Investitionsbank Berlin 2010).
102
 
 
Aside from the proceeds of privatising the two housing companies (see chapter 5), 
Berlin’s government received 1.5 billion Euros from the state-owned housing com-
panies between 1991 and 2006. These incomes were generated through the above 
described mergers, dividend payments, special dividends from property sales, and 
subsidy repayments (Wowereit and Junge-Reyer 2007). The payments to the state 
created increasing financial difficulties for the state-owned housing companies. The 
representative of the housing department of a district confirmed this process: 
“We have experienced how state-owned housing companies were 
merged. Berlin’s government, as the owner, decided to sell some of its 
housing companies to others in order to receive the revenue from the 
sale. This meant that the money went from one pocket into another. In 
the end, this resulted in a situation where some of the state-owned 
housing companies became nearly bankrupt.” (Deputy head of a dis-
trict housing administration, ID 17) 
The payments of the state-owned housing companies to the state are in stark contrast 
with the expectation that public-led housing is non-profit oriented. This underlines a 
more differentiated picture from the normalised expectations of a private versus pub-
lic mode of housing provision. In 2007, this particular form of public-led housing 
provision, which aims at generating profits for the state while continuing to provide 
housing for a broad representation of the population, was re-emphasised with the mas-
ter plan for the remaining state-owned housing companies. The next section analyses 
the particularities of Berlin’s strategic aims in the master plan for the remaining state-
owned housing companies. 
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 In 2007, the government decided to hold on to approximately 15 percent of its housing stock and 
stopped further privatisation although single units and smaller estates could still be sold, especially if 
they fostered owner-occupation (Wowereit and Junge-Reyer 2007). 
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Principles for state-owned housing companies defined economic and social goals 
 
The government of Berlin does not intervene in the operations of its state-owned 
housing companies. However, the government is able to influence the strategic orien-
tation of the state-owned housing companies through different channels, thereby im-
plementing political priorities regarding the provision of housing. At least one mem-
ber of the Senate Department for Urban Development and one member of the Senate 
Department for Finance participate on each company’s administrative board. This 
facilitates regular information exchange. More important, the government of Berlin 
annually develops an agreement with each company, outlining the strategic goals; and 
the state-owned housing companies have to provide quarterly reports. The representa-
tive of the Senate Department of Urban Development explained the relation between 
the state and the companies: 
“Let’s say we are not influencing the operations. However, we try to 
provide certain general regulations. From my point of view, these 
regulations could still be a bit more differentiated and precise than 
they are now, but of course we do not intervene in the operations.” 
(Employee Senate Department for Urban Development, ID 5) 
In 2006, due to the continuing financial difficulties faced by state-owned housing 
companies – in the form of high debts as a result of the payments that were made to 
the state (see above), but also because of increasing public opposition towards further 
privatisation – politicians demanded a master plan outlining the state’s general strat-
egy towards its state-owned housing companies (Abgeordnetenhaus Berlin 2006). In 
the summer 2007, the Senate thus enacted its first master plan to guide state-owned 
housing companies (see Wowereit and Junge-Reyer 2007). In this strategic plan, there 
was a commitment to keep the six remaining housing companies under state owner-
ship, with adherence to keeping 15 percent of Berlin’s housing stock. Smaller port-
folio sales were possible but had to be agreed upon by the Senate. Privatisation to 
tenants were still to encouraged (Wowereit and Junge-Reyer 2007: 8). 
 
The master plan re-emphasised the state-owned housing companies’ mandate to main-
tain and provide housing for a broad cross-section of the population and to contribute 
to a stabilisation of rent levels (Wowereit and Junge-Reyer 2007: 6). Berlin’s state-
owned housing companies were to take into account the tenants’ situation when in-
creasing rent levels and to maintain comparable rents after modernisation (Wowereit 
and Junge-Reyer 2007: 11). Additionally, the strategic plan mentioned the importance 
of state-owned housing stock for accommodating people unable to access the private 
housing market. State-owned housing companies therefore had to integrate socially 
disadvantaged people. Furthermore, they were considered important partners for the 
positive development of disadvantaged neighbourhoods (Wowereit and Junge-Reyer 
2007: 7); for example, contributing to neighbourhood management programmes, 
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which aim to “activate the commitment of residents” (Senatsverwaltung für 
Stadtentwicklung 2007a: 1, author's translation).  
 
The master plan therefore confirmed the social responsibilities of state-owned housing 
companies. In contrast to the traditional aim of state-led housing provision, the master 
plan newly incorporated economic goals such as profit-making in order to be able to 
pay dividends to the state. The master plan thus not only depicted the social responsi-
bilities of these housing companies, but also identified economic goals that they had 
to pursue. The plan outlined the continuation of financial stabilisation in terms of op-
timising the core business and further reducing the debt (Wowereit and Junge-Reyer 
2007: 9). These measures would allow companies to pay out dividends in the future: 
“The task of state-owned housing companies, today, is to strategically align the com-
pany with the political aims for urban development. They need to become economi-
cally healthy companies, in order to be able to pay dividends to the state”
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(Wowereit and Junge-Reyer 2007: 5, author's translation). A representative from the 
Senate Department for Urban Development confirmed the state’s aim to lead its hous-
ing companies into profit-making enterprises in order to extract dividends: 
“I don’t think that privatisation was the decisive reason for the profes-
sionalisation of Berlin’s state-owned housing companies. Moreover, 
because of the general situation, the Senate took care that the state-
owned housing companies are managed more professionally in order 
to avoid losses and to finally lead the companies into a profit zone. 
This was done with the intention to siphon dividends in order to im-
prove Berlin’s state budget.” (Employee Senate Department of Urban 
Development, ID 5) 
Besides social and economic goals, state-owned housing companies were also asked 
to continue playing a role as vanguards for housing innovation: They were to improve 
housing with regards to energy efficiency; provide adequate housing for a growing 
ageing population by re-modelling dwellings for the purpose of communal living.  
 
The master plan left all state-owned housing companies with three responsibilities: 
Becoming economically viable, remaining socially responsible to a broad cross-
section of the population, and being a role model for innovative (and sustainable) in-
vestment in the housing sector. Duvigneau (2001: 1, author's translation), a state-
owned housing company director prior to the company’s privatisation, described this 
transition of state-owned housing companies as from “a means of redistributional 
                                                 
 
103
 In Annex 6 of the plan, where short, middle and long-term goals for each company are formulated, 
the economic aims are more detailed. The Senate demands a reduction of the companies’ staff, and a 
further privatisation of dwellings to tenants in order to increase the rate of owner-occupied housing. 
The companies need to achieve an adequate profit for the state (Wowereit and Junge-Reyer 2007: VIII-
XXIV). 
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politics to an economically successful service enterprise with social standards”. These 
new strategic goals confirm the move to a more entrepreneurial housing provision: 
For the state, achieving economic goals is equally important as providing housing for 
a broad stratum of the population. The state no longer perceives the construction and 
management of housing as a necessary instrument to support low income households, 
but increasingly uses state-owned housing as a way to raise money. 
 
This vision of state-led housing provision contradicts the understanding of the entre-
preneurial city as the mere withdrawal of the state from welfare provision through 
privatisation. The reformation of state-owned housing companies shows that a trans-
formation towards an entrepreneurial housing provision is more complex than the 
retreat of the state in favour of private agencies. In contrast to the privatisation of 
state-owned housing (see chapter 5), the reformation of the state-owned housing com-
panies promotes the integration of market mechanisms into the state-led housing pro-
vision (compare Fosler 1992; Jessop 1997b). In Berlin, these market mechanisms are 
identified as the integration of economic goals into public-led housing provision.  
 
The integration of market mechanisms into the state-led housing provision further 
challenges the dualistic understanding of the state versus the private sphere of housing 
provision. This creates a particular hybrid form of public-led housing provision which 
cannot simply be equated to a private-led form of provision. In the previous chapter, it 
was shown that the private sphere of housing provision is not one dimensional, but is 
instantiated in particular production mechanisms. Equally, the incorporation of profit-
oriented goals into state-led housing provision does not mean that state-owned hous-
ing companies are part of the private sphere of housing provision. While integrating 
economic goals, state-owned housing companies still have a political mandate to pro-
vide housing for a broad cross-section of the population, and especially for low in-
come households. To this end, the chapter turns its attention to an analysis of how 
state-owned housing companies actually implemented their new mandate, ultimately 
creating processes of uneven development. 
 
The master plan’s economic and social guiding principles shape the state-owned 
housing companies production mechanisms in particular ways. In order to understand 
how this form of entrepreneurial housing provision creates mechanisms of uneven 
development, it is important to analyse the production mechanisms of state-owned 
housing companies. The state-owned housing companies’ production mechanisms are 
however not solely dependent on the state’s guiding principles; their strategies are 
also highly influenced by Berlin’s specific market conditions in which they have to 
operate. Before investigating the contingently emerging production mechanisms of 
state-owned housing companies, the following section analyses Berlin’s market con-
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ditions and how they have changed resulting from the entrance of institutional inves-
tors. 
 
6.2 Institutional Investors Created Competitive Market Conditions 
 
Until 1990, competition between state-owned housing companies was sparse. The 
relation among the state-owned housing companies was more collaborative than com-
petitive due to three mechanisms: First, state-owned housing companies, as all other 
non-profit housing companies, were regulated in the particular way described above, 
where their profits were limited and activities were constrained to social housing and 
certain segments of the private housing sector. Second, there was a widespread hous-
ing shortage in Berlin before and shortly after reunification (see chapter 1 and 4). 
State-owned housing companies did not have to compete for tenants. Third, state-
owned housing companies dominated certain neighbourhoods due to their historical 
development where each housing company was mandated to construct and manage 
particular housing estates. The state-owned housing companies’ activities were there-
fore spatially concentrated, giving them a monopoly position in certain neighbour-
hoods. 
 
This non-competitive situation however changed with the transformation of these 
conditions: First, the reformation of state-owned housing companies triggered profit 
expectations (see section 6.1) which fostered a rivalry, defined through their profits, 
amongst themselves. They each had to broaden their activities in order to generate the 
expected profit and therefore they competed for profitable investment opportunities. 
This competition was reinforced through a public debate on the state-owned com-
panies’ value; and whether their selling price values more than their economic, social, 
and environmental contribution to Berlin’s development. This debate was connected 
to the question of whether more state-owned housing companies should be sold and if 
so, which ones. A representative from a state-owned housing company explained: 
“It is certainly the case, if you consider all the state-owned housing 
companies, that the possible profits through privatisation were dis-
cussed. […] Hence, what can the state-owned housing companies do? 
They have to make profit, to be cost-effective and they have to place 
themselves differently on the market. They belong to Berlin and the 
Senator for Finance is looking at what he can take out of them to help 
a city that chronically suffers from financial difficulties. Thus, you are 
no longer just a landlord, but you develop; you brand yourself and you 
position yourself in the market. This is due to the fact that there are 
competing [state-owned] companies that have a certain quality, rev-
enue optimisation, and customer proximity that the private housing 
companies do not provide.” (Deputy head of a customer service centre 
for a state-owned housing company, ID 24) 
 142 
Second, the surplus of housing that Berlin had starting in the mid-1990s created a 
more competitive market situation for housing providers. In order to keep the income 
stream stable, housing companies were forced to fight vacancy rates by attracting 
more tenants. A representative of a state-owned housing company confirmed this, 
underlining the competition between private and state-owned as well as among state-
owned housing companies: 
“The competition is of course strong, also between state-owned hous-
ing companies. I don’t really care if I get a tenant from another state-
owned company or a privatised one; the main point is that the tenant 
lives with us, is reliable, takes care of his apartment and the envi-
ronment, and adheres to the rules.” (Technical project manager of a 
state-owned housing company, ID 20) 
And third, the entrance of institutional investors (see chapter 5) drastically changed 
the ownership structure of housing provision, creating a more competitive envi-
ronment for the remaining state-owned housing companies. Institutional investors 
abrogated the monopolistic position of state-owned housing companies in certain 
areas. Investment funds bought previously state-owned housing, competing in the 
same market segment. The deputy director of a tenant association pointed to the diffi-
cult position that state-owned housing companies are in today: 
“Berlin’s state-owned housing companies are in a difficult situation 
from my point of view. They are under political pressure to provide 
housing for the financially disadvantaged population. At the same 
time, they are in competition with the new investors. Previously, they 
were not really in competition with the private landlord who owned 
eight apartments. However, they are in competition with the new in-
vestors because they have the same structure and try to attract the 
same tenants.” (Deputy manager of an umbrella tenant association, ID 
6) 
In this more competitive market environment with a diversified owner structure, the 
activities of state-owned housing companies were no longer protected and they had to 
adapt to the new provision structure.  
 
Thus far, the chapter established the state’s changing aims of maintaining control of 
state-owned housing companies. The new guiding principles for the state-owned 
housing companies’ social, economic, and innovative responsibilities were outlined. 
The chapter further analysed the specific market conditions under which state-owned 
housing companies acted. Having established these conditions, the chapter now turns 
to an analysis of the contingently emerging production mechanisms of state-owned 
housing companies, investigating how these contribute to processes of uneven devel-
opment. 
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6.3 Guiding Principles and Competitive Market Conditions Shaped the Strategies 
of State-owned Housing Companies 
 
Thus far, the chapter explored the redefinition of state-led housing provision and the 
particular market conditions within which state-owned housing companies operate. In 
order to explain how the reformation of state-owned housing companies generates 
processes of uneven development, the chapter now turns to an investigation of the 
contingently emerging production mechanisms within the context analysed. The guid-
ing questions for the analysis of how production mechanisms fostered uneven devel-
opment were therefore as followed: 
• How do the production mechanisms of the state-owned housing com-
panies play out in practice under the competitive market conditions? 
• How do the production mechanisms of state-owned housing com-
panies affect the consumption under the competitive market conditions? 
The following sections analyse the finance, investment, management, and exchange 
strategies of state-owned housing companies under Berlin’s specific market condi-
tions, investigating how the particular strategies affect the consumption of state-
owned housing. The analysis is predominantly based on three out of the six state-
owned housing companies. 
 
6.3.1 Finance of State-owned Housing Companies  
 
Even though Berlin’s government introduced economic goals into the guiding princi-
ples of state-owned housing companies, the financial mechanisms differ considerably 
from both types of investment funds, the value added and the opportunistic, analysed 
in the previous chapter. First, the financial preconditions of state-owned housing 
companies differ largely from real estate private equity funds. Managers of real estate 
private equity funds collect capital for a specific investment project (see section 5.3) 
which they exit as soon as the return on investment is realised. State-owned housing 
companies, being public limited companies (AG) or companies of limited liability 
(GmbH), cannot enter and exit Berlin’s housing market as they please. They are per-
manent actors in Berlin’s housing market, carrying historically developed financial 
preconditions with them (see below). This means, they have to integrate much longer 
time spans into their strategies, even compared to long-term investors such as value 
added investment funds. As a result, state-owned housing companies are highly de-
pendent on steady income from the provision of housing. 
 
Second, in comparison to the institutional investors’ profit expectations of 11 to 15 
percent for value added funds and 16 percent or more for opportunistic funds, the 
state’s profit expectations are lower. There is no official number, but a former parlia-
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mentarian claimed that the Senator for Finance had expected five percent. Although 
profit expectations were lower, the state required state-owned housing companies to 
increase their equity rates (see Table 6.1). In order to reduce debt and increase their 
equity rates, state-owned housing companies had to make high profit rates. Only 
through high profits, were they able to fulfil both expectations; increasing equity rates 
and pay out dividends. Again, this was achieved through increasing income streams. 
Third, state-owned housing companies were not only structured through these finance 
mechanisms, but were further structured through the social and innovative guiding 
principles of the state (see section 6.1) such as the mandate to provide housing for low 
income households. In contrast to the private real estate equity funds, state-owned 
housing companies had to generate higher incomes in order to carry out these social 
responsibilities (Duvigneau 2001: 8). 
 
All of the remaining state-owned housing companies acted under these finance 
mechanisms. They had to reduce their debts and increase their income streams in 
order to meet the terms of their owner, the government of Berlin. However, each 
state-owned housing company’s specific condition differed based on its historical 
development. The following paragraph analyses how the state-owned housing com-
panies differed in regards to their financial situation and portfolio structure. 
 
Different financial preconditions for state-owned housing companies 
 
Historically, state-owned housing companies operated in specific areas of the city. 
This geographical distribution influenced their wealth. Their position was however 
reconstituted after merging with other housing companies (see section 6.1). The ac-
quiring company ended up with greater or lesser amounts of debt, depending on the 
financial condition of the state-owned housing company that was bought. Moreover, 
the post-merger financial situation of the state-owned housing company also de-
pended on the housing portfolio of the acquired companies. The state-owned housing 
company that could acquire another one which owned a considerable amount of 19
th
-
century block developments for which demand was relatively high, ended up in a bet-
ter position compared to a state-owned housing company that had to acquire one 
which predominantly owned prefabricated housing estates in the outskirts. A state-
owned housing company project manager explained the acquisitions they made and 
the financial situation they were put in: 
“In 2000, we made an acquisition of two other state-owned housing 
companies. One of the companies had exclusively old housing units in 
Prenzlauer Berg, around 13,000 units I think. The other company was 
in a catastrophic situation necessitating major repairs and maintenance 
to its housing stock. We also had to modernise the acquired com-
pany’s housing stock and make it cost-effective again. This acquisi-
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tion therefore had an extreme impact on the finances of our company.” 
(Technical project manager of a state-owned housing company, ID 20) 
The 2003 annual report of another state-owned housing company described the effect 
of the shrinking population on its business operations, explaining how the shrinkage 
unevenly affected its housing stock. The housing stock it owned historically was only 
marginally affected because it was distributed all over the city and contained housing 
from all time periods. However, the housing stock it acquired from a company in East 
Berlin with almost exclusively prefabricated housing built between 1980 and 1985 in 
the outskirts was dramatically affected (Senatsverwaltung für Finanzen 2004b: 223). 
Table 6.1 shows the equity and vacancy rates of the three state-owned housing com-
panies analysed, indicating their economic position in terms of equity and vacancy 
rates in 2002 after the mergers were completed, and in 2009, respectively. 
 
Table 6.1: Economic Position of State-owned Housing Companies Analysed 
Equity rates Vacancy rates  
2002 2009 2002 2009 
Company A 14% 19% No data 5.0% 
Company B 2% 7% 3.5% 3.5% 
Company C 14% 25% 8.9% 5.8% 
Source: Senatsverwaltung für Finanzen (2004b) and Senatsverwaltung für Finanzen (2010b). 
 
The analysis shows that the financial situation of state-owned housing companies was 
uneven, creating different conditions under which they had to comply with the eco-
nomic and social goals mandated by Berlin’s government. This underlines the argu-
ment that state-led housing provision takes different forms and cannot be abstracted as 
such. Moreover, it points to the need to take both the finance mechanisms and the 
differing pre-conditions into account (see also section 6.3.3).  
 
Having established the financial mechanisms of state-owned housing companies and 
their differing conditions, the following section analyses the contingently emerging 
investment, management, and exchange strategies of state-owned housing companies. 
 
6.3.2 Investment, Management, and Exchange of State-owned Housing Companies 
 
The finance mechanisms established in the last section show that state-owned housing 
companies became highly dependent on income streams. Due to the depressed market 
situation where rent levels cannot be increased arbitrarily, the logic consequence for 
state-owned housing companies would have been that – similar to the value added 
investment funds – they would have focused on the housing stock with development 
potential, modernised it and increased rent levels, improving the social structure of 
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tenants. Compared to value added investment funds, state-owned housing companies 
have however a mandate to provide and maintain housing for low income households. 
This created specific investment, management, and exchange mechanisms. This sec-
tion explores the strategies observed among state-owned housing companies. 
 
Increasing income streams through selling unprofitable housing estates 
 
In order to pay dividends to Berlin’s government (see section 6.1), state-owned hous-
ing companies took up credit capital to buy the other state-owned housing companies. 
This affected their equity structure because they faced increasing interest payments 
and reduced liquidity often resulting in precarious financial situations which forced 
them to consolidate their budgets and reduce their debt. In order to increase their 
equity rates as required by Berlin’s government, state-owned housing companies sold 
a portion of their properties (see section 5.1). 
 
All state-owned housing companies followed this divestment strategy. The gov-
ernment’s imperative was to sell 15 percent of the state-owned housing stock (see 
chapter 5). State-owned housing companies tried to divest properties that were not 
deemed good investment opportunities and that would not create demand. The manag-
ing director of a state-owned housing company emphasised the company’s survival 
strategy and pointed to the fact that the housing required renovation: 
“The housing estate needed between 35 to 45 million Euros in renova-
tion. The estate was characterised by a difficult social structure and a 
vacancy rate of 15 percent. It was necessary for our company to sell it, 
we would have had no chance otherwise.” (Managing director of a 
state-owned housing company, ID 28) 
State-owned housing companies predominantly sold the housing stock with the most 
problematic physical and social conditions. Similarly to value added investment funds, 
state-owned housing companies divested housing without development potential as 
much as possible. If they were in a financial position to acquire new housing, they 
invested in housing with better profit margins. The representative of the Senate De-
partment for Urban Development confirmed this strategy: 
“There is also the tendency that state-owned housing companies ac-
quire housing again. Certain estates, I say, where for example the 
modernising and maintenance costs are very high, they are naturally 
going to be tried to be divested. Other housing estates are acquired 
which can be further developed. There is a lot of movement.” (Em-
ployee Senate Department for Urban Development, ID 5) 
In 2007, the state stopped the privatisation of state-owned housing. State-owned hous-
ing companies could therefore no longer divest the housing without development po-
tential as easily as during the height of the privatisation phase. Instead, now they had 
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to get approval from Berlin’s government for each en bloc privatisation. State-owned 
housing companies were therefore constrained in the housing divestment process for 
political reasons and not, as in the case of private investors, due to financial market 
failures (see section 5.3.3). 
 
In comparison to value added investment funds that could cherry-pick the portfolios 
they acquired, state-owned housing companies still have housing without develop-
ment potential. In this regard they are closer to value added investment funds that 
took over whole companies and were left with some housing that did not have devel-
opment potential (see section 5.4.2). However, unlike value added investment funds – 
which neglected the housing without development potential when divestment was not 
possible – state-owned housing companies were under closer political control and 
could not completely abandon their unprofitable housing estates. The next sections 
analyse how state-owned housing companies dealt with the imperative to create in-
come aside from selling complete housing estates and provide good housing standards 
for a broad cross-section of the population. 
 
Creating profit and providing low income housing through investing selectively 
 
State-owned housing companies have a high amount of housing units in large-scale 
housing estates at the edge of the city (see chapter 4). These estates are normally not 
regarded as housing with development potential. In contrast to the investment funds 
that neglected the housing without development potential, state-owned housing com-
panies did invest and upgrade less popular housing stock such as the post-war high-
rise developments located in the outskirts. Thus, while the investment fund did not 
invest at all in its large-scale apartment blocks, the state-owned housing company 
improved and painted their buildings’ façade within the same housing estate. Com-
plete modernisation of the buildings did however also not happen under the ownership 
of the state-owned housing company. A tenant consultant compared the privatised and 
state-owned housing company’s investment strategy in the large-scale housing estate 
he has been working in: 
“The privatised housing company has not invested anything into the 
buildings since I am there. The state-owned housing company has at 
least renovated the façade of the building, but basically they just 
painted the façade; it was not a full renovation.” (Collaborator of a 
tenant consulting service, ID 21) 
State-owned housing companies invested highly selectively, adapting the quality of 
modernisation to a certain housing type according to its potential to create demand 
and ultimately increase rents. State-owned housing companies strategically invested 
to provide housing at different rent levels: While continuing to invest in all housing 
types, they prioritised investment into housing with development potential and mini-
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mally renovated properties where profits could not be achieved due to the depressed 
market situation. A technical project manager from a state-owned housing company 
underlined the necessity for this prioritisation: 
“The solution is to reduce the housing standard, to no longer spoil the 
tenants, but also to explain to the tenants that there is no money for it. 
This is possible. There are ways to renovate cheaply. The message is 
simple; we have to tighten our belts. We cannot make every repair you 
wish for. At the same time, you have to optimise your core business 
where there are good chances in the long-term to make profit: You 
have to chose the housing with good chances for development to in-
vest in and wait to invest in the other ones with the hope that maybe 
one day the state has money again to subsidise housing.” (Technical 
project manager of a state-owned housing company, ID 20) 
This selective investment strategy was also applied within a single apartment building. 
A state-owned housing company renovated a high-rise development in one of the 
large-scale housing estates of the post-war period in the periphery of the city. The 
state-owned housing company modernised the five top floors apartments to luxurious 
standards while renovating the apartments without a view according to lower stand-
ards. The representative of the state-owned housing company explained: 
“This is the first time we deployed an entrepreneurial housing concept 
that we developed ourselves. With this concept, the idea came up to 
renovate the five top floor apartments based on a high standard, but 
also with high rents because it is cool to live there and to have a view 
over the city. We try to attract a clientele who is willing to pay 6 to 
6.20 Euros per square meter. The lower floor apartments will be 
cheaper in terms of rent levels, but also in regards to the quality of 
renovation.” (Head of a customer service centre for a state-owned 
housing company, ID 24) 
 
This selective investment strategy illustrates the balance between the pressure to make 
profits, thus being entrepreneurial, and provide housing for lower-income households. 
The state-owned housing companies tried to create a demand for better off incoming 
tenants. The top floor apartments were renovated without taking into account the ex-
isting tenants’ financial situation. The apartments were vacated and existing tenants 
were not able to move back into the renovated unit because rent levels were too high. 
At the same time, the state-owned housing company complied with the mandate to 
provide housing for lower-income households, renovating the bottom floors according 
to a lower standard. The representative was also highly aware of the government’s 
mandate to hold onto low income housing: 
“The task of our company, which is determined by the government, is 
to hold onto low income housing. We cannot completely move away 
from this market segment and solely focus on the higher-priced mar-
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ket segment.” (Head of a customer service centre for a state-owned 
housing company, ID 24) 
In order to hold on to low income housing, state-owned housing companies tried to 
make profits in the higher market segments and make the best of the housing they had 
in the lower market segments. This selective investment strategy starkly contrasts 
with the normalised conceptualisation of state-led housing provision that provides 
equal housing standards to everyone in need. Moreover, this investment strategy 
underlines the hybrid form of state-led housing provision which seeks to strike a bal-
ance between economic and social goals. 
 
State-owned housing companies however not only strategically invested in their hous-
ing stock, they also reduced personnel and maintenance in order to save costs and 
generate more income. The next section explores these management mechanisms. 
 
Saving costs through reducing personnel and maintenance of housing 
 
After the different state-owned housing companies’ mergers were completed at the 
end of 2002 (see section 6.1), the remaining state-owned housing companies began to 
streamline their organisation reducing personnel to consolidate their budgets. This 
affected the maintenance of the housing. The state-owned housing companies differ 
very little from value added investment funds in this regard. While both types of ac-
tors provided a certain standard to keep tenants (see section 5.4.2), state-owned hous-
ing companies and value added investment funds saved costs by lowering mainte-
nance standards. 
 
All analysed companies reduced personnel. This indicates that the ratio between the 
number of employees and the amount of housing they managed had increased. A re-
spondent confirmed the reduction in employees and explained it with the high debt 
that had to be reduced after the acquisition of other state-owned housing companies:  
“I think we paid 270 million Euros for the two others state-owned 
housing companies we bought. This money went to the state of Berlin. 
[…] When the state had to extract that money, it meant we had to save 
it. […] We also considerably reduced personnel through retirement or 
compensation packages.” (Technical project manager of a state-owned 
housing company, ID 20) 
Table 6.2 shows the reduction of personnel in comparison to the reduction of the 
housing stock. Except for one of the state-owned housing companies analysed, the 
reduction of the number of employees was considerably higher than the reduction of 
properties. 
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Table 6.2: Reduction of Personnel in Comparison to Reduction of Housing 
 
Reduction of personnel be-
tween 2003 and 2009 in % 
Reduction of housing stock 
between 2003 and 2009 in % 
Company A -36% -26% 
Company B -4% -15% 
Company C -34% -13% 
Source: Based on Senatsverwaltung für Finanzen (2004a), Senatsverwaltung für Finanzen 
(Senatsverwaltung für Finanzen 2010a), Senatsverwaltung für Finanzen (2004b), and Senats-
verwaltung für Finanzen (Senatsverwaltung für Finanzen 2010b). 
 
Table 6.2 however also shows that there are considerable differences between the 
three state-owned housing companies analysed. These variations point to the fact that 
state-owned housing companies possibly differentiated in the way they dealt with the 
state’s economic and social requirements. A possible explanation for this is the un-
even financial preconditions faced by state-owned housing companies mentioned 
above (see section 6.3.1). One respondent also claimed that it highly depended on the 
management team in charge of the company and the strategy it followed. The fact that 
state-owned housing companies had different approaches to housing provision (see 
also section 6.3.3 where this is further discussed) despite having the same owner and 
the same finance mechanisms was an unexpected outcome not previously concep-
tualised (see section 8.5 for a discussion of integrating this point into future research). 
 
Independent of the reasons for the difference in reducing personnel, this move also 
affected the management of the properties, influencing the physical outcome of the 
housing provision. In comparison to the value added investment funds, service centres 
were still operating. Housekeeping however, deteriorated. The tenant consultant of a 
19
th
-century block developments neighbourhood complained about the state-owned 
housing company’s management of the housing stock: 
“The state-owned housing company asked as much as possible for 
rent. And since the neighbourhood is popular, what they ask for is 
nowadays quite a lot. At the same time, they invest as little as possible 
into the maintenance of the housing. […] The housekeeping work 
such as cleaning and gardening is also reduced.” (Collaborator of a 
tenant consulting service, ID 19) 
 
The rationale behind these cost-saving strategies point to a more entrepreneurial hous-
ing provision. The state-owned housing companies reduce their investment because of 
the government’s prerogative to extract dividends. The income from housing provi-
sion and management is no longer necessarily re-invested in the housing stock, but is 
a profit-making endeavour. This more entrepreneurial rationale for state-led housing 
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provision does however not yet explain the uneven processes it creates. Instead, the 
way state-owned housing companies applied cost-saving strategies selectively is key 
to understanding uneven processes. The analysis shows that state-owned housing 
companies invested and saved costs in an uneven way, depending on the housing type 
and the possibility of making a profit with the particular unit or not. Moreover, the 
analysis points to the fact that the state-owned housing companies played out differ-
ently, therefore generating processes of uneven development. 
 
Having established the state-owned housing companies’ investment and management 
strategies, the following sections turn to the exchange strategies undertaken by them. 
In order to create income in a relatively depressed market situation, especially in the 
large-scale housing estates located in the periphery, state-owned housing companies 
had to find a balance between lowering vacancy rates and increasing rent levels. As 
analysed above, state-owned housing companies also invested in housing with less 
development potential, albeit selectively. They however also actively sought clients in 
order to decrease vacancy rates without compromising rent levels. 
 
Attracting tenants through creating niche markets and branding 
 
Due to a more competitive market (see section 6.2), but also because of the depressed 
market situation in the post-war high-rise developments, state-owned housing com-
panies increasingly sought to improve their competitive advantage and attract tenants 
through the creation of niche markets. State-owned housing companies were targeting 
specific tenant groups such as students, and promoted themselves as leaders in energy 
efficient housing to attract the conscious consumer. A deputy manager of an umbrella 
tenant organisation confirmed the repositioning of state-owned housing companies in 
certain market segments: 
“There is the tendency of state-owned housing companies to occupy 
certain subjects in order to gain a reputation. For example, there are 
companies that are concerned with the question of housing for senior 
citizens. Or there are others that are occupied with the question how to 
make housing energy-efficient and how to use renewable energies.” 
(Deputy manager of an umbrella tenant association, ID 6) 
While reducing maintenance and management costs, state-owned housing companies 
put considerable effort into advertising. With a new image intended to set them apart 
from their competitors (both state-owned and private housing companies), state-
owned housing companies attempted to attract and retain tenants. A representative of 
a state-owned housing company explained the attempt to brand itself: 
“We have a new logo and started an image campaign with posters all 
over the city. This is an attempt to establish the brand of our company. 
We are not sure if we achieve this goal because we can only do it 
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within Berlin and not throughout Germany. But the idea is that people 
in Berlin know the name of our company.” (Head of a customer ser-
vice centre for a state-owned housing company, ID 24) 
The state-owned housing companies also stopped publishing their common trade 
magazine and began publishing their own. Every individual company increased its 
investment in marketing. 
“They increase their efforts for attracting and retaining clients; they all 
publish their own magazine now, whereas they previously had a 
common one. Apparently, they could not present themselves well en-
ough to distinguish themselves from each other.” (Deputy manager of 
an umbrella tenant association, ID 6) 
The strategy of attracting tenants to reduce vacancy rates stood in stark contrast to 
opportunistic investment funds that lowered rent levels to seek more tenants. State-
owned housing companies were highly dependent on income streams, and could not 
compromise on rent levels. They had to seek tenants with other strategies, such as 
development investment, creation of niche markets, and branding. This allowed them 
to decrease vacancy rates and increase rent levels at the same time. 
 
Undertaking branding campaigns and its search for niche markets suggests that the 
state no longer provides housing opportunities in relatively equal standards with equal 
rent levels. Housing has become a commodity that is customised and advertised to 
different target groups. State-owned housing companies make the consumer believe 
that being their tenant differentiates them from others. This starkly contrasts with an 
understanding of state-led housing as a decommodified form of provision that is 
socially financed, standardised, and allocated. Commodification of state-led housing 
also took place by raising rent levels in all market segments and abandoning the prin-
ciple of quasi-social housing, analysed in the next section. 
 
Increasing income through raising rent levels to the maximum amount possible  
 
To generate more rental income, state-owned housing companies pushed rent levels to 
the maximum amount possible. They acted equally aggressively as value added in-
vestment funds to achieve high profits (see section 5.4.2), ultimately displacing ten-
ants. This especially affected tenants in modernised housing units of 19
th
-century 
block developments, where demand was high, but also in luxuriously modernised top 
floor apartments located in the outskirts as analysed above. However, state-owned 
housing companies also increased rent levels in the lower market segments.  
 
Highly dependent on income streams, state-owned housing companies increased rent 
levels to the maximum amount possible in all market segments. In comparison to op-
portunistic funds that completely neglected their housing (see section 0), state-owned 
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housing companies maintained the housing stock relatively well. With the creation of 
niche markets and branding efforts, state-owned housing companies were able to at-
tract clientele and increase rent levels. A representative of a state-owned housing 
company explained their rent strategy that clearly pushed rent levels as high as pos-
sible.  
“The decisive point is the location. In the Köpenik area, we clearly 
have high-priced housing because the location is near the water. There 
you can get six Euros per square metre in smaller apartments. In cer-
tain areas, we work with seven to eight Euros because of the location, 
and the clientele that demands this kind of housing is ready to pay a 
lot of money for living in a trendy old apartment under heritage pro-
tection a little further away from the centre. However, Köpenik also 
has other areas with two to three storeys and where we can take 5.50 
or 6.50 [Euros]. In large housing estates, 5.50 Euros is however al-
ready the maximum we can take.” (Head of a customer service centre 
for a state-owned housing company, ID 24) 
The state-owned housing companies’ year end reports that were analysed, further con-
firmed that rent increases were implemented wherever the market situation allowed it 
(Senatsverwaltung für Finanzen 2010b).
104
 
 
The turn towards extracting the maximum possible rents contradicts with what Droste 
and Knorr-Siedow (2007) call ‘quasi social’ housing (see also Stephens et al. 2008). 
According to these authors, state-owned housing companies traditionally rented their 
free market rental units at below market rates to fulfil their social mandate. Profit 
maximisation was not sought in favour of social benefits such as low levels of segre-
gation within neighbourhoods or limiting housing allowance expenditure. None of the 
state-owned housing companies analysed adhered to the provision of ‘quasi social’ 
housing. The representative of a state-owned housing company confirmed this and 
explained what happened when the housing units in a high-rise estate from the late 
1970s came on the free market because state subsidies were repaid: 
“In this area, 4,300 housing units will come on the free market in 
January 2010. This means, we will announce a 20 percent rise to our 
tenants. This is a rise from 3.80 to 4.50 Euros per square metre and 
yes, it is not clear if the tenants can bear this increase.” (Head of a 
customer service centre for a state-owned housing company, ID 24) 
                                                 
 
104
 Hallenberg’s report (2008: 106) also confirmed this. The report stated that state-owned housing 
companies still owned a larger amount of housing units in lower market segments compared to added 
value investment funds. The increase of rent levels was however similar to that of the investments 
funds’ housing stock. Between the end of 2004 and 2007, rent levels of state-owned housing companies 
increased between 7 and 10.5 percent compared to 13 percent by the largest privatised housing com-
pany. 
 154 
Under the new guiding principles (see section 6.1), state-owned housing companies 
were no longer able to make general concessions reducing their revenue. Due to their 
social mandate, the state-owned housing companies were however prepared to make 
temporary compromises for tenants with financial difficulties. Their exchange strat-
egy ended up insisting on increasing rent levels, but did not force tenants who were 
not able to pay out immediately. Under exceptional circumstances, state-owned hous-
ing companies, compared to value added investment funds, were willing to make con-
cessions on their profit-making. A representative of a state-owned housing company 
claimed that they would still act in a socially responsible manner, prepared to negoti-
ate individual cases of hardship: 
“Today, in order to maximise profits, we exhaust all legal possibilities. 
That sometimes hurts because long-term tenants can no longer bear 
the rents. However, we can of course also help; we can look for an-
other apartment that might not be 100 square metres, but 65 to 70 
square metres for a two-person household. We have lots of possibili-
ties there. And in case of hardship we can also wave the rent increase. 
However, in these cases we have to be sure that the tenant is really 
without means and can’t pay the rent. And of course, this can only be 
done as a temporary measure.” (Technical project manager of a state-
owned housing company, ID 20) 
State-owned housing companies could often fall back on their wide ranging housing 
portfolio and were able to relocate tenants within their own housing stock. A repre-
sentative of a district administration also confirmed the willingness to negotiate and 
find individual solutions for socially disadvantaged tenants. 
“There are difficult tenants that are just not moving out when there is 
a renovation announcement. There are several of these cases due to 
the low rent levels that were common in this neighbourhood before. 
For these cases, state-owned housing companies are more willing to 
negotiate.” (Collaborator of an urban renewal division within a district 
administration, ID 18) 
The abandonment of quasi-social housing clearly marks a shift from the traditional 
form of state-led housing provision. The state-owned housing companies’ informal 
means of negotiating single cases distinguishes them from the private-led housing 
provision analysed in chapter 5. The openness to negotiate single cases however, does 
not hide the fact that state-owned housing companies rely on higher rent levels be-
cause they have to increase profit margins in order to reduce their debt load and pay 
dividends. This also affected their tenant allocation strategy. 
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Prioritising a better off clientele through a segmented allocation strategy 
 
When state-owned housing companies modernised the housing stock, they pursued an 
allocation strategy which prioritised a clientele with a high socio-economic status. 
State-owned housing companies were reluctant to allocate their housing to less well 
off tenants, even when it was still under regulatory control as a result of subsidisation 
(see chapter 7). A tenant consultant attributed this to the ignorance of certain employ-
ees within the housing company: 
“They would prefer not to take anyone with a housing voucher, but 
only tenants that have a higher income. However, this is also because 
the administrators of the housing companies often don’t know that the 
income limit for a housing voucher is pretty high and people with 
housing vouchers are not necessarily the most disadvantaged.” (Col-
laborator of a tenant consulting service, ID 21) 
In comparison to value added investment funds that openly admitted their discriminat-
ing allocation strategies, state-owned housing companies were aware of their political 
mandate to provide housing for lower-income households. A quote from a representa-
tive of a state-owned housing company showed how cautious they were: 
“At least we want to keep the social structure as it is now. Of course, 
we want to improve it a little, but we have to be careful with this sub-
ject. We have a mandate from the state to provide affordable housing. 
And if we say now we don’t want to have tenants on social benefits, 
we naturally can’t say it like this because people on social benefits are 
part of this city. However you can’t only take them.” (Head of a cus-
tomer service centre for a state-owned housing company, ID 24) 
State-owned housing companies could not openly discriminate tenants. However, by 
pushing rent levels to the maximum allowable possible, state-owned housing com-
panies still excluded certain household groups from renting a specific unit. Tenants 
who could not afford higher rent levels after modernisation were allocated to lower 
quality housing. 
 
The production mechanisms of state-owned housing companies were guided by the 
government’s imperative to lower their debt, increase their equity and profit-making, 
while continuing to hold housing for low income households. State-owned housing 
companies complied with these principles by divesting some of their non-profitable 
housing estates. When the en bloc privatisation of state-owned housing was no longer 
politically acceptable, state-owned housing companies held onto their portfolio, selec-
tively investing based on expected rental income after modernisation. They restruc-
tured, reducing personnel and the quality of maintenance, in addition to undertaking 
considerable efforts to attract and retain their clientele through the creation of niche 
markets and branding. At the same time, they increased rent levels according to the 
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possibilities within specific market segments. These production mechanisms split the 
state-owned housing into different market segments.  
 
State-owned housing companies shape a segmented form of consumption 
 
Based on the production mechanisms analysed above, state-owned housing companies 
accepted a segmented form of consumption. Selective investment linked to strategic 
rent increases further augmented tenant segmentation. State-owned housing com-
panies made a clear division between upper and lower market segments. They 
achieved their economic goals by increasing rent levels to the maximum amount pos-
sible and abandoning the principle of quasi-social housing. Because these companies 
could attract an affluent clientele to the 19
th
-century block developments in inner city 
areas or in luxuriously renovated apartments further out of the city, they increased 
rent levels primarily in these housing units. This created a situation where inner city 
housing became too expensive for low income households. 
 
At the same time, state-owned housing companies complied with the mandate to pro-
vide housing for low income households by using the less profitable housing stock in 
their portfolio. This housing is in the outskirts where vacancy rates are still high and 
rent levels relatively low. Investment in this housing stock was often not profitable 
and therefore developed according to lower standards, resulting in the concentration 
of low income households in these properties. This segmentation, on a neighbourhood 
or a block scale
105
, starkly contrasts with the traditional form of state-led housing pro-
vision that focused on the provision of high quality standardised and often monoto-
nous housing for a broad stratum of the population. Compared to the production 
mechanisms of value added and opportunistic investment funds, which actively cre-
ated a concentration of high and low income households respectively, state-owned 
housing companies created segregation in a more subtle way (compare section 5.4).  
 
Unlike the investment funds analysed in chapter 5, state-owned housing companies 
adhered to a wide range of housing types. However, the particular way they devel-
oped their properties fostered the uneven development of housing and did not counter 
segregation tendencies. A respondent described this situation: 
“With a few social projects, the state-owned companies suggested that 
everything remained the same. However, especially where they saw 
market opportunities, state-owned housing companies pressed ahead 
                                                 
 
105
 The segmentation of tenants within one building is comparable to the situation in the 19
th
-century 
block developments at the beginning of the Twentieth century before the state intervened in the provi-
sion of housing structure; low income families lived in the rear wings of the block and higher income 
families in the front rows of the block (see section 4.1). 
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to increase rent levels in new tenancy agreements without considering 
the context of the market. They pushed forward with significantly 
higher offers, the consequences being that tenants were under pressure. 
State-owned housing companies were responsible for a development 
that worsened the situation in many neighbourhoods, leading to more 
social segregation.” (Deputy managing director of an association for 
housing and urban development, ID 8) 
The production mechanisms and their effects on housing consumption analysed above, 
have been observed among all of the state-owned housing companies studied. As 
mentioned, differences among state-owned housing companies however existed re-
garding the extent to which they followed the strategies analysed. These differences 
are further explored in the next section. 
 
6.3.3 Differences Among State-owned Housing Companies 
 
The above-explored strategies have been observed among all three state-owned hous-
ing companies analysed. As pointed out, subtle differences between state-owned 
housing companies however emerged. These differences became especially apparent 
with regards to the state-owned housing companies’ social engagement. This en-
gagement is analysed in more detail, especially how state-owned housing companies’ 
attitudes differed on this subject. 
 
In contrast to employing ‘hard’ means such as below-market rents (quasi-social hous-
ing), the social responsibility mandate of state-owned housing companies increasingly 
focused on ‘soft’ means such as supporting neighbourhood improvement. Commit-
ment to urban development beyond housing was not new: State-owned housing com-
panies have a long tradition of taking care of the neighbourhoods they built 
(Burkhardt 1999). Since 1999, state-owned housing companies have also participated 
in the ‘social city’ (Soziale Stadt) national policy programme that is implemented 
through Berlin’s ‘neighbourhood management programme’ (Quartiersmanagement). 
This programme aims for resident participation to improve their disadvantaged neigh-
bourhood. Through educational and cultural projects, neighbourhood management 
teams
106
 are trying to integrate immigrant families, engage young people, or help cre-
ate businesses in vacant neighbourhood lots. State-owned housing companies are of-
ten important partners for neighbourhood managers. 
 
These neighbourhood revitalisation projects continued to be undertaken by all the 
state-owned housing companies, as opposed to reduced neighbourhood activities by 
                                                 
 
106
 At the time of investigation, there were 33 neighbourhood management teams, usually constituted of 
social workers from non-governmental organisations. 
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investment funds (see section 5.4.2). One of the state-owned housing companies ana-
lysed chose however to deepen its social engagement with a strategy called “Value 
Added City” (Stadtrendite)
107
. The Value Added City concept is defined as the added 
value provided to Berlin’s citizens in terms of social, ecological, cultural, and quality 
of life components of city living. The particular state-owned housing company there-
fore used a different mechanism to housing provision.  
 
With the Value Added City strategy, the state-owned housing company not only 
deepened its social engagement, it also attempted to capture and cost out the social 
side of its ‘soft’ engagement in the neighbourhood and the city. The housing company 
explained on its website that “Value Added City allows it to present the success of 
social engagement in numbers” (Degewo 2011, author's translation).
108
 The represen-
tative of a state-owned housing company explained the idea behind the concept: 
“In the wake of the privatisation process, the idea of a Value Added 
City came on the table for the first time. The question was what the 
shareholder [the state] gets out of these housing companies besides the 
annual net income. What other profits are there from having these 
companies? And then it was assessed that these housing companies 
are participating in lots of other areas in their neighbourhoods and dis-
tricts and therefore establish a certain added value or so called Value 
Added City. [The respondent then went on to talk about the diverse 
projects, from building an association for coaching students to in-
creased security guards, to tenant parties and sport facilities]. These 
are of course all small things where the question remains how much 
impact they have. We cannot measure the value. […] I cannot say that 
because of this engagement we have rented out so many more apart-
ments.” (Head of a customer service centre for a state-owned housing 
company, ID 24) 
In comparison to traditional neighbourhood engagement, the Value Added City strat-
egy is not only used to reinforce the idea of ‘soft’ means to support the social im-
provement of neighbourhoods. As the quote underscores, the particular state-owned 
housing company uses the strategy also to strengthen its competitive position and to 
attract tenants. This type of engagement is also closely linked to the company’s pro-
motional activities aimed at creating higher demand for their housing. A neighbour-
hood manager described the collaboration with the state-owned housing company and 
the importance for the company to sell it as their own product: 
                                                 
 
107
 The literal translation of Stadtrendite would be city-yield. However Value Added City was consid-
ered more accurate in portraying the concept, which defines the value added to a city’s development, 
which goes beyond a pure economic return. 
108
 The particular state-owned housing company mandated the Humboldt University in Berlin to calcu-
late the Value Added City and came up with the following formula: The value added city = (annual net 
income + expenditures for social engagement + consequential societal revenues) / (deployed capital) 
(Degewo 2008: 26). 
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“The state-owned housing company is very active with regards to 
school development. They contributed some money at the beginning 
to our educational initiative. Their engagement happens in collabor-
ation with us. This means, we sometimes have a debate whose name is 
on the promotional material. The state-owned housing company has a 
high need for recognition, but we can deal with that. At least they 
have the same goals as we do.” (Project director of neighbourhood 
management team, ID 26) 
This Value Added City strategy promoted by one of the state-owned housing com-
panies was however not embraced by all counterparts. One state-owned housing com-
pany that was analysed emphasised the goal to decrease debt more than neighbour-
hood engagement, even though it was still contributing to the traditional neighbour-
hood management programmes. The director of this state-owned housing company 
felt threatened by new political demands that state-owned housing companies need to 
play a role in dealing with the city’s social problems. The director explained the com-
pany’s strategy and how profit maximisation could be mitigated through new political 
demands that prioritise social over economic goals: 
“We will optimise our core business. We have an investment plan un-
til 2018 which is already quite concrete for up to 2013/14 and we re-
structure the company which is almost done. We have been certified 
as an ISO9001 company, this is our strategy: Write off debts, optimise 
the core business and then, if the demand from the political side turns 
again, and we have to contribute to the making of the city, we need to 
have the strength for this. With the former Senator of Finance, we 
could really be entrepreneurial for five years. But this is ending. Since 
we are more or less financially stabilised, the political demands with 
regards to rent levels etc. are increasing again. That will be the big 
conflict in the future. Value Added City, Value Added City. We say 
though, without financial added value, there is no Value Added City.” 
(Managing director of a state-owned housing company, ID 28) 
This state-owned housing company sees the Value Added City strategy not as an op-
portunity to strengthen its competitive position, but as a constraint to its economic 
goals. By contrast, the company that applied the Value Added City strategy used it as 
a tool to strengthen the entrepreneurial goals. The analysis regarding the state-owned 
housing companies’ attitude towards the Value Added City strategy suggests that 
state-owned housing companies interpret the state’s guiding principles differently and 
do not cohesively adapt to economic and social demands, but adopt different strat-
egies under Berlin’s specific market conditions.  
 
This diverging emphasis with regards to their social engagement contradicts the 
understanding that state-owned housing companies follow equally the same strategies 
based on the state’s economic and social imperatives. As argued, the analysis suggests 
that the financial condition of a particular state-owned housing company (see section 
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6.3.1) plays a role in explaining these differences. Depending on its financial situation, 
a company has more or less room for manoeuvre to invest in neighbourhood engage-
ment and using this engagement for promotional activities. Other factors that need 
further exploration such as the specific management structure may also play a role 
(see also section 8.5). 
 
The analysis of state-owned housing companies confirmed a more entrepreneurial 
approach through the integration of market mechanisms into state-led housing provi-
sion. State-owned housing companies increasingly treated housing as a commodity 
that is no longer standardised for a broad cross-section of the population, but tailored 
to different clients. The integration of these market mechanisms represents however 
not an abandonment of state-led housing provision. I therefore strongly argue against 
the simplistic dualism of state-led versus private-led housing provision as analytical 
categories. The analysis shows that a more entrepreneurial state strategy for housing 
provision does not equal a privatised form of housing provision. Moreover, the spe-
cific market mechanisms that were integrated into state-owned housing companies 
indicate a particular hybrid form of housing provision. 
 
A more entrepreneurial form of state-led housing provision has to be analysed along 
the production, regulation, and consumption relations within a specific temporal and 
spatial context to understand the particular processes it creates. In Berlin, state-owned 
housing companies apply strategies that were also observed among privatised housing 
companies (compare with chapter 5). The particular way they use entrepreneurial 
strategies and the degree to which they use them however differ from privatised hous-
ing provision. Having explored the privatised housing provision in chapter 5 and the 
state-owned housing provision in this chapter, the next section turns to a comparative 
synthesis of the different providers, looking at their key production mechanisms and 
their effects on the consumption of different types of housing. 
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6.4 Synthesis of Privatised and State-owned Production Mechanisms 
 
The analysis of the production mechanisms of both privatised and state-owned hous-
ing provision showed that there is no clear distinction between either, but there are 
different hybrid forms. Moreover, the state’s transformation towards an entrepreneu-
rial housing provision has to be treated with caution. The privatisation of state-owned 
housing does not lead to a one-dimensional mechanism, but has multiple conse-
quences based on how housing production plays out in a specific spatial and temporal 
context. At the same time, the incorporation of entrepreneurial goals into state-owned 
housing provision does not generate the same production mechanisms as private-led 
housing; state-owned housing companies still differ from real estate private equity 
funds. Furthermore, state-owned housing companies chose to respond to the state’s 
economic and social in different ways.  
 
The analysis of the real estate private equity funds (see chapter 5) and the state-owned 
housing companies (this chapter) shows that the conceptualisation of private versus 
state-led housing does not satisfactorily explain the multidimensional mechanisms. I 
therefore argue that a re-conceptualisation of production mechanisms defined as the 
particular finance strategy to achieve economic (and, for state-owned housing com-
panies, social) goals better explains the uneven mechanisms. The finance strategy 
based on risk versus profit (investment funds) and entrepreneurial versus social (state-
owned housing companies) explains the way these companies invest, manage, and 
exchange housing. This section provides an overview of the key mechanisms ob-
served among the different privatised and state-led housing companies in the specific 
circumstances of Berlin’s housing market between 1999 and 2009. Table 6.3 summa-
rises the mechanisms of the value added investment fund, the opportunistic invest-
ment fund, and the state-owned housing company.  
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Table 6.3: Key Production Mechanisms of Privatised and State-owned Housing 
 Value Added Investment Funds Opportunistic Investment Funds State-owned Housing Companies 
Finance 
Balancing risk versus profit: Capital gain 
through use-value of housing 
Balancing risk versus profit: Capital gain 
through exchange-value of housing 
Balancing economic versus social goals: 
Capital gain through use-value of housing and 
provision of housing for low income tenants 
Investment 
Value added strategy: Cherry-picking and 
modernising 19
th
-century block developments 
and Twenties and Thirties row developments 
in good locations 
Bigger-fool strategy: Purchasing cheap, often 
low quality, housing (post-war high-rise de-
velopments) in order to re-sell it at a higher 
price 
Segmented strategy: Adhering to a wide port-
folio (all housing types), but modernising 
based on the possibility to raise rents 
Management 
Efficient management: Streamlining manage-
ment of housing stock  
Neglecting management: Abandoning man-
agement of the housing stock 
Efficient management: Streamlining manage-
ment of housing stock  
Exchange 
Exclusive exchange strategy: Increasing rent 
levels and following a discriminating alloca-
tion strategy, selectively choosing affluent 
families 
Inclusive exchange strategy: Decreasing rent 
levels and following an aggressive letting 
strategy, attracting low income tenants 
Segmented exchange strategy: Increase rent 
levels in all market segments, while willing to 
negotiate individual solutions 
Consumption  
Exclusive consumption: Low income house-
holds are displaced or prevented from moving 
into the housing that was revalorised 
Inclusive consumption: Low income house-
holds, often on social welfare, move into the 
neglected housing stock 
Segmented consumption: Low income house-
holds can no longer afford the rent and are 
displaced from the housing in the higher-
market segments 
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Value added investment funds followed a comparably lower risk strategy, with 
higher equity investment and lower profit targets. They predominantly focused 
on capital gain through the use-value of the housing, and therefore depended on 
rental income. This finance strategy entailed both investment in housing with 
development potential and divestment or, if the latter was not possible, neglect-
ing housing with no development potential. The value added funds modernised 
the housing, sometimes to luxurious standards, in order to place it within a higher 
market segment and demand higher rent levels. Tenant service was restructured, 
and neighbourhood engagement was specifically reduced, but the management of 
the housing was maintained to a relatively high standard. Value added invest-
ment funds provided housing for well off people actively displacing and exclud-
ing low income households through rental barriers and a discriminating alloca-
tion strategy.  
 
Opportunistic investment funds followed a high-risk strategy that targeted high 
profits with small equity investment through financial leveraging. They were 
therefore not interested in investing in the housing. They bought cheap housing 
to resell it at a higher price within a short amount of time. During the time they 
held on to the housing, they neglected necessary renovations and abandoned 
maintenance. The housing management personnel was reduced and replaced with 
unskilled employees. Especially once opportunistic funds could no longer re-sell 
the housing due to the financial crisis, they chose to lower rent levels in order to 
decrease vacancy rates and increase income streams, a necessity in order to serve 
their interest payments. For the same reasons, they followed an aggressive letting 
strategy, attracting low income households. Better off households moved out of 
the neglected housing stock. At the same time, low income households, often on 
social welfare, moved in creating a concentration of socially disadvantaged ten-
ants. 
 
State-owned housing companies were required to make capital gain through the 
provision of housing. At the same time, they were still restricted through their 
political mandate to provide housing for low income households. They chose to 
respond to this political mandate adhering to a wide-ranging portfolio and stra-
tegically investing in the housing based on the rents they could expect. Addition-
ally, they were willing to negotiate with difficult tenants to at least temporarily 
provide relief from higher rent levels. Furthermore, the state-owned housing 
companies were committed to neighbourhood improvement. However, the pres-
sure to make profits was high and state-owned housing companies replied by 
maximising rental income and saving management costs. This generated more 
segregated neighbourhoods because rent levels in neighbourhoods with high de-
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mand were no longer affordable for low income tenants. Low income households 
therefore moved into lower quality housing, often in the large-scale housing es-
tates in the periphery. 
 
Conclusion 
 
The reformation process of Berlin’s state-owned housing companies did not 
mark a withdrawal, but rather a transformation of the state’s role in housing pro-
vision. The economic and social guiding principles for state-owned housing 
companies showed however that the state’s approach towards housing provision 
had become increasingly entrepreneurial: Market mechanisms have been imple-
mented or were no longer restricted through particular regulation. Again, the 
analysis shows that one needs to go beyond a mere confirmation of a more entre-
preneurial form – as described in section 2.2 – of state-led housing provision to 
understand the processes of uneven development that it created. To understand 
these processes, it is crucial to investigate the particular market mechanisms that 
were integrated and how they played out in practice. The state’s new strategic 
plan put state-owned housing companies in an ambiguous position – between an 
economic successful, but socially responsible enterprise. The state’s guidelines 
fostered the state-owned housing companies’ profit seeking in order to benefit 
from dividend payments. At the same time, the state adhered to a principle of 
providing housing for a broad stratum of the population and specifically for low 
income households. These finance relations influenced the investment, manage-
ment, and exchange strategies of state-owned housing companies. 
 
The analysis shows that the way state-owned housing companies dealt with the 
state’s principles was uneven in two ways. On the one hand, state-owned housing 
companies invested and managed the different types of housing in their portfolio 
unevenly. On the other hand, state-owned housing companies responded differ-
ently to the state’s economic and social goals, especially with regards to the 
social commitment. In this way, they provided housing unevenly. The mecha-
nisms analysed in this chapter further contribute to finding empirically grounded 
explanations on how a more entrepreneurial mode of housing provision generates 
processes of uneven development and shows that there is more than one mecha-
nism creating uneven development. 
 
Having established the contingently emerging production mechanisms of the 
different types of housing providers in the previous and current chapter, the next 
chapter turns towards the state’s re-regulation of social housing and urban re-
newal, addressing the question of how the state further regulates processes of 
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uneven development. Social housing and urban renewal housing are two ex-
tremes based on their development potential. Social housing is non-profitable 
because of its restricted rent ceiling. Urban renewal housing is considered a good 
investment, especially when supported by state subsidies. The re-regulation of 
supply-side subsidies for social housing and urban renewal is therefore expected 
to reinforce the uneven production mechanisms explored in this and the previous 
chapter 5. The next chapter investigates how the production mechanisms estab-
lished so far change under these specific regulatory conditions for social and 
urban renewal housing. 
 
 
166 
7 Abandonment of State Subsidies for Housing 
 
This chapter turns towards the question of how the state regulates processes of 
uneven production development, within the particular housing sectors of social 
and urban renewal housing. The chapter illustrates how the state further contri-
butes and reinforces processes of uneven development through particular regula-
tory changes of supply-side housing subsidisation. This is the third process iden-
tified in Berlin’s new mode of housing provision: The abandonment of supply-
side subsidies for social and urban renewal housing coupled with deregulation of 
rent and allocation rules. This chapter examines how specific regulatory condi-
tions of social housing and urban renewal influence the production mechanisms 
of institutional investors and state-owned housing companies. It is argued that the 
way the abandonment of state subsidies plays out in practice reinforces the un-
even production mechanisms previously established. The following questions 
guided the analysis of this chapter: 
• How do the production mechanisms change under the specific 
regulatory changes of social housing and urban renewal? 
• How do the production mechanisms affect the consumption 
mechanisms under the specific regulatory changes of social hous-
ing and urban renewal? 
• How do the production and consumption mechanisms interact 
with each other creating processes of uneven development? 
 
Supply-side subsidies for the construction and renewal of housing usually in-
clude one or all of the following: Construction grants, loans at lower interest 
rates, payments of the difference between market and below-market interest rates, 
and payments between market rent and a subsidised rent (Lawson 2006: 69). The 
supply-side subsidies that Berlin’s government granted targeted the reduction of 
credit necessary for the construction of social housing and the renewal of old 
housing. However, towards the end of the 1990s, Berlin’s government started to 
withdraw from any commitment towards the subsidisation of housing due to in-
creasing financial pressure which rendered the government incapable of continu-
ing to run a costly housing subsidies system.109 
 
                                                 
 
109 See chapter 1 on Berlin’s urban development in the 1990s and the resulting financial difficul-
ties. 
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Two processes resulting from the abandonment of supply-side subsidies can be 
distinguished: First, the abandonment of supply-side subsidies for social housing 
and second, the reconfiguration of urban renewal policies. This chapter is there-
fore divided into two parts. Section 7.1 analyses the mechanisms generated 
through the abandonment of subsidies for the social housing stock. Section 7.2 
explores the mechanisms triggered by the reconfiguration of the urban renewal 
programme which continually reduced the subsidies for the housing stock and 
finally shifted the subsidies from housing towards public infrastructure. Both 
sections analyse the contingently defined production mechanisms under the new 
regulatory conditions for social housing and urban renewal, explaining how they 
affected consumption relations and reinforced processes of uneven development. 
 
7.1 Abandonment of Subsidies for Social Housing 
 
For the same reasons that the state traditionally held state-owned housing (see 
chapter 6), it financed so-called social housing. In the broadest sense, socially 
financed housing is “housing whose construction and in consequence rents are 
subsidised from public funds” (Emms 1990: 1). As with state-led housing, social 
housing is either target to the masses or residualised. Harloe (1995: 7, emphasis 
in original) argued that states solely support a mass model in times when specific 
“social, economic and political circumstances limit the scope for private provi-
sion and when this limitation is of strategic significance for certain aspects of the 
maintenance and development of the capitalist social and economic system”. 
Harloe (1995) detects in Europe and in the US a general trend towards the states’ 
retreat from a mass model of housing provision, underlining the withdrawal ten-
dencies from the provision of social services identified by the entrepreneurial 
city debate (see section 2.3.1). This section explores the development of social 
housing in Berlin and confirms a transformation from a mass towards a residu-
alised form of housing provision. In order to understand the processes of uneven 
development, the analysis goes beyond a confirmation of the state’s withdrawal 
from mass housing provision and investigates how the contingently defined pro-
duction mechanisms play out under a particular form of social housing provision 
generating processes of uneven development. 
 
In Germany, socially financed housing was traditionally constructed for a broad 
stratum of the population, reflecting a mass model (see also chapter 4). This was 
especially the case in the city of Berlin (Krätke and Borst 2000: 165).110 Because 
                                                 
 
110 Between 1949 and 1987, around 80 percent of the new housing construction in West Berlin 
was state-subsidised, 40 percent of which was social housing (Häußermann and Kapphan 2002). 
See also chapter 4. 
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of the specific status of West Berlin as an isolated city and chronicle housing 
shortages, both land price and construction costs were high. In order to make rent 
affordable for Berlin’s tenants, but also to make long-term investment more at-
tractive in a city where investment was considered too risky, the state granted 
high amounts of subsidies. The state subsidised private- and state-owned housing 
companies through direct grants, the allocation of public construction loans, or 
an allowance to decrease expenditures for capital and management costs 
(Hanauske 1995: 39 et seq.). These subsidies decreased the economic rent (Kos-
tenmiete), which was calculated by the costs of credit interest rate, equity yield 
rate, management costs, and amortisation.111 During the time that the housing 
unit was subsidised, it had to be rented under certain conditions; meaning that 
rent ceilings were determined at the subsidised economic rent and allocation was 
restricted to households who received housing vouchers (Wohnberechtigungs-
schein, WBS) because their income was under a certain level. However, the later 
the subsidies were granted, the more expensive the credit costs. This means that 
the social housing stock became increasingly more expensive.  
 
Socially financed housing in Germany was, from the very beginning, designed to 
become part of the free market after a certain period. The social housing subsi-
dies lasted for 15 years, usually followed by subsidies for another 15 years. Since 
the subsidies were declining, the state paid less each year and the subsidised eco-
nomic rent to be paid by the tenant increased. After the 30 years, the so-called 
subsidy lock-in period ended and housing units became part of the free market. 
The idea behind this declining form of social housing subsidies was the assump-
tion that tenants’ income would increase enough during the 30-year period so 
that they would be able to pay the full economic rent. This, however, is based on 
the assumption of a high degree of stability within the tenants’ structure and of 
their continuously improving financial status.  
 
In contrast to other western European countries (Harloe 1995: 337 et seq.), this 
form of socially financed housing provision was always considered as an emer-
gency intervention due to the desperate housing shortage after the Second World 
War (Novy 1991: 20). The decline in social housing transforming from a mass 
model towards a residualised model of housing provision was pre-programmed 
(Harloe 1995: 495; see also chapter 4). While most regional governments 
                                                 
 
111 The economic rent model was criticised as an incentive to overprice the initial investment. 
Since the interest rate for invested equity and credit capital differed, the initial investment signifi-
cantly influenced the economic rent level. Furthermore, the critiques of the economic rent model 
complained about the independence of the economic rent level from the actual market situation. 
See Kofner (2004) for more details on the economic rent model. 
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(Länder) in Germany continue to finance social housing,112 even though to a con-
siderably lesser degree, Berlin decided to completely withdraw from financing 
social housing. Analytically, this withdrawal further confirms Berlin’s move to-
wards a more entrepreneurial mode of housing provision. What are however the 
particularities of the abandonment of socially financed housing in the context of 
Berlin? And how do these particularities play out in practice reinforcing uneven 
production and consumption mechanisms? It is to this end that this section of the 
chapter now turns. 
 
In 1998, the government of Berlin ended subsidisation programmes for the con-
struction of social housing. More dramatically however, at the beginning of 2003, 
the government of Berlin decided to stop the follow-up support of all housing 
units that fell out of the basic subsidy period of 15 years. All housing that was 
built with state subsidies between 1987 and 1997 no longer received follow-up 
subsidies of another 15 years.113 This new regulation affected approximately 
28,000 housing units (Senatsverwaltung für Stadtentwicklung), which was 15 
percent of the social housing stock in 2009. With the premature abandonment of 
the follow-up subsidies, the government also lifted the rent limits conditions and 
allocation rules for the affected housing units (Senatsverwaltung für 
Stadtentwicklung), ultimately integrating these housing units into the free market 
after 15 years and not 30 years. The government argued that the subsidisation of 
social housing was no longer feasible because of the high state debt loads 
(Senatsverwaltung für Stadtentwicklung 2011). A representative of the Senate 
Department for Urban Development confirmed, and proposed another argument: 
“There were two components. On the one side, it was said that 
there is a depressed housing market and therefore subsidisation is 
not necessary. On the other side – and from my point of view this 
was more important – was the financial situation in Berlin. The 
subsidisation system in Berlin was relatively expensive and there-
fore a big burden on Berlin’s budget.” (Employee of the Senate 
Department for Urban Development, ID5) 
The argument, that high vacancy rates were an indication that the free market 
would provide enough affordable housing, stems from a naïve view of the work-
ings of free housing market, as the following analysis shows. 
 
                                                 
 
112 Since 2006, the financing of social housing is the sole responsibility of the regional govern-
mants (see also chapter 4). 
113 The government provided the follow-up subsidies starting in 1972. However, the follow-up 
support of an extra 15 years had never been contractually guaranteed. Thus, legally, the govern-
ment had the right to withdraw from its commitment. The Federal Administrative Court con-
firmed this in a decision from 6th May 2006, after it dismissed an application for further subsi-
dies. 
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7.1.1 Production Mechanisms for Former Social Housing 
 
In Berlin, the abandonment of the follow-up social housing subsidies affected all 
housing providers that owned social housing built between 1987 and 1997 be-
cause earlier built social housing had already been integrated into the free market 
or received subsidies for the full 30 years. These providers, however, only re-
ceived 15 years worth of subsidies due to the new regulations even though they 
based their cost-benefit analysis for the construction of the social housing units 
on the expectation of receiving state subsidies for 30 years. With the aban-
donment of the previously committed follow-up subsidies, these housing provid-
ers were left with a gap of 15 years governmental financial support. The housing 
providers consequently had to deal with increasing financial shortage and had to 
find new financial channels to cover the deficit.  
 
The abandonment of social housing subsidies constitutes a shift in the finance 
structure of housing, from public to private loans, and from subsidised interest 
rates to market interest rates defined by the capital market (Priemus and 
Dieleman 1999). This suggests that the housing providers operated along previ-
ously established finance strategies. The abandonment of the follow-up subsidies 
for social housing coupled with early re-integration into the free market is there-
fore expected to reinforce the uneven production mechanisms established in the 
previous chapters 5 and 6. In order to analyse how the abandonment of the fol-
low-up subsidies reinforced processes of uneven development, this section inves-
tigates the following question: How do the different types of housing providers 
finance, invest, manage, and exchange the former social housing stock that no 
longer benefits from supply-side subsidies? 
 
The analysis distinguishes between four types of housing providers. First, the 
previously established value added investment funds, which have a long-term 
strategy based on creating added value; second, the opportunistic investment 
funds, which follow a short-term strategy based on leveraging (see chapter 5); 
and third, the remaining state-owned housing companies, which have to balance 
economic and social goals (see chapter 6). In addition to the already established 
housing providers, this section introduces a fourth type of provider: Social hous-
ing companies that have exclusively built in the social housing market seg-
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ment.114 In contrast to state-owned housing companies (see chapter 5), social 
housing companies continue to operate in a non-profit manner. The following 
sections explore how the production mechanisms contingently emerge through 
these different types of housing companies under the new regulatory conditions 
for social housing. 
 
Finding new forms of finance for former social housing 
 
All four analytically distinguished types of housing providers had a certain 
amount of housing units that were affected by the abandonment of the follow-up 
subsidies and the early re-integration of the social housing into the free market. 
The new regulation affected the housing provider depending on how much social 
housing it owned that was built between 1987 and 1997. This was especially 
problematic for companies that solely built social housing. Housing providers 
that had a broader portfolio such as large housing companies owned by value 
added investment funds or the state were less affected by the new regulations. 
The division manager of a social housing company explained the impact that the 
abandonment of the follow-up subsidies had on them: 
“With the Senate decision abandoning the follow-up subsidies, 
the housing companies that built with those subsidies got their 
legs cut. That means the government cut subsidies that were 
agreed upon and they are now lacking in the budgets of these 
housing companies. That affects us strongly because we have 
only built in the domain of social housing. Thus, we don’t see 
this as a positive decision. What should we do now? How should 
we deal with this?” (Division manager of a social housing com-
pany, ID 25) 
Every year, further social housing units built between 1987 and 1997 phased out 
of the first 15 years lock-in period and therefore no longer received subsidies. 
For these units, the companies lacked the financial resources that they expected 
to receive through the follow-up subsidies. This effect is cumulative until 2012 
when the last batch of social housing constructed in 1997 phases out of the 15 
years lock-in period. The technical manager of a state-owned housing company 
that was not exclusively in the business of social housing saw the situation less 
dramatic than the previous respondent. However, the technical manager pointed 
out the cumulative effect over time: 
                                                 
 
114 A social housing company owned by a regional church was analysed here. While the company 
also owns housing on the free market as a result of the specific way socially financed housing 
comes onto the free market after a certain period of time, it distinguishes itself from state-owned 
housing companies because it exclusively built within the social housing market. It has therefore 
no 19th-century block developments in its portfolio, but almost exclusively post-war high-rise 
developments.  
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“We did not get from one day to the next into a dire economic 
situation. We were affected, I think in 2006 for the first time, 
with 200 apartments. The difference between rent and economic 
rent for 200 apartments is bearable. However, with each year the 
number of apartments affected adds up and we will have a peak 
of affected apartments in 2011/2012 when the financial impact is 
pretty dramatic.” (Technical project manager of a state-owned 
housing company, ID 20) 
In a stressed housing market, housing companies possibly fill the subsidies in-
come gap by increasing rent levels (Turner and Whitehead 2002: 207 et seq.). In 
Berlin, the abandonment of follow-up subsidies was coupled with a release from 
rent ceilings and allocation rules. As such, housing companies could – at least in 
theory – increase the rents to the full economic rent level. In practice, however, 
this was not possible because the full economic rent level is around 15 Euros per 
square metre (Holm 2005) because of the high construction costs explained 
above. Housing companies are not able to achieve such high rent levels in Ber-
lin’s market environment where the average rent is 4.83 Euros per square metre 
(Investitionsbank Berlin 2010). Evidence from the past few years confirmed this 
(Senatsverwaltung für Stadtentwicklung 2011). Housing companies could not 
achieve cost-effective rent levels for the housing stock that was affected by the 
abandonment of follow-up subsidies: Despite the release from rent limits, the 
market situation of the former social housing stock made it impossible to in-
crease rents above the rent levels in the surrounding area. A respondent ex-
plained: 
“To achieve cost-effectiveness of these housing units is basically 
impossible because the financing was calculated differently and 
because the tenant that originally moved in, as a socially disad-
vantaged tenant with a housing voucher, cannot pay the economic 
rent which is around 12 to 15 Euros per square metre.” (Division 
manager of a social housing company, ID 25) 
Social housing that was released from the lock-in period was often in need of 
renovation because housing companies had not invested in it during the lock-in 
period; they had no incentive to do so. The dire housing conditions contributed to 
the fact that housing companies could not increase rent levels. Because of the 
abandonment of the follow-up subsidies, the companies lacked the financial 
means to invest in the improvement of the housing stock. These improvements 
were however necessary to justify increasing rents. A spokesperson for an asso-
ciation of housing companies in Berlin and Brandenburg stated that the com-
panies lacked funding for renovations and investment in the housing stock as a 
result of the abandonment of the subsidies: 
“The problem is not only that the subsidies are no longer con-
tinued, but also that the housing stock affected is getting older 
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and investments should be made. However, because the com-
panies cannot achieve effective rent levels and the operating costs 
are increasing, they lack the money for investment.” (Spokesman 
for an umbrella organisation for housing companies, ID 9) 
Companies faced difficulties increasing rents among social housing tenants be-
cause they were already low in the surrounding area. This was also because the 
housing was often in areas with a ‘poor reputation’ caused by the existence of 
social housing in these areas in the first place. Investors therefore considered the 
housing as having low development potential. 
 
As a result of the abandonment of social housing subsidies and the impossibility 
of raising rent levels, housing providers had to find other ways to deal with the 
financial deficit. Such a shift from a public structure of finance to a private one 
usually means replacing “considerations of fairness and bureaucracy” with a “cri-
teria of efficiency and effectivity” (Priemus and Dieleman 1999: 630). This 
transformation involves market-oriented strategies such as cross-subsidisation 
(Lawson 2006), selling the housing stock, or reducing maintenance costs (Turner 
and Whitehead 2002). The concrete investment, management, and exchange 
strategies however depend on the type of housing company. The following sec-
tions explore all the identified strategies that the different types of housing pro-
viders applied in order to deal with the financial shortcomings as a result of the 
abandonment of social housing subsidies. 
 
Selling off or neglecting former social housing 
 
The lack of finance for former social housing units reinforced the contingently 
emerging production mechanisms of value added investment funds, opportunistic 
investment funds, and state-owned housing companies established in the previ-
ous chapters 5 and 6. The former social housing stock that lacked the expected 
benefit of subsidies has low development potential due to the mechanisms ana-
lysed above. Housing providers therefore treated this housing stock according to 
their investment strategies. 
 
Value added investment funds that followed a cherry-picking strategy avoided 
the purchase of problematic social housing estates. However, in the cases where 
they purchased whole housing companies, they could not avoid getting social 
housing in their portfolio and were therefore unintentionally affected by the 
abandonment of the follow-up subsidies for social housing (see section 5.4.2). 
When they could not rent the housing units for a profitable margin, the value 
added investment funds sold off the unprofitable former social housing stock. A 
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respondent of a private housing company that is owned by an institutional in-
vestment fund expresses it pretty clearly: 
“Housing units with no development potential in poor locations 
are sold.” (Chief financial officer of a private housing company, 
ID 12) 
In contrast to value added investment funds, opportunistic investment funds did 
not take into account the housing conditions or the regulatory bindings of the 
housing they purchased. Due to their short-term strategy to sell the housing 
within a short time period at a higher price than they purchased it (see section 0), 
their investment decision was independent of whether it was social housing or 
not. During the short time they held onto the housing, they neglected any kind of 
necessary investments. 
 
As a result of their diverging finance and investment strategies, value added and 
opportunistic investment funds responded quite differently to the lack of follow-
up subsidies in the particular market situation. While value added investment 
funds focused on higher market segments and tried to get rid of the former social 
housing stock, opportunistic investment funds bought it, but neglected it, causing 
physical and social deterioration of the housing stock (see section 0). This starkly 
contrasted with the government’s anticipation that the free market would invest 
in and provide affordable housing. Moreover, it fostered a deterioration of the 
quality of the housing. 
 
In comparison to the investment funds, state-owned housing companies and 
social housing companies had a mandate to provide housing for low income ten-
ants and could therefore not completely neglect the former social housing stock. 
With the state’s consent, state-owned housing companies also sold unprofitable 
housing stock to reduce their debt, especially when they lacked the financial re-
sources to make the necessary improvements (see chapter 6). Responsible for the 
mandate to continue providing housing for low income tenants, state-owned 
housing companies however, could not sell all the former social housing stock. 
Specifically when the state no longer promoted en bloc privatisation (see chapter 
5), state-owned housing companies were left with unprofitable former social 
housing. They therefore had to keep this type of housing and could not entirely 
neglect it. This was also the case for social housing companies which were solely 
active in the social housing market. State-owned housing companies and social 
housing companies therefore had to find alternative ways to deal with lacking 
subsidies. 
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Cross-subsidising former social housing through rent pooling 
 
In general, housing owners with a large portfolio are able to pool rents across 
different housing units to balance unprofitable housing units with cost-effective 
ones (Lawson 2006: 70). This strategy was followed by social and state-owned 
housing companies which cross-subsidised their unprofitable housing units with 
rent levels from more profitable ones in other locations in Berlin. Both types of 
housing companies owned considerable amounts of former social housing that 
was already on the free market. These housing units had benefitted from the 30- 
year subsidies and were not affected by the subsidy default. If these units were 
located within well-situated neighbourhoods, housing companies could attract a 
clientele with a higher socio-economic status. With the higher profit margin they 
offset the lacking subsidies for the housing units they had built between 1987 and 
1997. The division manager of a social housing company explained this strategy 
to balance out the income gap: 
“We decided in our company to increase the rents of these [af-
fected] housing units to the average of the rent mirror115, some-
times to the upper limit of the rent mirror, but this also depended 
on the area and the fittings of the apartment. Of course, you can’t 
forget that the fitting is social housing standard that is already 15 
years old. We then cross-subsidise the difference between this 
rent and the economic rent with rents that we get from older 
social housing stock that already phased out of the lock-in period.” 
(Division manager of a social housing company, ID 25) 
Due to the abandonment of the follow-up subsidies, social housing companies 
were forced to make profits on certain properties, in order to offset the deficit in 
the social housing stock: They could no longer manage all of their housing at a 
non-profitable rate. For state-owned housing companies, the pressure was even 
higher due to the state’s profit expectations (see chapter 6). The rent pooling 
strategy therefore generated an accelerated upgrading of attractive housing in 
Berlin, because housing companies increased rents of the housing on the free 
market that had been located in better neighbourhoods or had been equipped with 
better standards.  
 
The analysis of the different strategies followed by private investors and state-
owned housing companies once again shows that it is not concepts of private or 
public which define the way housing companies operate. Instead, it is the hous-
ing providers’ finance strategies, their imperative to make profit or provide for 
low income tenants – or both. State-owned housing companies might therefore 
                                                 
 
115 The rent mirror is a comparative rent-index. See section 7.2.1 for further explanations of how 
the rent mirror works. 
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act in a way only expected of private investors or vice-versa. This underlines the 
argument that the dualistic conceptualisation of private versus public-led housing 
provision simplifies complex processes. Rather, a conceptualisation along causal 
mechanisms such as production relations and the constraints within which actors 
operate is more useful to understand these processes.  
 
The analysis also shows that the particular state regulation reinforced uneven 
investment by the different housing providers. The abandonment of housing sub-
sidies for social housing underpinned the constraints faced by housing providers; 
not only did the social housing stock that came prematurely onto the free housing 
market not have enough development potential for investment. The housing pro-
viders that were affected also lacked the necessary financial resources and be-
came even more constrained to undertake the necessary investments. Value 
added and opportunistic investment funds divested or neglected this housing be-
cause it did not have the necessary development potential to achieve target re-
turns, but they achieved their targets through speculative buying and selling. 
State-owned housing companies also sold part of this housing stock but together 
with social housing companies, they were predominantly dependent on cross-
subsidising strategies through rent pooling. None of the housing providers how-
ever invested into this type of housing.  
 
Contrary to the understanding that the state’s withdrawal fosters private invest-
ment, its retreat did not trigger a modernisation process of this type of housing. 
Moreover, the abandonment of social housing subsidies reinforced the deteriora-
tion of the former social housing stock. This also affected the provision of the 
remaining social housing which was continuously reduced and, at the same time, 
became more expensive. The following section turns towards an analysis of the 
effects on the provision of housing for low income households. 
 
7.1.2 Provision of Remaining Social Housing 
 
With the abandonment of social housing subsidies, private and state-owned hous-
ing companies completely stopped the construction of new social housing.116 
Since housing companies no longer had any financial incentives to build social 
housing and Berlin’s government has not replaced the abandonment of supply-
                                                 
 
116 In 2009, social housing made up 18.3 percent of the rental housing stock (Investitionsbank 
Berlin 2010: 31). Due to historical developments, the social housing stock was almost exclusively 
in West Berlin. There were additional housing units that were built during the GDR era in East 
Berlin and, after reunification, were placed under allocation control based on the allocation con-
trol law (Belegungsbindungs-gesetz, BelBindG) (Investitionsbank Berlin 2010). See also section 
7.1.4. 
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side subsidies with other regulatory tools, such as planning regulations 
(Whitehead 2007), there is a decline in affordable housing. Two historically con-
tingent processes are fostering this decline. 
 
First, as described above, social housing was historically established as a tempo-
rary condition. The old social housing units were therefore continuously phasing 
out of the lock-in period and were integrated into the free market. At the same 
time, housing companies no longer constructed new social housing due to the 
lack of subsidies. Hence, the amount of social housing declined each year.117 
Second, credit and therefore housing construction costs increased with time. The 
rent ceilings that the government determined were therefore higher for later built 
social housing. As a consequence, the social housing units that did not yet phase 
out of the lock-in period – and were therefore reserved for low income house-
holds – were the ones with higher rent levels. At the same time, the former social 
housing stock that was already released from the rent and allocation restrictions 
were the ones that had lower rent ceilings. When housing companies did not in-
vest in the social housing stock that came onto the free market, rent levels in 
these units remained low. 
 
These mechanisms ensured that the average rent level of social housing was 
higher than the average rent level on the free housing market. Moreover, between 
1999 and 2008, social housing rents increased faster than the rents on the free 
market.118 Figure 7.1 reflects the base rent119 development within the social hous-
ing stock and shows the accelerating increase of rent levels due to the processes 
described above. According to the government’s housing market report, the aver-
age rent for social housing was 5.12 Euros per square metre compared to the 4.83 
Euros per square metre for housing on the free market (Investitionsbank Berlin 
2010: 44 et seq.).  
 
                                                 
 
117 Between 1999 and 2008, the social housing stock under rent and allocation control has de-
creased by 32 percent to around 9.8 percent of the total housing stock. The Investitionsbank Ber-
lin (2009: 32) forecasts that from the 290,000 social housing units in 1998, only 140,000 will be 
left in 2018, because more and more fall out of the subsidised period. 
118 The rent level of the social housing stock has increased with an average yearly growth rate of 
3.2 percent between 1999 and 2008. This increase is higher than for the rent levels on the free 
market (average growth of 2.1 percent per year in the same time period). 
119 Base rent is defined as the rent without operational costs like heating. 
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Figure 7.1: Base Rent Development of Social Housing (Euro/m! per Month) 
 
Source: adapted from IBB Wohnungsmarktbericht 2009 (Investitionsbank Berlin 2010: 
47). 
 
While the range of rent levels on the free market was much wider, the apartments 
on the free market that either needed urgent renovation or had lower quality fit-
tings than social housing, pulled the average free market rent down. A represen-
tative of the Senate Department of Urban Development confirmed the problem, 
pointing out that socially financed housing might not be able to play a role in 
providing for low income households in future: 
“In about ten years, there will be around 130,000 social housing 
apartments left. This is a large reduction and because of the his-
torical development of social housing in large housing estates in 
certain areas of the city, the effect is a concentration of the re-
maining social housing. And the second problem is that the hous-
ing units that are released from the lock-in period sooner, are the 
housing units with relatively low rents because they were subsi-
dised through cheap construction credits. This means that the 
housing that is coming onto the free-market is the cheaper hous-
ing. And the remaining social housing has already a relatively 
high rent. This is from my point of view a problem and there is 
the question how the remaining social housing can contribute to 
the provision of housing for poor households.” (Employee of the 
Senate Department for Urban Development, ID 5) 
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Figure 7.1 also shows that the real average of rent in social housing is lower than 
the base rent.120 This indicates that housing companies were not able to raise rent 
levels in the social housing stock according to the government-determined rent 
ceilings for social housing. This happened because Berlin’s tenants could find 
housing units on the free market that were cheaper than the social housing units. 
 
With no new social housing construction and no alternative regulations, the pro-
vision of affordable housing is therefore not secured for the future. According to 
the 2009 Housing Market Report, only seven percent of the social housing stock 
was still available for less than four Euros per square metre and will gradually be 
omitted from the social housing stock by 2015 (Investitionsbank Berlin 2010: 47). 
This means that there will be an increasing lack of affordable and good standard 
housing for the poorer population of Berlin. Increasingly, tenants most in need of 
state assistance cannot access social housing dwellings because rent levels in the 
remaining social housing units are becoming higher. These tenants have to find 
housing units on the free market. The free market units at affordable rent levels 
are however often of substandard quality because housing companies disinvest in 
these units due to their finance and investment strategies (see chapter 5 and 6). 
 
The increasing lack of affordable housing due to the abandonment of socially 
financed housing was not especially surprising since it has been documented in 
other countries (see, for example, Turner and Whitehead 2002). The lack of af-
fordable housing was, however, not due to increasing rent levels as one might 
expect, but due to particular market relations. As demonstrated, if housing pro-
viders did not make the necessary investments, they were not able to increase 
rent levels. The quality of the housing however deteriorated. At the same time, 
the remaining social housing (that still received subsidies) became more expen-
sive, which caused a decrease in the affordable housing stock.  
 
The analysis shows that the abandonment of social housing subsidies reinforced 
the uneven production mechanisms of the different types of housing providers. 
Under the particular regulatory and market relations, these production mecha-
nisms increasingly created a lack of affordable housing. The following section 
analyses the changing relations in the consumption of social housing. 
 
                                                 
 
120 The average rent ceiling for social housing units is 5.40 Euros per square metre. The real aver-
age however is 5.12 Euros (Investitionsbank Berlin 2010: 48).  
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7.1.3 Consumption of Social Housing 
 
As already mentioned, Berlin’s social housing stock was historically built for a 
wide stratum of the population. In the post-war era, new social housing in the 
outskirts was often considered a better alternative to the rundown inner city hous-
ing stock that sometimes still retained signs of war. The middle classes therefore 
moved into the social housing of post-war high-rise developments (see chapter 4). 
The following section explores the changes in consumption under the new regu-
latory conditions and the production mechanisms analysed above. It addresses 
the following question: How does the demand of different types of income groups 
and types of household structures shape the process of uneven development 
under the new regulatory conditions for social housing? 
 
Two processes have been observed. First, better off tenants left social housing 
units due to particular regulatory conditions, which meant that they would have 
had to pay higher rent levels in the social housing stock. Second, due to the phys-
ical characteristics of certain social housing estates from the post-war era and a 
particular national regulation that affects households on social welfare, a concen-
tration of large households on social welfare is built up in these estates. The fol-
lowing analysis underlines the argument that the particular production and regu-
lation mechanisms shape the consumption of social housing (Ball 1986; Lawson 
2006). 
 
Better off tenants leave social housing units  
 
Regulatory changes and a lack of investment in the social housing stock created a 
process where mobile better off tenants left social housing apartments. At the 
beginning of the 1980s, Berlin’s government introduced a fee for households 
whose income considerably increased over the years. In order to be able to stay 
in the social housing unit, these households had to pay the fee in addition to the 
subsidised rent.121 This further reflects the change from a social housing model 
that provides for the masses to a more residualised model (see section 7.1; Harloe 
1995). Through the introduction of the fee, better off and mobile tenants had 
therefore no longer an economic incentive to stay in the social housing unit. The 
ageing social housing stock coupled with a lack of investment (see section 7.1.1) 
contributed to the exodus of tenants because the latter were no longer satisfied 
                                                 
 
121 In 1981, a national law permitted the states to introduce such a fee in order to reduce the num-
ber of ‘wrongly’ subsidised housing (Gesetz über den Abbau der Fehlsubventionierung im Woh-
nungswesen). 
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with the value for money (Geyer 1999: 93 in Häußermann and Kapphan 2002: 
161). The depressed housing market after reunification (see chapter 1) acceler-
ated this process because housing units with similar standards could be found 
cheaper on the free market. Tenants who had been living in these estates for a 
long time, often elderly people who moved in when they were newly built, re-
mained because they were less mobile. At the same time, low income households 
and immigrants started to occupy the vacant units. These groups had not access 
to other markets segments because of high rent barriers or active allocation dis-
crimination (see chapter 5 and 6).  
 
These specific processes generated an increasing concentration of low income 
households in the social housing stock of the post-war high-rise developments 
(Häußermann and Kapphan 2002: 154). A neighbourhood manager of a large 
social housing estate described the process and the conflicts that emerged: 
“We have here a situation where we have a population that 
moved into these housing units in the 1960s. When they moved 
here, these apartments were very modern and the people are still 
proud that they received these modern apartments. They have 
brought up their children here and they feel at home here. The 
children however moved out and these early tenants are ageing. 
Now, they are confronted with the moving in of the socially dis-
advantaged, among them a lot of immigrants. The early tenants 
cannot relate to these families because they have brought up their 
own children differently. We have conflicts here between old and 
young, between Germans and non-Germans.” (Project director of 
neighbourhood management team, ID 26) 
The increasing social problems that came with a concentration of low income 
households, especially in the big social housing estates in the periphery, re-
inforced the processes where mobile households moved out. In areas where this 
movement took place, the state interfered. In 2002, the government of Berlin 
abandoned the fee that wealthier households had to pay when staying in social 
housing units. The aim of this re-regulation was to “create a social mix that is 
urgently necessary in social housing estates” and to “secure social housing for a 
broad stratum of the population” (Senatsverwaltung für Stadtentwicklung 2002, 
author's translation). The state thus tried to incentivise better off tenants to re-
main in the social housing stock or attract new middle class families in specific 
neighbourhoods. A few years later, in 2005, the state also abandoned the alloca-
tion rules for approximately 40,000 social housing units in order to open up these 
dwellings for everyone (Senatsverwaltung für Stadtentwicklung 2005a).  
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The simple lifting of the fees and the allocation regulation had however no im-
pact on the social structure of the social housing estates. The representative of the 
Senate Department for Urban Development confirmed this: 
“The record shows that even in the areas where the allocation 
rule has been lifted, it is mostly the population strata which is en-
titled to a housing voucher that moves into the social housing 
stock.” (Employee of the Senate Department for Urban Devel-
opment, ID 5) 
This was primarily the case for social housing that was not modernised. And 
housing companies did not upgrade social housing units because as long as the 
housing stock was locked-in, there was no incentive to so; and when the social 
housing stock came onto the free market, it was mostly not cost-effective to do 
so (see sections 7.1.1). The lack of investment in the less-well located social 
housing stock hollowed out the government’s efforts to attract wealthy house-
holds to some of the disadvantaged neighbourhoods. The analysis shows that the 
state’s changes to regulate previous rounds of uneven development (the exodus 
of better off tenants) did not play out the way it anticipated or hoped for. The 
uneven production mechanisms, which predominantly neglected the social hous-
ing stock, shaped the consumption. 
 
Large households on social welfare move into certain social housing estates 
 
Income mechanisms did not only shape the process of uneven development 
under the specific regulatory conditions and production mechanisms. Specific 
types of households also shaped processes of uneven development. In social 
housing estates from the 1960s and 1970s, a concentration of large households 
could be observed. Again, production mechanisms and regulatory processes 
caused the unevenness of housing consumption. 
 
Social housing estates from the 1960s and 1970s were standardised and con-
structed with generously sized rooms.122 This had the effect that even though the 
rent per square metre was still relatively low, the apartment was becoming unaf-
fordable because of the unit’s size. Smaller households had to leave the premises 
because they could not afford the increasing rents. The neighbourhood manager 
regretted the exodus of smaller households: 
                                                 
 
122 A social housing estate from the 1970s that was analysed contained two-room apartments of 
80 square metres. The living room or lounge is counted as a room, thus a two-room apartment in 
Germany is the equivalent of a one-bedroom plus lounge apartment in the United Kingdom. 
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“The last senior citizen households have also moved out of this 
estate because they could no longer afford the rents.” (Project di-
rector of a neighbourhood management team, ID 29) 
This affected people on social welfare even more because of regulatory changes 
to their housing allocation. With the reform of the social welfare regulations on 
the national level, households on social welfare were allocated housing by the 
job centre according to an ‘adequate rent’ for the number of people living in the 
same household.123 The adequate rent was based on a certain number of square 
metres per person. In the end, social housing estates with large sized bedrooms 
became too expensive for smaller households on welfare and they had to relo-
cate.124 
 
The job centre then allocated the generously sized apartments to larger house-
holds that matched adequate rent criteria. Because the apartments of the estate 
were standardised, the job centre automatically created an unintended concentra-
tion of larger families on social welfare. These families were often immigrants. 
The social structure of these housing estates then prevented better off households 
who were not on social welfare from moving in. Again, the abandonment of the 
allocation (see above) could not change this process. The neighbourhood man-
ager of such a social housing estate complained about this process: 
“The problem is, these apartments are very generous in their size. 
That means the households that are moving into these apartments 
nowadays are not a family with two children because in this case 
the job centre would not pay the rent. And private tenants who 
earn their own money would of course never voluntarily chose to 
live in these housing units where each balcony has a satellite dish, 
where the children go to a school with seventy percent immi-
grants, where German is no longer spoken.” (Project director of 
the Neighbourhood Management Programme, ID 29) 
The bigger families were allocated these generously sized apartments while 
smaller households could no longer afford them because they were not allocated 
and did not receive a subsidy. In this case, the national regulatory conditions for 
households on social welfare had a major impact in shaping this process. More-
                                                 
 
123 According to social welfare regulations (Hartz-IV), adequate housing in Berlin for a one-
person household costs no more than 378 Euros including all utilities and heating costs; for a 
two-person household it is 444 Euros (Senatsverwaltung für Integration Arbeit und Soziales 
2009). 
124 Eekhoff and Mackscheidt (2006), in their study on the consequence of the changing regulation 
in social welfare at the national level, emphasise that the municipal governments have to pay the 
housing costs of persons on social welfare. This means that municipalities, especially those with 
financial difficulties, are increasingly under pressure to strictly apply these living standard ade-
quacy regulations. In these municipalities households on social welfare will most likely be relo-
cated because the government cannot sustain subsidies for these tenants’ housing. 
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over, the specific physical characteristics of the monotonous, but generously 
sized post-war social housing estates played an important role in the concentra-
tion of large households on social welfare. The local state’s attempt to create a 
more diversified social structure in such social housing estates did not have an 
impact under these conditions. 
 
The concentration of low income households has been confirmed for other count-
ries where governments re-regulated the social housing provision (Van Kempen 
and Priemus 2002; Whitehead and Scanlon 2007: 6). This analysis shows the 
particular production and regulatory mechanisms that shaped this concentration 
in Berlin. It also shows that there is not only a concentration of low income 
households, but under specific circumstances, there is also a concentration of 
specific types of low income households, such as large families. 
 
7.1.4 Synthesis of Key Mechanisms in Social Housing and Their Spatial  
Outcomes 
 
The abandonment of subsidies for social housing can be regarded as a shift to-
wards a more entrepreneurial, market-oriented mode of regulation with regards 
to housing provision. The analysis however shows that a reductionist view of the 
abandonment of government institutions and the infiltration of market mecha-
nisms often put forward by the entrepreneurial city debate (see, for example, 
Swyngedouw 2000; Meyer 1995) is not sufficient for understanding the complex 
processes of uneven mechanisms. It is not enough to confirm the transformation 
of the state towards a more entrepreneurial form. In order to understand the pro-
cesses of uneven development, there is a need to investigate the uneven produc-
tion and consumption mechanisms, triggered intentionally or unintentionally by 
particular state regulation. 
 
With the abandonment of social housing subsidies, the state halted the construc-
tion of new social housing. At the same time, the state’s abandonment of follow-
up subsidies for social housing created financial havoc for housing companies 
owning social housing that was built between 1987 and 1997. This triggered 
mechanisms that were not necessarily anticipated by the government. In the par-
ticular market situation, housing companies were not able to adjust rent levels 
cost-effectively and therefore had to find other ways to balance their income gap. 
This, in consequence, reinforced the uneven production mechanisms of the dif-
ferent housing providers. Value added funds divested or neglected the unprofit-
able former social housing. State-owned housing companies did the same until 
the government stopped promoting en bloc privatisation. Opportunistic invest-
ment funds did buy these housing estates, but did not invest and upgrade them. 
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Thus, the withdrawal of the state did not foster investment for the modernisation 
of former social housing ensuring their eventual neglect. State-owned housing 
companies and social housing companies, both of them with a mandate to pro-
vide for low income households, did adhere to unprofitable housing and cross-
subsidised with rents from more profitable housing stock. 
 
Due to the historical development of social housing, the abandonment of the 
supply-side subsidies created an increasing gap between cheap, but below-
standard housing on the free market, and more expensive social housing. Again, 
the government’s anticipation that the free market would be able to provide for 
low income housing could not be confirmed. While opportunistic investment 
funds did provide housing for low income residents through their ‘discount hous-
ing’ strategy (see section 5.4.3), they did it in a way unintended by the gov-
ernment – by neglecting the housing stock and creating problematic neighbour-
hoods. The decline in social housing units coupled with increasingly expensive 
rents in the remaining social housing stock, points to the fact that it got difficult 
for low income households to find good housing. 
 
The processes of uneven development are caused by the diverging strategies that 
the different housing providers applied. Likewise, each of the strategies is inher-
ently uneven because of the selective investment. The different investment strat-
egies all create a revalorisation of well-situated housing stock and an increas-
ingly neglect of dwellings that actually need investment, such as former social 
housing. These uneven production mechanisms also influence the consumption 
mechanisms. Under the specific regulatory conditions, the disinvestment of hous-
ing companies in the non-profitable housing stock creates a concentration of low 
income households and large families on social welfare in certain housing estates. 
 
Critically, as a result of the spatial development of social housing, these mecha-
nisms had different effects on their respective neighbourhoods. Figure 7.2 il-
lustrates the distribution of social housing and allocation restricted housing in the 
districts in 2009. Most of the social housing stock was located within the western 
part of the city. This was because social housing was only built in East Berlin 
after reunification until the abandonment of the social housing subsidy in 1998. 
The housing stock built by the government in East Berlin was not considered 
social housing after reunification, but received the status of allocation-restricted 
housing. In comparison to social housing, allocation-restricted housing units had 
no rent ceilings, but only allocation restrictions. 
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Figure 7.2: Distribution of Social Housing in the Districts 2009
125
 
 
Source: adapted from IBB Wohnungsmarktbericht (Investitionsbank Berlin 2010). 
 
The distribution of the social and allocation-restricted housing had three conse-
quences. First, since the social housing stock in the eastern part of the city was 
built between 1991 and 1997, this area will no longer have social housing after 
2013 because of the abandonment of the 15 year follow-up subsidies (Lichten-
berg, Marzahn-Hellersdorf, Pankow, Treptow-Köpenick, and parts of 
Friedrichshain-Kreuzberg and Mitte126). Second, the increasing exclusion of 
social housing from the lock-in period affected the western parts of the city most 
because western districts had most of the social housing stock (Mitte, Neukölln, 
Reinickendorf, Spandau, and Tempelhof-Schöneberg). Third, the allocation-
restricted housing units in the eastern parts of Berlin will only be available until 
2013 according to established law (Senatsverwaltung für Justiz 1995). Thereafter, 
it will be released from any restrictions.127 With this continuous decline of social 
                                                 
 
125 Unfortunately, it was not possible to find geographical data on the housing stock that is af-
fected by the abandonment of the 15-year follow-up subsidies.  
126 Friedrichshain-Kreuzberg and Mitte are two districts that have been merged with districts 
from West Berlin (Kreuzberg was part of West Berlin; Mitte integrated the Western districts of 
Tiergarten and Wedding). These districts therefore have a mixture of social housing that was built 
before reunification in the West and of social housing that was built after reunification. 
127 For some of these housing units, Berlin’s government and the housing companies agreed on a 
release from the allocation restriction for several years. This is because this housing stock has a 
relative high degree of vacancies. The government hopes that by releasing this housing stock 
from the allocation restriction, the government will be able to restrict allocation in the future as 
needed. 
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and allocation-restricted housing, there will be an increasing concentration of 
social housing in certain districts due to its historical distribution. 
 
*** 
 
7.2 Reconfiguration of Urban Renewal 
 
Traditionally, state-led urban renewal was a means to battle housing shortages 
and improve dwelling conditions in inner city areas that were destroyed in World 
War Two (Edgar and Taylor 2000: 165). The state initially helped the private 
market which was not able to make the necessary investments (Smith 2002: 438). 
In recent years, state-led urban renewal of inner city housing has often been con-
nected with a more entrepreneurial urban strategy. The state uses urban renewal 
strategies to strengthen the competitive position of the city by attracting invest-
ment, but also wealthier people to increase its tax base (Harris 2008). Moreover, 
governments deal with disadvantaged neighbourhoods by promoting the influx of 
middle and upper income families, in order to disintegrate the concentration of 
the poor and improve the social mix of neighbourhoods (Lees 2008), often lead-
ing to the displacement of poorer households (Davidson 2008). These urban re-
newal strategies are connected to a more private-led housing provision, where the 
state is no longer subsidising the provision of housing, but continuously with-
drawing from supply-side subsidies in favour of creating incentives for private-
led urban renewal (see also chapter 2). This section investigates how the changes 
towards a more entrepreneurial strategy of housing renewal played out in Berlin. 
It not only investigates the particular form in which the state reconfigured its 
urban renewal strategy, but more importantly how the production mechanisms of 
previously established housing providers play out in practice under the particular 
regulatory conditions of urban renewal. 
 
I analytically distinguish three phases of regulatory conditions in Berlin’s urban 
renewal process: First, the direct subsidisation of urban renewal coupled with 
strict rent ceilings and allocation rules; second, the change towards tax incentives 
for private investors; and third, the abandonment of any subsidies towards the 
renewal of housing. The reconfiguration of the urban renewal programme ana-
lysed in the three phases shows the changing rules, which brought about a shift 
towards a more entrepreneurial mode of housing renewal in Berlin. The state has 
been continuously withdrawing from its commitment to renovate the city’s old 
housing stock and concentrates its actions towards the creation of incentives for 
private housing developers to do the task. In order to understand the reasons for 
how these urban renewal regulatory conditions create uneven spatial develop-
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ment in Berlin, the following sections turn to the contingently defined production 
mechanisms during the three phases of reconfiguration and the changing con-
sumption relations these promoted. 
 
7.2.1 Production Mechanisms of Urban Renewal Housing 
 
In order to understand the production mechanisms of urban renewal housing, 
three types of housing providers are important to consider. While each has 
played a key role in one of the phases, they co-exist today under equal regulatory 
conditions. In the first phase of urban renewal that took place before reunifica-
tion in the neighbourhoods of West Berlin, the state commissioned predomi-
nantly state-owned housing companies to renew old 19th-century block develop-
ment housing (see also chapter 4). Already towards the end of the first phase, but 
primarily in the second and third phase, the state commissioned urban renewal 
agencies to coordinate the investment of private landlords within the designated 
urban renewal areas, predominantly in the inner city districts of East Berlin. In 
the second phase, small-scale private investors played a major role.128 In this 
phase, institutional investors have not yet entered Berlin’s housing market on a 
large scale. The urban renewal programme of the second phase helped however 
to create demand for 19th-century block developments which value added in-
vestment funds then used to strategically invest in housing with development 
potential once they entered Berlin’s housing market (see chapter 5).129 The third 
phase marked a complete shift from housing renewal towards the support of 
infrastructure renewal. The state redirected the funds for the improvement of 
parks, schools and other public infrastructure, and counted exclusively on private 
investment for the renewal of housing. 
 
The following section investigates how urban renewal strategies became incorpo-
rated in the entrepreneurial strategies of Berlin’s government. Going beyond the 
identification of urban renewal as an entrepreneurial strategy, the section then 
explores the contingently emerging production mechanisms under the regulatory 
conditions of the three phases. It investigates the uneven development processes 
                                                 
 
128 The small-scale investors are analytically difficult to differentiate because of their heterogene-
ous ownership structure (Holm 2006: 126). Due to the thesis’ focus on institutional investors and 
state-owned housing companies, the analysis of small-scale investors is based on the existing 
literature’s detailed account of urban renewal in the district of Prenzlauer Berg in the former East 
Berlin (Häußermann et al. 2002; Bernt and Holm 2005; Holm 2006) and interviews conducted 
with a district councilor of urban development, a head of a department for urban redevelopment 
projects and two representatives of a tenant consulting service in an inner city district in former 
East Berlin. 
129 Opportunistic investment funds did not have a particular interest in this type of housing be-
cause they were looking for cheap stock in order to re-sell it at a higher price (see chapter 5). 
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that the different phases triggered and addresses the question: How do the differ-
ent housing owners invest and manage the urban renewal housing under the spe-
cific regulatory phases?  
 
First phase: Subsidies and rent ceilings 
 
Urban renewal programmes130 were initially aiming at the improvement of the 
derelict housing stock of the late 19th-century block developments in West Berlin. 
The programmes were structured similarly to the social housing construction 
programmes: The government provided grants for the modernisation of the hous-
ing stock and subsidised rents according to a predetermined limit. Districts re-
ceived allocation rights with priority for tenants that were affected by the urban 
renewal process. As within the social housing stock, the predefined rent level 
continuously increased until the subsidies were exhausted or repaid, and the 
housing was released on the free market. Due to public protests that led to the 
urban renewal of old housing stock in inner city areas (see chapter 4), the process 
was characterised by a high degree of public participation. At first, state-owned 
housing companies executed the modernisation. The government mandated that 
state-owned housing companies buy the housing from the private owners who 
were unable or not prepared to modernise the housing units themselves and will-
ing to sell them. Later, the government increasingly also collaborated with pri-
vate housing investors. 
 
State-owned housing companies modernised under strict rent regulations 
 
The highly subsidised urban renewal process with public participation and strict 
rent limits created a slow modernisation process. Under these conditions, the 
state-owned housing company131 that was in charge had to negotiate the process 
with the state with regards to renovation costs, rent and allocation rules. At the 
same time, the state-owned housing company had to negotiate with the existing 
tenants, taking into account their capacity to pay higher rent levels and accord-
ingly adjust the form of modernisation. The project manager of a state-owned 
housing company described this process: 
                                                 
 
130 The urban renewal program was first introduced in the late 1960s and aimed at tearing down 
the old housing stock and building new large estates. This strategy was especially followed in the 
poorer areas. It had similarities with slum clearances in the Anglo-Saxon countries (Hall 2002: 
240 et seq.). With increasing protests against this form of urban renewal, from the late 1970s 
onwards, the state had adopted a strategy with a more sensitive approach where old housing stock 
was renovated rather than torn down (see also chapter 4). 
131 During the first phase of urban renewal, state-owned housing companies still acted under the 
principle of the common public interest (see section 6.1) and therefore were constrained in their 
profit maximisation. 
 
 
190 
“We had a contract with the government where every detail was 
regulated from buying the neglected housing, to the process of 
modernisation and future rent ceilings. […] At the beginning, the 
duty was to modernise the housing keeping rent levels at a mod-
erate level in order to prevent tenants from dislocating. […] 
When, for example, a gas system had to be renewed and it could 
not be paid from the current rent, Berlin [the government] – ac-
cording to the contract – covered the deficit.” (Technical project 
manager of a state-owned housing company, ID 20) 
It was not only the regulatory conditions that influenced the state-owned housing 
companies’ investment in Berlin’s urban renewal. Because of the participatory 
planning process, the modernisation also depended on tenant engagement. In 
neighbourhoods where tenants were actively participating, state-owned housing 
companies could only invest with the tenants’ consent. This led to less displace-
ment. A collaborator of a tenant consulting service who was involved in the 
whole process since the beginning expressed her satisfaction: 
“It was all terrific – during the urban renewal process and even at 
the end. I was impressed how we managed the process, how the 
tenants were satisfied and no one was displaced.” (Collaborator 
of a tenant consulting service, ID 21) 
Urban renewal in the first phase was highly subsidised, investment processes 
were negotiated and displacement of tenants was prevented. The process of state 
subsidies linked to predetermined rent ceilings contributed to a relatively stand-
ardised investment process, independent from the state-owned housing company 
in charge. The urban renewal process was thus characterised by a social regula-
tory overview where tenants’ interests were represented. This drastically changed 
with the second phase of urban renewal. 
 
Second phase: Tax incentives and relaxed rent regulations 
 
The situation dramatically changed after reunification. Before reunification, the 
government of West Berlin intervened in the urban renewal of its old housing 
stock because private investors were not willing to stem renovation costs without 
state support. It was too risky to invest. Urban renewal was considered as a way 
to battle the housing shortage and improve the physical structure of the some-
times still war-torn housing (Häußermann and Kapphan 2002: 75 et seq.). This 
created the investment processes described in the first phase.  
 
However, between 1993 and 1995, the government of Berlin reconfigured its 
urban renewal programme. The aim was now not only to improve the physical 
condition of the housing, but to “increase the competitive position” of these 
urban renewal designated districts (Senatsverwaltung für Stadtentwicklung, 
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author's translation) and to foster the influx of population groups that have a 
“stabilising effect” (Senatsverwaltung für Stadtentwicklung 2005c: 1, author's 
translation). In comparison to the first phase of urban renewal, which was at least 
partly a bottom-up approach with active tenant participation, the second phase of 
urban renewal was a top-down approach. The government designated 22 new 
urban renewal areas, now mostly in East Berlin.132 Some of the older urban re-
newal areas in West Berlin were however still designated as urban renewal areas 
and were now treated under the same regulatory conditions as the newly desig-
nated urban renewal areas. 
 
With less money than for previous rounds of renewal, the state subsidised the 
renovation of East Berlin’s old housing stock by providing tax incentives to pri-
vate investors in exchange for allocation rights for a portion of the housing stock. 
A commissioned urban renewal agency in each designated neighbourhood co-
ordinated the investment process. This second phase was the initial step of with-
drawal from direct state intervention in the modernisation of old housing stock 
within inner city areas. With tax incentives instead of direct subsidies, the state 
hoped to attract private investment and therefore speed-up the modernisation 
process of the inner city neighbourhoods of former East Berlin (Bremer et al. 
2007). At the same time, rent regulations for urban renewal housing were relaxed.  
 
The state, through its re-regulation, fostered the revalorisation of the designated 
urban renewal areas. This more private-led form of housing renewal could how-
ever only happen because the fall of the Wall made investment in Berlin attrac-
tive again and investors could capitalise on a particular rent gap. The following 
sections explore the contingently emerging production mechanisms of – and at 
the time predominantly – small scale private investors and how they produced 
this upgrading process under the particular regulatory conditions of the second 
urban renewal phase. 
 
Private investors capitalised on a rent gap 
 
With the abandonment of direct state subsidies for urban renewal, housing pro-
viders became more dependent on the capital market for housing renewal in-
vestment credits. Investors were therefore subject to market conditions. Besides 
the tax deductions for investment in housing renewal, the possible financial re-
                                                 
 
132 See Holm (2006) for an analysis of the effects of urban renewal on a specific neighbourhood – 
Prenzlauer Berg. 
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turns after renewal, through resale or rental income, became the most important 
factor for investment decisions (Holm 2006: 157). 
 
In the urban renewal designated areas of former East Berlin, housing providers, 
at the time especially small-scale private investors, capitalised on the existing 
rent gap (Smith 1996: 51 et seq.). The housing stock of the inner city areas in 
East Berlin had been what Smith (1996: 65) calls “under-maintained” for many 
years. In a capitalist market system, a housing shortage such as the one that oc-
curred in East Berlin before reunification would have stirred housing investment 
because rent levels could have been increased. However, in the planned economy 
of East Germany, the housing stock of East Berlin was completely abandoned for 
ideological reasons and rent remained at pre-war levels.133 At the time of reunifi-
cation, the housing stock was rundown. This led to a rent gap whereas the actual 
price was considerably lower than the potential profit of the dwellings. Accord-
ing to Holm (2006: 205), this under-maintenance of the housing stock was the 
key factor triggering the fast-paced modernisation process. Since the state no 
longer subsidised unprofitable urban renewal costs as it did in the first phase, 
private investors were under greater pressure to make the investment profitable. 
However, because they could not increase rents to a profitable level without 
modernising the housing stock, they renovated the housing – often to a high 
standard.  
 
The particular tenant structure in these designated urban renewal areas also fa-
cilitated the capitalisation of the existing rent gap. The buildings’ decline in 
value is often accompanied by a move-in of socially disadvantaged tenants 
(Smith 1996: 66). This was however not the case in East Berlin’s urban renewal 
areas. While there were considerable vacancies after reunification, the remaining 
tenants were part of a highly educated class that stayed in these dwellings for 
life-style and ideological reasons (see chapter 4). Investors therefore found an 
existing clientele that was able to pay higher rent levels. A respondent explained 
this specific condition: 
“Here, the buildings were in extremely poor condition, they were 
all dilapidated […]. But the social structure of the residents was 
completely unproblematic. It was actually very good. Normally, 
as for example in West Berlin, when you have such deteriorated 
housing, you would also have a problematic tenant structure with 
a lot of foreigners or the socially disadvantaged. This was not the 
case here. And this was attractive to the private investor, because 
                                                 
 
133 See chapter 4 for a discussion of how East Berlin’s government neglected the housing stock in 
the inner city. 
 
 
193 
it did not have to force the problematic tenants out first, but had a 
clientele that could afford paying higher prices. […] This was the 
reason for the specific dynamic that took place. […] I think this 
was very special.” (District councillor for urban development, ID 
11) 
Investment strategies then also affected rent levels in the renovated housing 
where the state’s regulatory conditions were considerably relaxed in the second 
urban renewal phase. 
 
Private investors modernised under relaxed rent regulations 
 
In this second phase of urban renewal, the state abandoned rent ceilings, reducing 
its control over market mechanisms. Before 1995, the subsidies were tied to a 
predefined rent ceiling that increased a certain amount each year in accordance 
with the declining subsidies. Therefore, state-owned housing companies only 
increased rent levels in the designated urban renewal areas according to pre-
determined ceilings. Because of this regulation, the tenant could foresee the rent 
increase for as long as the housing units were subsidised. With the deregulation 
during the second phase of urban renewal, after 1995, the rent ceiling in urban 
renewal areas was based on the average of the ‘rent mirror’, a comparative rent 
index that also regulated rent levels on the free market. 
 
Mechanism of the rent mirror: To understand the difference between the prede-
fined rent ceilings of the first phase and the rents based on the average of the rent 
mirror, the workings of the rent mirror have to be briefly explained. Together 
with tenant and landlord organisations, the state evaluates the comparative rent 
index every four years.134 On the free housing market, this rent index applies to 
existing tenancy agreements (Bundesministerium der Justiz 2009). Within a time 
period of three years, the rents of existing tenants then cannot be raised above 
twenty percent of the comparative rent. Tenants who newly move into an apart-
ment and sign a new tenancy agreement are however not protected by the com-
parative rent regulation. This specifically affects the rent levels of free market 
19th-century block developments because demand is high enough that value 
added investment funds increase rent levels to earn more profit through higher 
income streams (see section 5.4.2). Tenants who seek housing in these develop-
                                                 
 
134 Rents are regulated on the national level based on the principle of comparative rent of an area 
(ortsübliche Vergleichsmiete). In order to define the comparative rent for a specific place, most 
communities, especially bigger cities, develop a so-called “rent mirror” every four years. Berlin’s 
“rent mirror” is based on a sampling method and negotiations between stakeholders. It is a com-
parative rent scheme with different rent indices regarding the type, size, configuration, quality, 
and location of the housing unit.  
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ments often pay higher rent than the indexed rent.135 These newly negotiated 
rents then influence the next rent mirror reflecting a higher average rent level in 
the 19th-century block developments. With a new rent mirror that appears every 
four years, rent increases are legitimised for existing tenancy agreements on the 
free market and in designated urban renewal areas. In urban renewal designated 
housing, the owner can consequently increase rents to the average rent of the 
comparative index which is the rent ceiling. In 19th-century block development 
neighbourhoods with high demand, this process is creating a self-reinforcing 
cycle. The time lag of four years is slowing down, but not halting the revalorisa-
tion process.  
 
With this regulatory change from predefined rent ceilings to the rent average of 
the mirror, both private investors and state-owned housing companies increased 
rent levels. In contrast to the former social housing stock, demand for the urban 
renewal housing was high and private investors, as well as state-owned housing 
companies, could raise it the maximum amount possible. The mechanism of the 
rent mirror therefore accelerated the increase of rent levels in urban renewal 
housing of 19th-century block developments.  
 
When urban renewal neighbourhoods were released from their designated status 
and planning permission was no longer needed for renovation, investors were 
prone to further modernise the housing in order to increase profits. This was also 
because they could pass renovation costs onto the tenants.136 The release from 
urban renewal designation created a system where investors luxuriously modern-
ised housing for the sake of increasing rents. The responsible person for urban 
renewal areas in a district pointed this out: 
“Especially in this neighbourhood, the fact that we cannot limit 
rent levels is a problem, because the neighbourhood is in an area 
that is very popular among tenants, also among those who earn 
good money. And the former population that not necessarily 
earns a lot of money, there are also pensioners among them, has 
to worry about being dislocated. There are also renovations tak-
ing place that redo something that has already been modernised. 
This results again in increasing rents. And the private owners al-
ways get the apartment emptied.” (Collaborator of a tenant con-
sulting service, ID 21) 
                                                 
 
135 An analysis of the latest rent mirror shows that rent levels for new tenancy contracts are con-
siderably higher than rent levels in existing tenancy agreements (Müller 2009). 
136 The housing owner can transfer 11 percent of the modernisation costs onto the rent. Even 
when the costs are amortised, the rent remains at the higher level. 
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The state’s reconfiguration of the urban renewal programme was not a mere 
withdrawal from the housing provision. Moreover, it was this reconfiguration 
which allowed value-creating through investment. It thus was not the mere with-
drawal of the state that created the revalorisation of housing, but the way in 
which it incentivised investment without a social regulatory overview represent-
ing tenants’ interests. The appreciation of housing also benefitted the state itself 
with regards to its own housing companies’ financial situation (see chapter 6). 
The following quote from a representative of a state-owned housing company 
shows that the state no longer hindered its housing companies to increase rent 
levels in urban renewal areas. 
“Towards the end of the 1990s, the state forced rent increases. 
Rents for new tenants after the renewal were also pushed signifi-
cantly higher with the aim to improve profitability and therefore 
also Berlin’s budget.” (Technical project manager of a state-
owned housing company, ID 20) 
 
The upgrading of inner city areas through investment and increasing rents cre-
ated processes of displacement. The government still required a social plan for 
when urban renewal “expected to negatively impact the personal circumstances 
of the affected tenants” in order to prevent a displacement of low income house-
holds (Senatsverwaltung für Stadtentwicklung 2005c: 1, author's translation). 
However, while existing tenants were not necessarily directly displaced due to 
the regulatory conditions in place, urban renewal created a process of exclusion-
ary displacement where low income households are no longer able to move into 
these neighbourhoods (Marcuse 1986).  
 
This second phase of the changing regulatory conditions marked the first step 
towards a more entrepreneurial form of renewal. Urban renewal was used as a 
strategy to promote private investment in the city and its built environment. The 
particular way in which the state deregulated rent levels and attracted investment 
through tax-incentives without public participation generated production mecha-
nisms that fostered the capitalisation of the existing rent gap. At the time, it was 
predominantly small-scale private investors that invested in the urban renewal of 
the designated areas. Due to their heterogeneous character, it is difficult to differ-
entiate the specific strategy that each investor followed. However, in order to 
make investment in these urban renewal areas profitable, it was essential to mod-
ernise the housing stock to create demand and increase rent levels (Holm 2006: 
126). 
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In contrast to the first phase of urban renewal, the modernisation process of the 
reconfigured urban renewal programme generated a much faster renewal process. 
It was a process that was, so the analysis suggests, anticipated by the government. 
The fast-paced upgrading process however also brought about increasingly indi-
rect and exclusionary displacement of tenants (see also section 7.2.2). In contrast 
to modernisation, the government did, at least officially, not anticipate the dis-
placement; it was an unintended consequence. Once a majority of the old hous-
ing stock was renewed, the state reconfigured the urban renewal programme once 
again. 
 
Third phase: From housing to infrastructure 
 
In 2002, the programme entered what is analytically identified as its third phase. 
This time, the government withdrew completely from the subsidisation of hous-
ing renewal and proclaimed that it ought to be a task for private capital. Urban 
renewal subsidies were now exclusively targeting the modernisation of infra-
structure and the improvement of the urban environment in designated neigh-
bourhoods. The new programme declared that public money would only be allo-
cated for public buildings (Senatsverwaltung für Stadtentwicklung 2005c: 2). 
This entailed less financial responsibility for Berlin's Senate Department for 
Urban Development which was no longer able to support housing renewal.  
 
In this third phase of urban renewal, the engagement of private capital was no 
longer sought with tax incentives (Senatsverwaltung für Stadtentwicklung), but 
instead with the improvement of infrastructure such as schools and parks. By 
upgrading public infrastructure, the state attracted private investors to upgrade its 
housing stock. A district politician questioned the new urban renewal strategy of 
Berlin’s government: 
“I can quarrel for a long time about the fact that in 2000, the gov-
ernment of Berlin stopped investing into housing and now invests 
in public space. At first, this sounds reasonable. But one could 
also ask why the state should now additionally improve the resi-
dential environment with public money further benefiting private 
investors. However, why should the state not? It makes no sense 
when the schools are in a poor state. This is a difficult question.” 
(District councillor for urban development, ID 11) 
Without tax incentives for housing renewal, providers made their decisions 
solely based on the calculation of the return on the investment after modernisa-
tion. This reinforced the pressure to increase rent levels after modernisation. 
With the abandonment of state subsidies towards housing, the state could no 
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longer influence rent levels beyond general rent regulations. A respondent con-
firmed this:    
“You had the phase before 2000/2001 with the commitment of 
public subsidies, where the state could negotiate the renewal 
goals with the private landlord, where it had considerable power 
to offer something. From 2001 onwards, after there were no more 
public subsidies, the state could no longer offer anything and 
therefore it was not entitled to demand anything. From 2001 on-
wards, this has led to increasing gentrification of this district.” 
(Former project manager for the development of a housing estate 
employed by an asset management company, ID 13) 
State-owned housing companies and private investors, and now increasingly also 
value added investment funds, operated according to their strategic goals (see 
chapters 5 and 6) without any specific regulatory obstacles. In market segments 
that benefitted from a relatively high demand such as the urban renewal areas of 
the 19th-century block developments, the removal of regulatory challenges cre-
ated a reinforcing investment and revalorisation process. Alternative forms of 
housing subsidies that were still available played only a subordinate role as the 
next section shows. 
 
State-owned housing companies and value added investment funds modernised 
under market conditions, rarely using alternative forms of housing subsidies  
 
With the further reconfiguration of the urban renewal programme, the gov-
ernment of Berlin completely abandoned its commitment to the renovation of the 
old housing stock. Even though the government still had to pay subsidies to hon-
our former commitments, it abandoned any further engagement in this domain 
and does – according to a representative of the Senate Department for Urban 
Development – not plan any new intervention to subsidise housing construction 
or renovation. As a consequence of this reconfiguration from public to private 
urban renewal, the state continuously reduced its influence within the domain of 
housing provision. The following quote summarises the process. 
“Housing renovation used to be connected to high subsidy ex-
penditure by the state and it used to be regulated differently. 
Nowadays, subsidies are obtained through a bank and it is volun-
tarily to take the subsidies. In the traditional urban renewal pro-
grammes of the 1980s in Berlin, it was completely different. The 
subsidies were paid and the landlord was forced to renew the 
housing with the subsidies. Therefore, you had the rent obliga-
tions, a social regulation that is nowadays no longer possible be-
cause we now have the principle: public money for public build-
ings, private money for private buildings. This means that with 
regards to the provision of housing there are no state subsidies 
anymore. None might be exaggerated, but only very few; in the 
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domain of energy efficiency upgrades and housing suitable for 
elder people, but these subsidies are very limited and therefore 
have practically no effect on the rent level.” (Deputy managing 
director of an umbrella tenant organisation, ID 6) 
As this deputy managing director mentioned, there were new forms of subsidies, 
predominantly for energy-efficiency upgrades and for the modernisation of hous-
ing to make it suitable for elderly people. These subsidies in form of a credit at a 
subsidised interest rate were distributed and administered by the Investment 
Bank Berlin (IBB) in collaboration with the KfW bank (Kreditanstalt für den 
Wiederaufbau). The former offered promotion programs with low interest 
credits.137 
 
Compared to the influence that subsidies had on rent levels during the early 
phase of the urban renewal programme, these newer forms only had a minor im-
pact. The subsidies were not mandatory for the renovation of certain housing 
units. Housing providers were therefore free to decide if they wanted to make use 
of this subsidisation programme that was coupled with certain conditions. State-
owned housing companies accessed these subsidies more than value added in-
vestment funds. However, both emphasised that a decision to access the subsi-
dies was only made after a cost-benefit analysis. A representative of a state-
owned housing company described their decision-making process: 
“These subsidies do play a role and we will access them for the 
block we start renovating this year. However, there is always the 
question if it is worth to receive the credit at a subsidised rate. On 
the one hand, there is an administrative work that accompanies it. 
On the other hand, we have to transfer the subsidy to the rent lev-
els. And since we want to keep the social structure or even im-
prove it by attracting a better off clientele, the lower rent levels 
are not always wished for.” (Head of a customer service centre 
for a state-owned housing company, ID 24) 
In cases where housing companies saw possibilities to increase rents to profitable 
levels, the subsidies were not very attractive because it could constrain possible 
profit maximisation. Value added investment funds were even more reluctant to 
access the subsidies. A statement from a portfolio manager of a privatised hous-
ing company reflected this attitude: 
“Yes, subsidies do play a role. That is, we always examine the 
subsidies program if it fits our investment portfolio. For example, 
if the subsidy programme only supports one aspect, we however 
aim at a complete renewal; it is often not worth to apply for it. To 
summarise though, we examine each time, but we do not often 
                                                 
 
137 See Investitionsbank Berlin (2011) for more details. 
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access them.” (Portfolio manager of a private housing company, 
ID 12) 
 
In the cases where state-owned housing companies or private investors accessed 
the subsidies, the regulatory conditions were not constraining enough for the sub-
sidies to have a relevant impact on rent levels. Housing companies that decided 
to make use of these programmes had to convey the difference of the subsidised 
interest rate and the capital market interest rate onto the tenants’ rent. However, 
the difference between the subsidised and the capital market interest rate was too 
small to have a major effect on rent levels. Furthermore, several informants indi-
cated that investors often did not pass this reduction onto tenants because there 
was no control mechanism in place and the administrative effort was too cumber-
some. A project manager who renovated a housing estate on behalf of an investor 
illustrated this point: 
“There was a conflict with my employer concerning the transfer 
of the interest advantage from the KfW-subsidies to tenants 
where I said, either we do this or I am leaving this job. It is un-
believable that the KfW provides subsidies, and the law regulates 
the transfer of the interest advantage onto the rents, but there is 
no one who controls it.” (Former project manager for the devel-
opment of a housing estate employed by an asset management 
company, ID 13) 
The way these alternative forms of housing subsidies work was not attractive 
enough for investors’ with regards to their cost-benefit analysis. At the same time, 
when the subsidies were used and the regulatory conditions implemented, they 
were not effective enough for tenants because of the small difference it made to 
their rents. 
 
The three phases of Berlin’s urban renewal programme confirm a transformation 
towards a more entrepreneurial form of housing renewal. The first phase that was 
analysed shows that the state focused on the improvement of the physical condi-
tion of the old housing stock through a state-subsidised urban renewal process 
that was linked to restrictive rent levels. State-owned housing companies, at that 
time the major player in urban renewal, operated within particular regulations 
that guaranteed the financing of urban renewal, but were also hindered from 
maximising profit. The second phase marked the radical departure of the initial 
urban renewal programme: It aimed to attract both private capital into neigh-
bourhoods and “socially stabilised families” (Senatsverwaltung für 
Stadtentwicklung, author's translation). Housing providers, then mostly small-
scale private investors, increasingly worked under market conditions, pressured 
to make high returns on their housing renewal investment. These investors capi-
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talised on an existing rent gap and increased rent levels. The third phase of urban 
renewal continued the changes made in the second one by completely abandon-
ing urban renewal subsidies. Housing providers, and now increasingly value 
added investment funds, but also state-owned housing companies invested, man-
aged, and exchanged the housing according to their strategic goals established in 
the previous chapters 5 and 6.  
 
The radical break towards a more entrepreneurial form of housing renewal took 
place within the second phase. However, the analysis shows that there is a con-
tinuous reconfiguration and a particular mode of social regulation is always only 
temporary. It is this continuous process between the particular form of regulation 
and production, and how these relations play out under temporal and spatial cir-
cumstances, that is crucial to understanding uneven processes. In the case of the 
reconfiguration of the urban renewal programme, there was a continuous process 
towards a more entrepreneurial form, whereas the contingently emerging produc-
tion mechanisms of state-owned housing companies and value added investment 
funds were less and less constrained by regulatory conditions. This reinforced the 
revalorisation of the 19th-century block developments considered as having de-
velopment potential, especially where a rent gap can be capitalised upon. 
 
The reconfiguration of the urban renewal programme towards creating incentives 
for investment shows that the interplay between the production and regulation 
mechanisms created gentrification in the designated neighbourhoods. This under-
lines the argument that gentrification is not solely an effect of production (rent 
gap), but also the consequence of an entrepreneurial policy regime (Lees 2003, 
2008). Through this more entrepreneurial policy regime, the government of Ber-
lin achieved the goal of modernising these districts and improving their competi-
tive position. It however also created a more exclusionary form of consumption 
within these housing units. The next section turns towards an analysis of the con-
sequences on consumption. 
 
7.2.2 Consumption of Urban Renewal Housing 
 
The production mechanisms under the urban renewal regulatory changes have 
influenced, in turn, the consumption of aggregated demand with regards to in-
come and household structure. The following section addresses the question: 
How does the demand of different types of income groups and types of household 
structures shape the process of uneven development under the regulatory condi-
tions of urban renewal? 
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Direct and exclusionary displacement of low income households 
 
The new rent levels for urban renewal designated areas – that were based on the 
rent mirror – generated increasing financial pressure for low income households. 
Even though existing tenants were protected from arbitrary rent increases, the 
legitimate increase after every rent mirror evaluation resulted in the direct dis-
placement of households that could no longer afford the rents. This type of dis-
placement especially occurred in the inner city areas of West Berlin which 
largely still benefitted from the early urban renewal programmes. Before urban 
renewal, immigrants and other low income tenants such as students and retirees 
who were not able to move into the new social housing in the outskirts occupied 
the rundown dwellings (see chapter 4). These tenants could no longer afford to 
live in the old housing stock. With the renovation of the housing units, tenants 
often had to move out and even though they were entitled to re-occupy the for-
mer apartment after renovation, they could often not afford the higher rent. Some 
housing units were still bound to allocation regulations where only tenants with a 
housing voucher were entitled to move. However, housing vouchers are not only 
reserved for the poor.138 Even though the landlord had to rent out the newly 
renovated apartment in urban renewal areas to households with vouchers, the rent 
levels hindered the in-movement of the poor.  
 
As mentioned, in East Berlin’s urban renewal designated neighbourhoods, the 
rundown dwellings were either vacant or occupied by a well-educated middle 
class. Direct displacement played a less important role. However, more dramatic 
in these neighbourhoods was the type of displacement Marcuse (1986) calls ex-
clusionary displacement (see section 2.2.4). This means that low income house-
holds were excluded from moving into this area because of increasing rent levels. 
This process, which happened in both East and West Berlin, was even more ac-
celerated once the designated urban renewal area was released from its urban 
renewal status and the housing became excluded from any regulatory bindings. 
An urban renewal consultant, who experienced the urban renewal process from 
the beginning to the end and who was still working on the development of the 
neighbourhood, explained: 
“For 25 years this neighbourhood was an urban renewal area 
[from 1979 to 2003]. 75 percent of the housing stock in this 
                                                 
 
138 A single person household in Berlin is entitled to a housing voucher if their net income is 
below 16,800 Euros per year (Senatsverwaltung für Stadtentwicklung 2010c). The average net 
income per person in Berlin is 15,342 Euros a year (Statistische Ämter des Bundes und der 
Länder 2008). Thus, even single households, which have a net income slightly above average, are 
entitled to a housing voucher. 
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neighbourhood is now renovated and modernised. In the mean-
time, many of the original tenants have however been displaced. 
We were in charge of creating social plans during the time of the 
urban renewal programme. The displacement of the tenant only 
took place after the neighbourhood was released from the pro-
gramme. […] The negative impact of the renovation process is 
felt now, years later, but in a very cruel way.” (Collaborator of a 
tenant consulting service, ID 19) 
The combination of deregulated rent limits and modernisation increasingly cre-
ated expensive residential areas. Allocation regulations, where they still existed, 
did not have a great impact because they not only applied to poorer households. 
While low income households were displaced, middle and upper income house-
holds moved into the urban renewal housing. 
 
Increasing demand of middle class households for urban renewal housing 
 
The investment into the designated urban renewal areas created islands of nicely 
renovated housing units reserved for the expanding national and international 
middle class.  
“The neighbourhood is very popular and the latest studies have 
shown that the people who are financially strong, make up a 
growing part of the population in the neighbourhood. This devel-
opment was certainly initiated by the designation as an urban re-
newal area.” (Head of an urban renewal division within a district 
administration, ID 18) 
At the same time, the increasing demand for dwellings in the old housing stock 
of inner city areas propelled housing providers into further investment. New 
rounds of investment however not only took place in the urban designated areas, 
but also in neighbouring areas (see section 7.2.3). 
 
The reconfiguration of urban renewal towards a more entrepreneurial form pri-
oritised the investment of private capital over the protection of more vulnerable 
tenants. It generated the social exclusion of poorer households in inner city 
neighbourhoods because housing providers were no longer restricted in the way 
they operated on Berlin’s housing market. The contingently emerging production 
mechanisms that created processes of uneven development (see chapter 5 and 6) 
were therefore reinforced. The following section recaptures the key mechanisms 
and analyses their spatial outcome. 
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7.2.3 Synthesis of Key Mechanisms in Urban Renewal Housing and Their  
Spatial Outcomes 
 
The reconfiguration of the urban renewal programme created an accelerated re-
valorisation process of inner city areas. The abandonment of direct state subsi-
dies linked to rent ceilings in favour of tax incentives for private investment gen-
erated a fast paced modernisation process. This was partly influenced by specific 
historical circumstances. After reunification, investment became attractive again 
and private housing providers could capitalise on the rent gap due to the neglect 
of the old housing stock in East Berlin’s inner city during the GDR era. Private 
investors, at the time small-scale, used possible tax deductions to modernise the 
19th-century block developments and increased rents, which were no longer lim-
ited according to predetermined levels. The production mechanisms, combined 
with the reconfiguration of the urban renewal programme created two processes: 
On the one hand, the private investors’ strategies under the particular regulatory 
conditions improved the old housing stock. On the other hand, these strategies 
created a socio-spatial segregation where low income households were displaced 
and middle class households moved in. The following two quotes illustrate this 
process: 
“This urban renewal area is a success because we achieved a 
technical renovation coupled with social development. We didn’t 
achieve everything we wanted, but look at the cars that are 
parked outside and the streets etc. At least we marked the terri-
tory in a way that people highly identify themselves with the area, 
that they enjoy living here and that people who don’t live here 
would like to move here. Furthermore, this area is also profitable 
for us.” (Technical project manager of a state-owned housing 
company, ID 20) 
“The area is a great success from an urban development point of 
view. From a social perspective however, it is not successful.” 
(Collaborator of a tenant consulting service, ID 19) 
These mechanisms not only affected the designated urban renewal areas: With 
tax incentives, the urban renewal programme generated investors’ interest and 
sparked the renovation process of rundown inner city areas. Due to the increasing 
demand and the attractive investment conditions described above, investors also 
started to modernise the housing stock adjacent to the urban renewal areas. 
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The effect carried over into the surrounding areas 
 
The development of urban renewal designated neighbourhoods fostered invest-
ment in the surrounding areas. Investors, in this case value added investment 
funds and state-owned housing companies, renewed the 19th-century block de-
velopments without urban renewal tax incentives, without the need to apply for 
planning permission, and no need to adhere to rent and allocation rules.  
 
The islands of nicely renovated housing expanded, extending even beyond the 
19th-century block developments. Investors also started to target the Twenties 
and Thirties row developments (see chapter 4) adjacent to the 19th-century block 
developments. Because these row developments were centrally located and were 
increasingly celebrated for their architectural style, they became the new target 
for modernisation. Map 7.1 shows the old and current renewal areas; the revalo-
risation processes also took place around each of the renewal areas. 
 
Map 7.1: Current and Former Urban Renewal Areas in the Inner City of Berlin 
 
Data set: Informationssystem Stadt und Umwelt (ISU) der Senatsverwaltung für Stad-
tentwicklung Berlin 
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Throughout the upgrading process of whole districts, the few subsidised housing 
units located in the designated urban renewal areas still under rent and allocation 
rules were relatively irrelevant. A district politician explained:  
“The effect is that even though a lot of state money was invested, 
an apartment in Prenzlauer Berg is no longer affordable for the 
tenant with an average income. This process became apparent 
relatively early on. Yes, you receive the housing unit that has 
been subsidised relatively cheap. However, everything that is sur-
rounding the subsidised housing, you can no longer afford. Pren-
zlauer Berg has 150,000 to 170,000 inhabitants, if you have a few 
thousand subsidised housing units, then this is okay, but it’s not 
very much.” (District councillor for urban development, ID 11) 
The mechanisms of direct and indirect displacement were amplified in the sur-
rounding areas because the housing outside of the designated urban renewal 
areas were under no specific regulatory constraints. The analysis thus shows that 
the state sponsored and enabled, through its particular reconfiguration of urban 
renewal, the gentrification of whole neighbourhoods. 
 
Berlin’s reconfiguration of urban renewal marked a more entrepreneurial form of 
housing provision, shaping processes of uneven development. Duncan and 
Goodwin (1988: 41) argue that local levels of regulation contribute to this differ-
entiation due to the specific way in which the local level transforms specific state 
regulation based on their representational and interpretative role (see also section 
2.1.3). In comparison to other lower state levels (Duncan and Goodwin 1988), 
district governments in Berlin have however little room for manoeuvre in the 
implementation and filtering of Berlin’s regulatory conditions. Nevertheless, 
there were differences among districts, which emerged from the analysis. In a 
final section, the analysis thus turns to the lowest regulatory state level and ex-
plores the districts’ influence on the entrepreneurial form of housing provision 
and the processes of uneven development. 
 
District governments’ local mode of social regulation 
 
Berlin is divided into twelve districts (Bezirke), representing the lowest level of 
government.139 The districts in Berlin do not play the same role as communities 
in other German provinces (Länder), thus they do not have the same influence on 
housing provision. Compared to other communities, the districts also do not have 
their own income streams, but receive their income from Berlin's city gov-
                                                 
 
139 The 12 districts were established with the reformation of the administration of Berlin in 2001 
(Verwaltungsreform). Before there were 23 districts; 11 in East Berlin and 12 in West Berlin. 
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ernment. This further limits their power to influence the housing provision, but 
they have certain influence through planning regulations. 
 
Some districts that were heavily affected by the mechanisms analysed above se-
lectively deployed planning tools to challenge the new regulatory conditions set 
by Berlin’s government. As Map 7.2 shows, there were predominantly two dis-
tricts – the most affected ones – that applied these measures. Moreover, there 
was a relatively high degree of resistance to the upgrading of these two dis-
tricts.140 The following quote further showed that districts were guided by their 
representational function. 
“The districts’ interests differ from the ones of Berlin’s gov-
ernment. The estate with 1,800 apartments that got modernised is 
a very small portion of the two millions apartments in Berlin. The 
estate is therefore uninteresting to Berlin’s government. However, 
it is interesting to us because it affects our electorate. This is also 
why the tenants approached us. We have a resident question pe-
riod at the district assembly and the tenants asked us how the dis-
trict can possibly accept what happens.” (Urban planner, member 
of a district parliament and head of the district’s urban planning 
commission, ID 15) 
Three intervention mechanisms could be observed in these districts: The attempt 
to cap rents to a certain level, the designation of milieu protection areas, and the 
restructuring ordinance.  
 
To counter the accelerated increase of rent levels, the districts tried to reinstall 
predetermined caps on rents as a condition for planning permission in designated 
urban renewal areas. By doing this, they tried to counter the consequences of 
Berlin’s reconfigured urban renewal programme which abandoned the predeter-
mined rent limits and therefore enabled housing providers to increase rent levels 
according to the rent mirror (see section 7.2.1). After a judicial proceeding, the 
Federal Administrative Court however prohibited the caps on rents in these urban 
renewal areas. This put an end to the districts’ interpretative role on rent regula-
tion. A district representative who is responsible for urban renewal areas con-
sidered this a big problem: 
“In the formerly eastern part of our district, we have negotiated 
rent caps with the developers since 1995. However, with the de-
cision of the Federal Administrative Court [in June 2006], this 
regulatory mean was taken from us, so we are no longer able to 
link the renewal with certain rent levels. This is a big problem.” 
                                                 
 
140 Both districts have a tradition of having resistance movements. The majority of the cars burnt 
(see chapter 1) were in these two districts. 
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(Collaborator of an urban renewal division within a district ad-
ministration, ID 18) 
District governments could not filter the new regulations, but could only retro-
actively try to stop some of the consequences of the production and consumption 
mechanisms under Berlin’s new regulatory conditions. Since the decision made it 
impossible to interfere in rent levels, districts instead deployed designation of 
milieu protection areas and the restructuring ordinance. 
 
As Map 7.2 shows, the two district governments designated several of their 
neighbourhoods as milieu protection areas. The milieu protection area could be 
applied to any neighbourhood in danger of accelerated upgrading and forcing 
developers to apply for planning permission. This was however often only an 
administrative procedure; if it was not something extraordinary in comparison to 
the housing standards of the surrounding area, planning permission had to be 
granted anyway. The designation of neighbourhoods as milieu protection areas 
was only a retroactive policy. Districts did not apply it to areas where renovation 
had not taken place yet because they also desired modernisation of their housing 
stock. There was a fine line between their goal to improve old housing stock 
conditions and their goal to prevent tenant displacement. When they designated 
an area, the milieu protection often came too late. Since urban renewal areas had 
already been modernised to high standards, the districts had to approve planning 
permission for the modernisation of adjacent housings despite milieu protection. 
A respondent pointed to the weakness, but believed it was better than nothing: 
“The instrument of milieu protection areas is too weak. It doesn’t 
help to stop the displacement of tenants. The only thing that you 
have to do now is to ask for permission if you want to add, for 
example, a balcony or a lift in the building. Then it will be exam-
ined if tenants can afford it. But basically, it’s just a very bureau-
cratic instrument. Nevertheless, I am glad that this area here is a 
designated area.” (Collaborator of a tenant consulting service, ID 
19) 
The designation of a milieu protection area could therefore only slow down the 
general trend of revalorisation, but could not halt it. 
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Map 7.2: Milieu Protection Areas and Restructuring Ordinance Area 
 
Data set: Informationssystem Stadt und Umwelt (ISU) der Senatsverwaltung für Stad-
tentwicklung Berlin 
 
In comparison to milieu protection, the restructuring ordinance had only been 
applied once (as shown in Map 7.2). District governments could apply a restruc-
turing ordinance to specific estates that were about to be modernised. This ordi-
nance forced the developer to grant existing tenants the right to stay within the 
housing even if they could not bear the modernisation costs. It therefore directly 
interfered in the process of displacement that would otherwise happen. This 
intervention strategy was relatively strong because when applied, it actively 
shaped production mechanisms. However, the tool could only be applied once a 
modernisation process was announced. In contrast to the milieu protection area, 
the restructuring ordinance could not be deployed preemptively. Often, the inter-
vention came too late because when planning permission was not needed, the 
district was not always aware of the modernisation process. 
 
In the case where the district government applied this restructuring ordinance, 
tenants of the estate who got a modernisation notice approached the district gov-
ernment. The district government only reacted after pressure from the tenants as 
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well as the district parliament. In cases where the district government did not 
take note of the modernisation process in advance because there was no tenant 
resistance or no planning permission needed, it could not interfere in the process. 
“Often, the district finds out too late about the modernisation 
process, because modernisation outside of milieu protection and 
urban renewal areas does not need planning permission. In our 
case, the district found out because the tenants fought against the 
modernisation. Furthermore, the housing company needed plan-
ning approval because one of the blocks was under heritage pro-
tection.” (Urban planner, member of a district parliament and 
head of the district’s urban planning commission, ID 15)  
The restructuring ordinance was also limited to the existing tenants. The social 
plan that granted tenants the right to stay within the housing did not prevent the 
upgrading of other housing units. This therefore still excluded lower-income 
households from moving into the vacant housing units after modernisation. In 
cases such as, for example, the estates of the Twenties and Thirties row devel-
opments in inner city areas where there was a high degree of vacancies before 
renovation due to the deplorable condition the restructuring ordinance had only a 
temporary effect for the remaining existing tenants. These developments created 
enough demand after renovation that under the existing regulatory and produc-
tion mechanisms, an upgrading process with exclusionary displacement was in-
evitable. 
“The estate is now renovated and there is no further investment 
needed, which would drive the rents up. However, we are not 
able to prevent the area from further appreciation, not least be-
cause of the demographic structure of the tenants of the estate. 
There are many older tenants and when they die, which is inevi-
table, new tenants will move in who pay higher rents which in-
creases the standard of the estate.” (Urban planner, member of a 
district parliament and head of the district’s urban planning 
commission, ID 15) 
The analysis shows that district governments’ room for manoeuvre was limited. 
They could rarely challenge Berlin’s transformation towards a more entrepreneu-
rial mode of housing provision, because the district governments’ did not have 
the capacity to interfere in the production mechanisms of housing provision. In-
stead, districts could only try to retroactively slow down the outcomes of uneven 
production mechanisms under the particular state regulations and the market 
conditions. In contrast to Duncan and Goodwin’s (1988) analysis of councils in 
the United Kingdom, the interpretative and representational role of districts in 
Berlin is marginal due to limited regulatory means. 
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Conclusion 
 
The abandonment of supply-side subsidies for social and urban renewal housing 
analysed in this chapter distinguishes Berlin’s further transformation to a more 
entrepreneurial form of housing provision. The abandonment of subsidies for 
social housing construction and the reconfiguration of the urban renewal pro-
gramme mark the rollback of the state in favour of private investment in housing 
provision. In addition to this, Berlin’s government also reduced its influence in 
regulating rent limits and allocation. The regulatory conditions explored in this 
chapter created constraints and opportunities for housing providers, which re-
inforced the processes identified in previous chapters.  
 
The abandonment of follow-up subsidies for social housing put financial con-
straints on housing companies. Since it was not possible to raise the rent to the 
intended cost efficient levels, housing companies suffered from an income gap 
that prevented them from modernising unprofitable housing units. The analysis 
shows that housing providers were unequally affected by these conditions. 
Moreover, based on their finance and investment relations, housing providers 
employed different strategies to deal with the subsidy gap. The housing com-
panies that primarily owned social housing were most affected by the aban-
donment of social housing subsidies. State-owned housing companies and social 
housing companies, both of which still adhered to their mandate of providing 
housing for low income households, cross-subsidised it with more profitable 
housing. Value added and opportunistic investment funds, which were tied to 
their return on investment targets, divested this unprofitable type of housing or 
neglected it. The consequence was a concentration of households on welfare in 
certain housing estates.  
 
At the same time, the reconfiguration of the urban renewal programme towards 
supporting private capital investment into the renewal of the housing stock cre-
ated opportunities for investors. Private and increasingly value added investment 
funds, but also state-owned housing companies, revalorised the 19th-century 
block developments in inner city areas. With the abandonment of urban renewal 
subsidies and the deregulation of rents that came with it, regulatory constraints 
dissolved. The revalorisation process of housing with development potential was 
therefore accelerated. As a consequence, low income households were directly 
displaced or could no longer move into these areas. These processes led to 
islands of modernised housing occupied by wealthy people. 
 
 
 
211 
The analysis in this chapter underlines the argument that it is the particular cou-
pling of regulation and production mechanisms that create processes of uneven 
development. This chapter shows that state regulation influences production 
mechanisms. The mechanisms state regulation triggers are however often unin-
tended, because it does not know how particular regulations, such as the aban-
donment of supply-side subsidies play out in a specific context. Thus, the aban-
donment of supply-side subsidies affected social housing differently than urban 
renewal housing, even though the abandonment meant that both housing types 
became increasingly integrated into free market mechanisms. 
 
This chapter, and those preceding it have demonstrated that a critical realist 
examination of the uneven processes of Berlin’s provision of housing structure 
allows for a better understanding of how the three forms of reorganisation – the 
privatisation of state-owned housing, the reformation of state-owned housing 
companies, and the abandonment of supply-side housing subsidies – triggered 
mechanisms within the provision of housing structure that leads to a process of 
social and spatial inequality. The analysis went beyond a confirmation of Ber-
lin’s move towards a more entrepreneurial city within the domain of social wel-
fare provision. Moreover, the analysis shows that entrepreneurial housing provi-
sion is struggled for and takes many different forms. Exploring the contingently 
emerging production and consumption mechanisms, the analysis shows how 
these mechanisms work with and against existing and changing state regulations 
in specific market conditions. The analysis therefore provides empirical explan-
ations for how a new mode of social regulation takes place under specific condi-
tions and how it creates processes of uneven development. 
 
The following concluding chapter of the thesis, turns towards a discussion of 
what these results mean for the understanding of regulation theory, the entrepre-
neurial city, and uneven development, arguing that these theoretical approaches 
have to incorporate a more finely tuned analysis in order to explain the mecha-
nisms between a new mode of regulation such as the entrepreneurial city and the 
social and spatial inequalities it triggers. 
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8 Conclusion 
 
The Introduction to this thesis stated two aims: First, to contribute to the theoreti-
cal debate on uneven development by investigating how a particular mode of 
social regulation creates socio-spatial inequalities at the urban level. Second, to 
add to the debate of Berlin’s urban development over the last decade through an 
understanding of the city’s mode of housing provision. The question the thesis 
thus addressed was: How have the transformations of Berlin’s mode of housing 
provision generated particular spatial and social inequalities?  
 
With the purpose of researching this question, I engaged with a specific approach 
to regulation theory which is concerned with the transformation of the local state 
and its impact on spatial development. I argued that a specific mode of regulation 
comes about through crisis resolutions struggled for, and moderated by, the state. 
This crisis resolution is an ongoing process of (re-)regulation. In this sense, regu-
lation theory was not used as a means to search for an ideal type institutional fix, 
but as a tool to investigate the processes of regulatory changes. Within this ap-
proach, I argued, uneven development emerges due to tensions within and be-
tween existing distinctive local modes of social regulation, which can be identi-
fied at all spatial scales. I then defined the current historical-specific mode of 
regulation at the urban level as the entrepreneurial city. Within this context, the 
entrepreneurial city regulatory form is characterised by a transformation from 
public-led welfare provision to the prioritisation of economic growth policies 
creating social and spatial inequalities.  
 
I argued – applying a sympathetic critique towards regulation theory and the en-
trepreneurial city debate – that both, regulation theory, and on a more concrete 
level the entrepreneurial city, tend however to be over-deterministic. In doing so, 
they fail to account for the multidimensionality of the transformation process of a 
particular mode of social regulation. Through this normalisation “for the speci-
ficity of outcomes” (Massey 1984: 6), regulation theory misses, or underplays, a 
causal explanation for why and how processes of uneven development occur due 
to the particular modes of social regulation. Accordingly, in order to understand 
the processes of uneven spatial development generated through an entrepreneu-
rial mode of social regulation, I strongly argue in favour of a more specific con-
ceptualisation of possible processes. As Peck (2003: 223) states: 
“The task of theoretically informed research on state restructuring has to extend 
beyond mere reaffirmation of these received categories (or worse still, the indis-
criminate relabeling of mundane policy shifts in such terms, as if this itself con-
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stituted an ‘explanation’). Not only must the categories themselves be subject to 
critical scrutiny, but carefully formulated empirical work is required in order to 
expose underlying patterns and processes, and to generate critical cases and 
counter-cases.” (Peck 2003: 223) 
Taking up Peck’s challenge, and extending it further I used a critical realist 
methodology to “carefully formulate the empirical work”. Through a critical 
realist approach, the thesis therefore overcame a “stylized reading of processes 
like ‘deregulation, ‘privatization’, ‘neoliberalization’”, but instead investigated 
the “underlying patterns and processes” (Peck 2003: 223). A critical realist ap-
proach helped to establish coherent causal mechanisms for explaining why and 
how a particular mode of housing provision creates processes of uneven devel-
opment. 
 
The thesis therefore provides the tools to better understand the underlying pro-
cesses and relationships between the transformation of Berlin’s mode of housing 
provision and their consequences of spatial and social inequalities at particular 
points in time. Accordingly, the thesis contributes to the creation of new empiri-
cal knowledge. The thesis is however not only an empirical study of Berlin’s 
mode of housing provision; by integrating a critical realist methodology with a 
state-centred regulation theory, the thesis contributes to a re-conceptualisation of 
the entrepreneurial city and uneven development, which helps to better under-
stand how and why a specific mode of regulation negotiated through the state 
creates processes of uneven development. The way I took a critical realist posi-
tion and developed it in the particular context and practices of housing provision 
has enabled me to demonstrate unique insights into Berlin’s housing provision, 
but also – more generally – into understanding how uneven spatial development 
is produced and intertwined with state restructuring. 
 
Based on the analysis of the transformation of Berlin’s mode of housing provi-
sion, this concluding chapter revisits the theoretical concepts. Given the signifi-
cance of this conceptual innovation, the chapter discusses how a critical realist 
analysis contributes to regulation theory through a re-conceptualisation of the 
entrepreneurial city and uneven development. The chapter starts with a discus-
sion on the integration of a critical realist methodology and a state-focused ap-
proach of regulation theory (8.1). Section 8.2 discusses how this critical realist 
methodology contributes to the re-conceptualisation of the entrepreneurial city as 
a starting rather than an end point of research. The section further illustrates why 
this re-conceptualisation contributes to a better understanding of state restructur-
ing and its uneven consequences. Section 8.3 reflects on the re-conceptualisation 
of uneven development as a process instead of an outcome, discussing its impact 
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beyond this thesis. In a further section (8.4), the chapter discusses the empirical 
contributions of the thesis, emphasising how the conceptual innovation contri-
buted to a better understanding of the regulatory changes of Berlin’s mode of 
housing provision. The final section of the chapter (8.5) points to some of the 
research gaps revealed and discusses possible leads for further research. 
 
8.1 Regulation Theory, the Role of the State, and Spatial Division of Labour 
 
In the Introduction to the thesis I argued that a state-focused approach to regula-
tion theory proves to be most useful to understand regulatory changes at the local 
scale due to its theorisation of the state through which local modes of social regu-
lation are negotiated and moderated. Moreover, the more concrete concept of the 
entrepreneurial city helped to identify regulatory changes in the mode of housing 
provision focusing on the role of the state. At the same time, I rejected Massey’s 
(1984) concept of spatial division of labour for understanding the transformation 
of Berlin’s mode of housing provision and the uneven development as a starting 
point. I argued that the spatial division of labour underemphasises the role of the 
state. Later, it was stated that Peck and Tickell (1995: 26 et seq.) argue for an 
integration of Massey’s (1984) concept of spatial division of labour in order to 
integrate sub-national economic spaces into the analysis. In doing so, Peck and 
Tickell (1995: 26 et seq.) state that regulation theory can take account of the 
local state as a necessary product of the division of capitalist production systems 
and its uneven development. This line of argument does however, as shown, not 
entirely solve the problem of an overly deterministic conceptualisation of uneven 
development as an outcome and does not account for the processes of how un-
even development emerges. 
 
Here I argue that regulation theory is a valid starting point for understanding pro-
cesses of regulatory changes. However, instead of a stylised integration of 
Massey’s concept of spatial division of labour as proposed by Peck and Tickell 
(1995: 26 et seq.), it is Massey’s critical realist thinking, and more specifically 
her critical realist methodology, which should be integrated into a regulation 
theory based analysis. While regulation theory claims to be based on realist on-
tology (Jessop 1990a), research by regulation theorists has rarely been taken far 
enough to integrate realism as a methodological approach. It is thus here, where 
critical realism makes the most valid contribution to regulation theory. A critical 
realist approach to regulation theory minimises the shortcoming of the overly 
deterministic conceptualisations of entrepreneurial city and uneven development 
(see below 8.2 and 8.3).  
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Using a critical realist methodology, the thesis is thus close to Massey’s (1984; 
Massey and Meegan 1982) conceptualisation of uneven development.141 Massey 
and Meegan (1982) argue in their investigation of the unevenness of job loss in 
different sectors of the British economy during the early 1970s that the particular 
causal mechanism for job loss, such as technical changes or rationalisation, gen-
erated different spatial outcomes. Thus, it is the particular way the companies 
worked and their effect on the existing environment that defines the uneven de-
velopment process. In contrast to Massey and Meegan (1982), this thesis how-
ever integrates critical realist methodology with regulation theory’s specific 
focus on state restructuring. Moreover, the thesis explores the particularities of 
the housing provision and its uneven development process, therefore investigat-
ing a specific sector and its impact on the built environment. 
 
The following two sections re-examine the concepts of entrepreneurial city and 
uneven development, explaining how critical realism contributes to a better 
understanding of how and why a particular mode of regulation creates processes 
of uneven development. Critical realism as a methodology (see Pratt 1994) con-
tributes to regulation theory and the entrepreneurial city debate respectively, and 
their conceptualisation of uneven development: First, realism addresses the issue 
of scale by shifting from abstract to concrete and from concrete to abstract. It 
therefore avoids an overly deterministic analysis of a particular mode of social 
regulation without falling into the trap of empirical particularities. Second, 
realism shifts from an understanding of uneven development as the outcome of 
different modes of local regulations to an open understanding of uneven devel-
opment as continuous and continuing processes. 
 
8.2 The Entrepreneurial City Re-examined 
 
Based on the review of the theoretical literature (see chapter 2) on the entrepre-
neurial form of urban governance, I defined the concept of the entrepreneurial 
city according to three characteristics. First, the local state’s emphasis on eco-
nomic growth oriented policies coupled with a withdrawal from the sphere of 
welfare provision; second, the institutional transformation from state-directed to 
private-led policy formulation and implementation; and third, the increasing 
socio-spatial inequality as a consequence of the transformation. This conceptuali-
sation of the entrepreneurial city is useful in identifying current regulatory chan-
ges at the urban scale. The changing priorities from welfare to economic devel-
                                                 
 
141 While she mostly avoids the realist language in her best-known work ‘Spatial Division of 
Labour’ (Massey 1984), she clearly adheres to a realist approach and explicitly does so in her 
earlier work, such as the ‘Anatomy of Job Loss’ (Massey and Meegan 1982). 
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opment can also be observed in the domain of housing provision. With regards to 
the provision of housing, urban entrepreneurialism is understood as a withdrawal 
from public-led housing provision such as the privatisation of state-owned hous-
ing. At the same time, an entrepreneurial form of housing provision aims to at-
tract private investment through growth oriented policies such as tax incentives. 
The consequences of a more entrepreneurial form of housing provision are ex-
clusionary spaces for the rich, in form of gentrified or gated neighbourhoods and 
increased socio-spatial inequalities. 
 
However, as pointed out in chapter 2, this conceptualisation of the entrepreneu-
rial city does not account for the multidimensionality of causal mechanisms trig-
gered by a transformation of the mode of housing provision. Moreover, I chal-
lenged the usefulness of the entrepreneurial city concept to understand the pro-
cesses of uneven development because the concept hides too many differentiat-
ing causal mechanisms under one umbrella. In this sense, the concept of entre-
preneurial city remains ‘chaotic’ (see Sayer 1992: 138 et seq.) because it has no 
“coherent relation to causality” (Massey and Meegan 1982: 9). This is especially 
problematic when trying to explain the why and how of uneven development. As 
Allen (1987: 235) indicates, “’chaotic’ conceptions are not intrinsically bad; they 
are only inadequate if they represent the end product of an analysis rather than 
the starting point.” Instead of reproducing these chaotic concepts, it is however 
necessary to construct “a more rigorous conception” of the particular forms in 
which the concept such as that of the entrepreneurial city can play out in practice.  
 
The thesis achieved this more rigorous conception with a two-step approach. 
First, I used the concept of the entrepreneurial city not as an end point for ex-
plaining socio-spatial inequalities, but as a starting point to identify processes of 
re-regulation of Berlin’s mode of housing provision. Second, based on critical 
realism I applied a rational abstraction (see Sayer 1992: 138 et seq.) of causal 
relations within the processes of housing re-regulation. Informed by realist stud-
ies of housing, I abstracted causally coherent analytical categories under the ban-
ners of production, regulation, and consumption of housing.  
 
I defined production relations as the finance, investment, management, and ex-
change strategies that emerge through different types of housing providers. The 
analysis revealed that the key to understand production relations was the finance-
investment relation, meaning that the particular type of finance determined the 
way housing providers invested, but also how they managed and exchanged the 
housing.  
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These production relations are however influenced by housing regulation and 
consumption relations. I abstracted housing regulation as constraining or enab-
ling rights to develop, maintain, exchange, and use housing. I further concep-
tualised consumption relations as the aggregate demand of users based on their 
income and their household structure. The production, regulation, and consump-
tion relations interact with each other, building the provision of housing structure. 
This rational abstraction provided the necessary tools to reveal the uneven 
mechanisms that are taking place. 
 
The emphasis of the thesis clearly based on the understanding of the production 
relations under the regulatory conditions they operated. I argued that the produc-
tion and regulation relations were the key to understand the uneven mechanisms 
of the mode of housing provision. Through the empirically grounded analysis 
three different types of production mechanisms were identified. The value added 
investment fund, the opportunistic investment fund, and the state-owned housing 
companies. The particular way these three types of housing providers played out 
in relation to regulation and consumption mechanisms uncovered the uneven 
causal processes of a more entrepreneurial form of housing provision. 
 
This two step approach contributes not only to a better understanding of the 
multidimensionality of entrepreneurial forms of urban governance, but also the 
uneven mechanisms of a particular mode of regulation within the housing sector. 
The following section shows in more detail how this innovative conceptuali-
sation contributed to a better understanding of the re-regulation of Berlin’s hous-
ing provision and its uneven consequences. 
 
Revealing the uneven mechanisms beyond the entrepreneurial city 
 
Derived from the conceptualisation of an entrepreneurial mode of housing provi-
sion, the analysis of the transformation of Berlin’s mode of housing provision 
identified three processes of re-regulation: First, the privatisation of state-owned 
housing and the entrance of institutional investment; second, the reformation of 
the remaining state-owned housing companies and the newly integrated eco-
nomic goals into their finance relations; third, the abandonment of supply-side 
subsidies for the construction and renewal of housing and the deregulation of rent 
and allocation rules. The detailed investigation of the three processes revealed a 
multitude of mechanisms underpinning the argument that it is not the more en-
trepreneurial form of housing provision per se, which creates the social and spa-
tial inequalities. Instead, it is the way the housing production and consumption 
plays out under the specific regulatory conditions, creating intended and unin-
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tended consequences. It is only through the rational abstraction of the particular 
mode of housing provision that these intended and unintended consequences of 
the processes of re-regulation could be revealed. By this, the analysis yielded 
new empirical knowledge that is above and beyond what previous conceptualisa-
tions afforded. The three processes of re-regulation are briefly recaptured in 
order to illustrate how the empirical analysis exposed the uneven mechanisms. 
 
First, the government privatised state-owned housing in a particular way, which 
facilitated the entrance of institutional investment in Berlin’s housing market. 
The en bloc privatisation excluded small-scale investors or home ownership. It is 
therefore not the privatisation process nor the entrance of institutional investment 
that creates social and spatial inequalities – as argued by the entrepreneurial city 
debate but the diverging ways in which the privatisation process plays out. This 
type of analysis further challenges the normalised conceptualisations of privatisa-
tion and of institutional investment. Privatisation of housing in this case took a 
particular form that contrasts from other forms of housing privatisation such as 
the increase of owner-occupied housing. Institutional investment, in turn, is often 
insufficiently abstracted under the concept of international financial capital. Insti-
tutional investors follow diverging strategies, which are defined through their 
finance relations. Value added investment funds operate differently from oppor-
tunistic investment funds, due to their differing return and risk strategies. In order 
to understand the uneven mechanisms, it is therefore important to differentiate 
between diverging finance-investment relations of private-led housing provision 
and how they play out under different regulatory and market conditions.   
 
Second, the particular way through which the state integrated economic goals 
into the guiding principles for state-owned housing companies created a specific 
hybrid form of state- and market-led housing provision. This uncovered mecha-
nisms, which go beyond the old dualism of state versus market-led housing pro-
vision and showed how complex the inter-linkage between the two spheres is. 
The particular integration of market mechanisms into state-led housing did not 
turn state-owned housing companies into private investors, but created particular 
mechanisms between economic profit-orientation and adhering to social goals 
such as the provision of housing for low income households dictated by the gov-
ernment. The analysis of state-owned housing companies further pointed to dif-
fering mechanisms within the state-led form of housing provision. While adher-
ing to the same finance mechanisms dictated by Berlin’s government, the histori-
cal development of the different state-owned housing companies generates di-
verging pathways. The analysis shows that the conceptual model (see chapter 3) 
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underemphasised the explanatory relations for these diverging pathways (see also 
section 8.5 below). 
 
Third, the abandonment of supply-side subsidies for the construction and renewal 
of housing coupled with the deregulation of rent and allocation rules reinforced 
the previously established mechanisms. It showed that regulatory changes consti-
tute opportunities or constraints for the different institutional investors and the 
state-owned housing companies, affecting the different market segments un-
equally. This shows that an increasing lack of affordable housing and the process 
of gentrification are not only due to the particular production mechanisms, but 
also a result of the particular regulatory regime. 
 
The detailed analysis of the three processes challenged the normative notion of 
market versus state-led housing provision referred to in the entrepreneurial city 
debate. The analysis exposed a complex transformation of the old dualism be-
tween the state and the private sphere. Berlin’s mode of housing provision is not 
a mere change from a state-led to a private-led housing provision. The particular 
way of the transformation created hybrid forms of housing provision. The boun-
daries between private and state-led housing are therefore blurred. Moreover, 
neither the private nor the state can be regarded as a coherent entity. Private-led 
housing provision takes diverse forms, depending on the specific finance mecha-
nism of the private housing provider. The same is true for state-led housing pro-
vision. Thus, the analysis shows that a dualistic distinction between the state and 
the private domain needs to be abandoned in favour of a more complex analysis, 
which accounts for the causal mechanisms between regulation, production, and 
consumption.  
 
These specific uneven mechanisms of Berlin’s mode of housing provision ex-
posed through a method of rational abstraction not only challenged the concept 
of the entrepreneurial city as an explanation for socio-spatial inequalities. The 
rational abstraction also contributes to a re-conceptualisation of uneven devel-
opment as a process instead of an outcome. The following section reflects on this 
re-conceptualisation of uneven development, addressing its impact, which goes 
beyond the particularities of this thesis. 
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8.3 Uneven Development Reviewed 
 
The critical realist analysis of the transformation of Berlin’s mode of housing 
provision also extends regulation theorists’ conceptualisation of uneven devel-
opment. Following specific regulation theorists (see chapter 2), I stated that un-
even development is the spatial outcome of the temporary coupling between the 
regime of accumulation and the mode of regulation in a capitalist system. More-
over, uneven development emerges from “different regulatory functions” (Peck 
and Tickell 1995: 27), which are located at different scales. The distinctive local 
modes of social regulation therefore create an uneven development which is re-
inforced by the local state’s autonomy as a regulatory agent who orchestrates 
uneven development. This conceptualisation, I argued, is however not able to 
take into account uneven development at the local scale where regulatory differ-
ences no longer play a significant role. The thesis therefore sought a re-
conceptualisation of uneven development as process instead of outcome. This re-
conceptualisation, again, came about through the critical realist methodology 
applied. 
 
The causal processes that arise from the particular way the different finance and 
investment relations of housing providers play out in practice are inherently un-
even. From this realist analysis of Berlin’s mode of housing provision follows 
that uneven development is not a mere consequence of the mode of social regula-
tion at a particular scale. Instead, it is the diverging finance strategies of value 
added funds, opportunistic funds, and state-owned housing companies that create 
processes of uneven development. Due to their particular finance strategy, the 
different housing providers follow diverging and uneven investment, manage-
ment, and exchange strategies. The uncovering of these mechanisms goes beyond 
an affirmation of different modes of social regulation, therefore achieving a 
higher level of understanding of the ongoing processes between regulation, pro-
duction and consumption. 
 
The analysis thus exposed the distinctive finance and investment relations the 
three identified housing providers have. Value added investment funds’ profit 
strategy is based on the modernisation of housing. They invest therefore only in 
the housing stock, which they believe has development potential for making 
profit through higher rent levels. They however abandon the unprofitable hous-
ing stock. Opportunistic investment funds have a high-risk strategy making profit 
through financial leveraging. They therefore buy often-unprofitable housing 
cheaply and try to re-sell it at a higher price. State-owned housing companies 
adhere to a wide range of housing types in their portfolio due to hybrid economic 
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and social goals. They however prioritise investment in the housing where they 
see possibilities for increasing rent levels. 
 
It is these diverging production mechanisms, emerging through the different 
types of housing providers that create processes of uneven development. These 
uneven finance and investment processes manifest themselves in the increasing 
social and spatial inequality of Berlin’s housing provision. However, the pro-
cesses of uneven development lead not to a final outcome, or spatial-fix, but are 
continuously reshaped. During the period of investigation, the mode of housing 
provision continued to be transformed through further regulatory changes such as 
the shift from state subsidies for housing to public infrastructure. Moreover, the 
market conditions were drastically changing because of the global financial crisis. 
It is these contingent relations, which continue to shift processes of uneven de-
velopment. The social and spatial inequalities are therefore always only provi-
sional (see Pratt 1994: 4). The reasons as to why particular providers invest and 
the processes of how and where they invest are therefore crucial for understand-
ing the processes of uneven development. This raises a final question of how 
much the characteristics of a place – the spatial, physical, institutional, and social 
predispositions as described in chapter 4 – matters for an explanation of uneven 
development. 
 
Understanding spatial relations beyond the characteristics of a neighbourhood 
 
Chapter 4 argued that the uneven spatial, physical, institutional, and social con-
text of the neighbourhood matters in order to understand subsequent processes of 
uneven development. Through a realist analysis, the thesis showed that the par-
ticular characteristics of a place – a neighbourhood – are however not enough to 
understand uneven development. It is the particular way, I argue, in which the 
different housing providers use these characteristics that create processes of un-
even development. The characteristics of the neighbourhood matter only to the 
extent that they depend on the type of production mechanism that create invest-
ment or disinvestment in the particular type of housing (see also Massey and 
Meegan 1982: 123 et seq.).  
 
The thesis thus confirmed that ‘space matters’ in the analysis of a particular 
mode of social regulation. More importantly, through developing the realist posi-
tion in the context of housing provision, the thesis showed how space matters. 
The under-maintained old neighbourhoods of the 19th-century block develop-
ments in the inner city are not just invested in because there is a rent gap. It is the 
particular way value added investment funds, and similarly the state-owned 
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housing companies, create profit through investing in this type of housing. At the 
same time, prefabricated high-rise housing estates from the 1970s are getting 
neglected due to the opportunistic investment funds’ finance strategy to buy 
cheap and make profit on the exchange value. Opportunistic investment funds 
therefore poorly manage and maintain the neighbourhoods of high-rise housing 
estates. 
 
The features of a particular place such as the spatial, physical, institutional, and 
social context of a neighbourhood have therefore only “effects via the particular 
objects, with causal powers, that constitute it” (Pratt 2004: 249). Spatial relations 
cannot be reduced to the characteristics of a place, but need to be examined with 
regards to how these characteristics are used by the housing providers and their 
financial mechanisms. The thesis uncovered the production mechanisms of hous-
ing not only in their abstract form, but investigated these mechanisms in relation 
to the particular conditions of the different neighbourhoods. This allowed for an 
in-depth understanding of how processes of uneven development play out spa-
tially (see Pratt 2004: 249). 
 
Logically, a further step of analysis is the question of how the different neigh-
bourhoods shape the uneven processes. Extending on Massey’s (1984: 242) point 
that “[…] geographical differentiation, distance and locational mobility them-
selves moulded, sometimes even enabled, the social and economic changes 
which took place” the question of the autonomy of localities argued for by Dun-
can and Goodwin (1988; see also Goodwin et al. 1993) becomes a more central 
focus to the analysis. The thesis made a start in this direction by investigating the 
role of particular district administrations in shaping the mode of housing provi-
sion. An exploration of the housing consumers as agents in orchestrating this 
process could be a further step in this direction (see also section 8.5 below). 
Through the critical realist model, the thesis provided the necessary tools for 
such an analysis. 
 
The re-conceptualisation of the current mode of social regulation and uneven 
development as the particular processes taking place through objects and their 
causal relations has consequences on the understanding of the debate of Berlin’s 
urban development between an entrepreneurial way and possible alternatives. 
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8.4 Berlin’s Urban Development Revisited 
 
There is a lively debate among scholars on the way Berlin has been developing 
since reunification (see chapter 1). Some scholars (see, for example, Cochrane 
and Jonas 1999; Bernt and Holm 2009) claim that Berlin’s urban development 
takes up a neoliberal pathway and follows other cities in its quest for economic 
competitiveness. Others (see, for example, Latham 2006a; Colomb 2007) point 
to the alternative pathways that are sought out. They emphasise Berlin as the 
place for alternative living strategies, and political resistance. In this sense, the 
analysis of the transformations of Berlin’s mode of housing provision could have 
been interpreted as a neoliberal or entrepreneurial turn creating more inequalities. 
An analytical focus on resistance towards the transformations in the housing pro-
vision could however have possibly revealed alternative pathways. 
 
Thus, the argument I make here, based on the approach developed and findings 
exposed in this thesis, is that in order to understand Berlin’s urban development, 
it is not a matter of reconfirming the neoliberal or alternative pathway Berlin 
might have taken or will take. It is the way the particular mode of social regula-
tion plays out in practice, the why and how of a particular form of urban govern-
ance that is important. Re-conceptualising the way in which the transformation of 
a local mode of social regulation is analysed by taking the concept of the entre-
preneurial city as the start and not the end point, the thesis went beyond the 
dualistic view of entrepreneurial city versus alternative urban development 
model and explains how a particular mode of housing provision plays out in 
practice. The debate of whether Berlin converges with the neoliberal urban 
model or takes alternative pathways is thus not particularly useful since one al-
ways finds stylised confirmation for one or the other.  
 
Based on the findings of the research done in this thesis, I argue therefore that 
research on Berlin’s urban development – and, of course, urban development 
more generally – should focus less on reconfirming neoliberal strategies or po-
litical alternatives, but on how these strategies play out under the particular cir-
cumstances. Research thus needs to address not only the theoretical abstraction 
of causally coherent concepts, but also needs to investigate the particularities of 
these concepts under the specific contingent conditions (see Pratt 2004: 249). 
This means an analysis of Berlin’s urban development needs to investigate the 
necessary relations of the object studied – as in this thesis’ case the production, 
consumption and regulation of the provision of housing structure – and how 
these relations play out under specific temporal and spatial conditions. This the-
sis showed how such an approach contributes to a better understanding of ongo-
ing processes of urban development. 
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This thesis’ innovative approach to conceptually link regulation theory, the en-
trepreneurial city and critical realism, and empirically investigate Berlin’s mode 
of housing provision produced new empirical knowledge and provided the con-
ceptual tools to understand the role of urban governance in producing processes 
of uneven development. The last section discusses how, based on the empirical 
findings, research should be taken further. 
 
8.5 Further Research 
 
The thesis’ findings point to a conceptual and an empirical gap, which should be 
further addressed. These gaps were underemphasised in the study due to the par-
ticular aims and design of it, but will be discussed in this final section of this 
concluding chapter. First, as already suggested, the role of housing consumption 
was not a key focus of the research and therefore deserves further attention in 
future research on the uneven mechanisms of housing provision. Consumption 
relations therefore need further conceptualisation with regards to the causal pro-
cesses within the structure of housing provision.  
 
Second, the investigation of Berlin’s mode of housing provision revealed not 
only the uneven mechanisms of institutional investment, but of the state-owned 
housing companies themselves. The causal relations for these mechanisms were 
however underemphasised by my conceptual model of the provision of housing 
structure due to the entrepreneurial city’s debate on housing privatisation and my 
focus on the causal mechanisms of institutional investors. Further research 
should therefore take a closer look at causal mechanisms of state-owned housing 
companies, but possibly also at causal mechanisms of other housing providers 
such as housing associations.  
 
Conceptualising the role of housing consumption 
 
The role of consumption was conceptually underdeveloped in this thesis. I ar-
gued that consumption is shaped through the particular production and regulation 
relations. Consumption therefore plays only a subordinate role for understanding 
processes of uneven spatial development. This conceptual underdevelopment 
resulted in an underemphasis of the influence of consumption and the increasing 
and decreasing demand of different types of households; it raises the question of 
what role the demand side of housing plays within the provision of housing 
structure and its uneven mechanisms. For a better understanding of the role con-
sumption plays within the processes of uneven development, “well-developed 
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conceptual models of this complex realm, and its influence on forms of housing 
provision, have yet to be developed” (Lawson 2006: 75).  
 
Lawson (2006: 76) mentions labour and welfare relations as possible leads to 
investigate the bargaining power of households in a specific housing market. The 
strand of literature on the consumption-oriented explanations of gentrification 
processes (Lees et al. 2008) might point to further leads, such as the political 
culture of consumers, gender relations, tastes, and lifestyles. Questions such as 
how particular groups’ consumption strategies create uneven mechanisms and 
influence the mode of housing provision should therefore be addressed in more 
detail. 
 
Investigating the uneven mechanisms of state-owned housing 
 
Extending on the literature of the entrepreneurial city, which focuses on the 
transformation from a state-led to a private-led mode of housing provision and its 
consequences of social and spatial inequalities, the thesis focused on the investi-
gation of the differentiated mechanisms of private-led housing provision, and 
more concretely on the entrance of institutional investment which took place due 
to the particular way Berlin’s government privatised its housing stock. Moreover, 
the realist literature on housing (Ball 1990; Lawson 2006) emphasises the fi-
nance and investment relations as the key to understand different modes of hous-
ing provision. The thesis focus rested therefore on the different financial mecha-
nisms of institutional investment taking place in Berlin and their uneven invest-
ment, management, and exchange strategies. 
 
However, during the course of the research, the question arose why there are 
strategic differences between state-owned housing companies despite operating 
under the same finance relations defined by Berlin’s government. The differ-
ences found, especially with regards to their social engagement, suggested that 
other types of relations, such as the organisational structure might also play a role 
in explaining different investment, management, and exchange strategies. The 
focus on finance relations did not seem sufficient to understand the different 
strategies state-owned housing companies chose to follow. 
 
The thesis has preliminarily argued that the differing historical development of 
the state-owned housing companies and the specific portfolio they inherited 
through this historical development accounts for the distinctive mechanisms ob-
served. The three state-owned housing companies, which were under scrutiny, 
might have been insufficiently differentiated to understand the relations which 
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create the different strategies. Future research on the role of state-owned housing 
in the uneven development of the provision of housing structure should therefore 
address the question of whether there are other necessary relations, besides the 
finance-investment ones, that influence the particular mode of housing provision. 
 
Conclusion 
 
This thesis confirmed that the restructuring of Berlin’s mode of housing provi-
sion involved a turn towards market-oriented housing provision creating socio-
spatial inequalities. However, in contrast to previous accounts of state restructur-
ing, the thesis’ critical realist methodology to investigate the entrepreneurial city 
and uneven development contributed to a more rigorous understanding of how 
and why state restructuring fosters uneven mechanisms, which in turn create 
social and spatial processes of uneven development. 
 
The thesis constructed a rigorous empirical evidence base of Berlin’s mode of 
housing provision and its impact on the city’s urban development. Moreover, the 
way the thesis integrated and developed the specific regulation theory, the entre-
preneurial city, and critical realism contributed to conceptual innovations. The 
entrepreneurial city as the current form of mode of regulation, I argued, is a start-
ing point for understanding state restructuring, but not the end point for explain-
ing how and why socio-spatial inequalities are created. Developing a conceptual 
model within the specific sector of housing, through rational abstraction, the the-
sis exposed the causal mechanisms and its uneven consequences that emerged 
from the re-regulation of a particular mode of housing provision. This allowed 
for a better understanding of the multiple dimensions of the particular form of 
urban governance. Moreover, it provided a way of re-conceptualising uneven 
development as a process within a specific regulatory mode rather than an out-
come of different regulatory modes. 
 
Following on from these conceptual contributions and empirical knowledge, the 
thesis has implications on two levels; one regarding future research on urban 
governance and the other on the politics of housing. First, it reassesses the way 
urban governance, and in particular urban housing provision, is researched. It 
provides conceptual tools for a more rigorous analysis of state restructuring and 
its uneven consequences. Moreover, the thesis proposes a particular conceptual 
model for theoretically informed research on the causal mechanisms of housing 
provision and its uneven consequences. Second, a better understanding of the 
intended and unintended consequences of Berlin’s particular mode of housing 
provision exposed through this research allows for a reassessment of the impact 
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of state restructuring. The thesis therefore provides not only new conceptual and 
empirical knowledge for researchers, but also delivers important insights to pol-
icy makers on how Berlin’s housing provision, and more specifically, the par-
ticular regulations negotiated and moderated through the state, contribute to un-
even development. 
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Appendix 1 Interview List 
 
ID Position Date 
Administration of Berlin Government 
5 Employee of the Senate Department for Urban Development 25.6.09 
Administration of District Governments 
15 
Urban planner who is also a member of a district parliament and head of the dis-
trict’s urban planning commission 
15.5.09 
11 District councillor and his collaborator for urban development 10.6.09 
17 Deputy head and his collaborator of a district housing administration 2.6.09 
18 
Head and his collaborator of an urban renewal division within a district administra-
tion 
8.6.09 
22 District councillor for social welfare, housing and environment 10.6.09 
Private Housing Companies and Investors 
12 Chief financial officer and his portfolio manager of a private housing company 20.7.09 
7 Principal of an investment firm 17.6.09 
16 Director of a real estate fund at a bank 12.8.09 
13 
Former project manager for the development of a housing estate employed by an 
asset management company 
18.6.09 
23 Head of public relations of a private housing company 
13.5. 
09 
30 Managing director of a property management firm 21.7.09  
Social Housing Company 
25 Division manager and his collaborator of a social housing company 10.7.09 
State-owned Housing Companies 
24 
Head and his deputy of a customer service centre for a state-owned housing 
company 
24.6.09 
20 Technical project manager of a state-owned housing company 7.7.09 
28 Managing director of a state-owned housing company 14.7.09 
Tenant Associations and Urban Development Consultants 
6 Deputy managing director of an umbrella tenant organisation 11.6.09 
19 Collaborator of a tenant consulting service 2.6.09 
21 Two collaborators of a tenant consulting service 16.7.09 
14 Two collaborators of a tenant consulting service 29.5.09 
27 District head of a tenant association 29.6.09 
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29 Project director of a neighbourhood management team 23.7.09  
26 Project director of neighbourhood management team 12.5.09  
Umbrella Organisations for Housing and Urban Development 
9 Spokesman for an umbrella organisation for housing companies 1.7.09 
8 Deputy managing director of an association for housing and urban development 22.7.09 
Housing Experts 
1 Professor for Urban Renewal and Urban Redevelopment, University of Kassel 9.1.09 
2 Managing director of a research institute for housing and urban development 6.1.09 
3 Lecturer for Urban Planning, University of Cottbus 6.1.09 
4 Visiting Professor for Urban Renewal, University of Cottbus 7.1.09 
10 Managing directors of a consulting firm 2.6.09 
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Appendix 2 Interview Guideline (German) 
 
Interviewleitfaden 
 
Einleitung 
 
Vielen Dank, dass Sie sich die Zeit nehmen für dieses Gespräch. Wie ich bereits in meiner Email 
angekündigt habe, mache ich eine Doktorarbeit zum Thema Wohnungsversorgung in Berlin. 
Dabei bin ich besonders daran interessiert, die Veränderungen der Wohnungsersorgung in den 
letzten zehn Jahren besser zu verstehen. Ich hoffe deshalb, dass Sie mir dabei behilflich sein 
können. 
 
Vier Aspekte sind mir dabei besonders wichtig. Der Prozess der Privatisierung, die Interessen 
privater Investoren, die Strategien der kommunalen Wohnungsbaugesellschaften und die Rolle 
des Staates, der Stadt Berlin wie auch der Bezirke. Dies ist jedoch  ein Gespräch und soll keine 
Umfrage sein, deshalb bitte ich Sie, Aspekte, die Sie für wichtig erachten, einzubringen. 
 
Dürfte ich dieses Gespräch aufnehmen? Dies dient vor allem mir, damit ich dem Gespräch besser 
folgen kann und mir nicht die Hand wund schreibe. Das Gespräch bleibt natürlich anonym. 
 
Vielleicht können Sie, bevor wir mit der ersten Frage beginnen, kurz Ihre Organisation und Ihre 
Arbeit beschreiben. 
 
Dann lassen Sie uns mit der ersten Einstiegsfrage beginnen: 
1. Was erachten Sie als größte Veränderung der Berliner Wohnungsversorgung in den 
letzten zehn Jahren? Vielleicht können Sie zwei drei Aspekte erläutern. 
 
 
Privatisierung / Internationalisierung 
Das bringt uns zur Frage der Privatisierungen kommunaler Wohnungsbaugesellschaften, respek-
tive dem kontinuierlichen Rückzug der Stadt aus der Wohnungsversorgung. 
 
2. Was sind aus Ihrer Sicht die Chancen und Risiken des Verkaufs der kommunalen Woh-
nungs-baugesellschaften an private Investoren? 
• Gibt es Unterschiede zwischen internationalen Investoren und lokalen Investoren? 
- Mehr Druck auf den Wohnungsmarkt? 
- Höhere Mieten? 
- Erhöhte Segregation der Bewohner? 
• Welche Konsequenzen sehen Sie für Ihre Organisation / für die verbliebenen kommuna-
len Wohnungsbaugesellschaften? 
• Sind gewisse Bezirke/Ortschaften stärker/anders von den Konsequenzen betroffen? 
 
3. Was waren die Umstände für die Privatisierung der Wohnungsbaugesellschaften? 
• Weshalb wurde privatisiert? 
• Zu welchen Bedingungen? Wie sahen die Verträge aus, gab es da große Unterschiede 
zwischen den Verkaufsverträgen? 
• Wie verpflichtend sind die Verträge? 
• Und wie wird die Einhaltung überprüft und gewährleistet? 
 
 
Wohnungsbaugesellschaften und deren Investoren (Privat und Stadt) 
Die drei wichtigsten Akteure in der Wohnungsversorgung sind die Wohnungsbaugesellschaften, 
die privaten Investoren und die Stadt, einerseits als Investoren andererseits als Regulator. Lassen 
Sie uns mit den Investoren und den Wohnungsbaugesellschaften beginnen. 
 
4. Was sind in Ihren Augen die Interessen der Investoren, in Berlin zu investieren? 
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• Was sind die Strategien der privaten Investoren? (Umwandlung in Eigentumswohnun-
gen, Weiterverkauf von Portfolios, Erhöhung der Mieten durch Modernisierung, Einspa-
rung der Kosten, Exit-Strategien?) 
• Was sind die Investitionskriterien? Weshalb wird in ein spezielles Objekt investiert? 
• Wo wird investiert? Gibt es Präferenzen / Kriterien bei der Lage? 
• Haben Politikinstrumente wie Steuererleichterungen/Fördermittel Einfluss auf die Inve-
stitionsstrategie? (Im Sinne, es wird nur da investiert, wo man Fördergelder erhält) 
• Gibt es gewisse staatliche Hinderungsgründe für die Investition? 
• Stimmen die staatlichen Interessen mit den privaten überein? 
(Frage 4 muss für die kommunalen Wohnungsbaugesellschaften etwas geändert werden: zum 
Beispiel muss das Thema der Wohnberechtigung angesprochen werden, die zu erfüllenden Quo-
ten.) 
 
5. Wie beeinflusst die Eigentümerstruktur der Wohnungsbaugesellschaft die Strategie der 
Gesellschaft? (Hier muss je nach Interviewpartner die Frage geändert werden: Wie beeinflusst 
die Eigentümerstruktur Ihr Machen und Tun?) 
• Was ist die Eigentümerstruktur? 
• Gab es Strategieänderungen nach der Privatisierung(swelle)? 
• Hat sich die Geschäftstätigkeit seither verändert? 
 
 
Modernisierung 
Die Wohnsiedlung wurde vor einigen Jahren modernisiert. Lassen Sie uns ein wenig über diesen 
Prozess sprechen. 
 
6. Weshalb wurde die Siedlung modernisiert? 
• Was wurde genau renoviert/modernisiert? War es eine Luxusrenovierung? 
• Wie wurde die Modernisierung finanziert? 
• Gab es Subventionen? Wurden die in Anspruch genommen? Zu welchen Bedingungen? 
• Gab es Opposition von der Bewohnerschaft? Wie wurde damit umgegangen? 
 
7. Was waren die Konsequenzen der Modernisierung? 
• Wie hat sich die Miete entwickelt? 
• Wie hat sich die Mieterstruktur entwickelt? 
 
 
Konsequenzen für die Wohnungsnachfrage 
Wir haben bis anhin vor allem über die Angebotsseite der Wohnungsversorgung gesprochen. Ich 
möchte Ihnen noch zwei Fragen zur Nachfrageseite stellen. 
 
8. Was sind die Chancen / Risiken des Privatisierungsprozesses für die Bewohner? 
• Gab es Veränderungen in der Unterhaltung/Bewirtschaftung der Wohnungen? 
• Hat sich die Mieterstruktur nach der Privatisierung verändert? Weshalb? 
 
Sie haben zu Beginn angesprochen, dass sich die Belegungs- und Mietregelungen ebenfalls ver-
ändert haben. 
9. Was sind die Chancen / Risiken der Aufgabe der Belegungsbindungen in einigen Wohn-
siedlungen für die Bewohner? 
• Ist dieses Projekt von diesen neuen Regelungen betroffen? 
 
 
Die Rolle des Staates 
Der letzte Aspekt, den ich diskutieren möchte, ist die Rolle des Staates. Wir haben bereits die 
Rolle des Staates als Wohnungsversorger diskutiert als wir über den Privatisierungs- und Mo-
dernisierungsprozess gesprochen haben. Hier möchte ich die Rolle des Staates im Umgang mit 
den Konsequenzen der Privatisierung wie wir sie oben diskutiert haben, ansprechen – also zum 
Beispiel eben die erhöhte soziale Segregation. Auf der einen Seite gibt es gewisse politische In-
strumente, wie die Festlegung von Sanierungsgebieten, welche die Modernisierung des Woh-
nungsbestandes fördert und gleichzeitig die Bewohnerschaft vor unbezahlbaren Mieten schützen 
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soll. Auf der anderen Seite gibt es informelle Wege, um mit dem erhöhten Druck auf die Mieter-
struktur umzugehen. 
 
10. Was für eine Bedeutung haben Ihrer Meinung nach diese politischen oder informellen 
Instrumente? 
• Können diese Instrumente etwas auswirken? 
• Was sind die Möglichkeiten / Einschränkungen der Regierung? 
 
11. Verfolgen die Bezirksregierungen eine andere Strategie als die Landesregierung im 
Umgang mit den Veränderungen in der Wohnungsversorgung? 
• Gibt es da gewisse Spannungen zwischen den Regierungsebenen? 
• Welche Rolle spielt der Bezirk im Prozess der Wohnungsprivatisierung? 
(Frage 11 bei den Bezirken etwas ausführlicher behandeln) 
 
12. Wie geht die Regierung Berlins mit dem Druck um, die Lebensqualität zu erhöhen, 
global wirtschaftlich mithalten zu können und gleichzeitig mit einem eingeschränkten Bud-
get eine sozialverträgliche Wohnungspolitik zu erbringen? Oder etwas provokative gefragt: 
Könnte die Regierung überhaupt anders handeln? 
 
 
Abschluss 
 
14. Gibt es noch etwas, das Sie gerne ansprechen würden, was bisher nicht diskutiert wurde? 
  
15. Kennen Sie Dokumente zu diesem Projekt, auf die Sie mich hinweisen können? Leute 
mit denen ich noch sprechen sollte? 
 
Noch einmal vielen Dank für dieses Gespräch. 
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Appendix 3 Conference List 
 
 
Organisation Conference Date Location 
Leibniz Gemeinschaft 
und Technische Univer-
sität 
Leeres Land und bunte Stadt? 
Räumliche Differenzierung im 
Zeichen des demographischen 
Wandels 
07. -
08.05.2009 
Vertretung Nordrhein-
Westfahlen, Berlin 
Bündnis 90/Die Grünen 
Bundestagsfraktion 
Gespaltene Städte? Segregation 
in der Stadt 
15.06.2009 
Vertretung Hamburg, 
Berlin 
vhw 
Public Value durch Urban Go-
vernance 
23.06.2009 
Wissenschaftszentrum 
Berlin 
Deutsche Wohnen AG 
Kooperation schafft Innovation. 
Neue Partnerkultur in der Woh-
nungswirtschaft 
02.07.2009 
Radialsystem V,  
Berlin 
Senatsverwaltung für 
Stadtentwicklung Berlin 
Stadtumbau in Großsiedlungen 08.07.2009 
Märkisches Viertel, 
Berlin 
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Appendix 4 Document List 
 
 
1 Government documents 
 
1.1 Parliamentarian Discussions on the Provision of Housing (January 2004 - July 2009) 
(Searched with the following keywords: landeseigene Wohnungsbaugesellschaften, städtische 
Wohnungsbaugesellschaften, GSW, GEHAG, GEWOBAG, DEGEWO on 
http://www.parlament-berlin.de:8080/starweb/AHAB/ (last accessed 17.07.2011)) 
Abgeordnetenhaus Berlin (2004). Durch Kooperationsvertrag ins nächste finanzielle Desaster?, 
Drucksache 15/11217, 17.02.2004. 
Abgeordnetenhaus Berlin (2004). Verkauf der Wohnungsbaugesellschaft GSW, Drucksache 
15/11520, 06.05.2004. 
Abgeordnetenhaus Berlin (2004). Wie wertvoll ist die GSW?, Drucksache 15/20352, 16.05.2004. 
Abgeordnetenhaus Berlin (2004). Wohnungsverkauf durch städtische Wohnungsbaugesellschaf-
ten 2001 bis 2003, Drucksache 15/11543, 21.05.2004. 
Abgeordnetenhaus Berlin (2004). Dringliche Beschlussempfehlung Nr.5/2004 des Verzeichnisses 
über Vermögensgeschäfte, Drucksache 15/2968, 17.06.2004. 
Abgeordnetenhaus Berlin (2005). Entwicklung nach dem Verkauf der GSW and das Konsortium 
C./W., Drucksache 15/13002, 05.01.2006. 
Abgeordnetenhaus Berlin (2006). Liquiditätsverkäufe der Wohnungsbaugesellschaften ohne 
Mieterschutz?, Drucksache 15/20656, 30.01.2006. 
Abgeordnetenhaus Berlin (2006). Aktuelle Stunde. Öffentlichen Wohnungsbestand des Landes 
Berlin durch ein tragfähiges Gesamtkonzept dauerhaft sichern. Plenarprotokoll 15/81, 
16.02.2006. 
Abgeordnetenhaus Berlin (2006). Wohnungsverkauf durch städtische Wohnungsbaugesellschaf-
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Appendix 5.1: Reorganisation of Housing Provision 
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Appendix 5.2: Regulation 
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Appendix 5.3: Institutional Investors 
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Appendix 5.4: State-owned Housing Companies 
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